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Just as the world was watching the peaceful efforts and attempts taking place
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia between the delegations of Kuwait and Iraq under the
auspices of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to resolve and settle the so-called Iraqi claims
against Kuwait concerning some oil and border disputes and the sudden withdrawal of
Iraqi negotiators during the late hours of August 1, 1990, the Kuwaiti people and the
whole world were astounded and shocked by the unexpected savagery invasion and
occupation of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces claimed to be brethren of the Kuwaiti
poople!! This most heinous crime took place on August 2, 1990 which corresponded
to the Eleventh of Al-Mohciram Al-Haraam, one of the most sacred months of Islam
during which all types of fightings are prohibited under Islamic Law except in true
self-defense. No Kuwaiti person could ever forget this sad and unforgettable event in
the history of Kuwait, the Gulf Region, and the whole world.
With the unfolding of those dreadful events of the Iraqi invasion and
occupation of Kuwait with all the atrocities accompanying the invasion and
occupation, we as an elected member of the National Council, the Kuwaiti
Parliament, and the head of the Legislative and Legal Committee of the said Council,
together with other members of the Council, tried to lead and invigorate the Kuwaiti
national struggle against the occupying forces of Iraq. But soon our colleagues and I
realized that we were sought by the Iraqi authorities and that all services in Kuwait
including health services became at their worst level; universities, schools, and all
other educational institutions stopped operating. Pollution reached its highest levels
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and Kuwait became nothing but a dim State, a ghost town. Some had no choice but to
leave Kuwait until the Iraqi forces were compelled to withdraw.
The world stood with us, the Kuwaiti people, and so did our western friends,
Arab and Muslim countries and organizations, and the coalition forces until Kuwait
was liberated. Soon after Kuwait was liberated we and others returned home to find
the worst destruction and devastation that could have never been expected or
imagined. Hundreds of oil-wells were set ablaze by the Iraqi forces before their
compelled withdrawal, tens of thousands of oil barrels were left inundating the Gulf
waters and thousands more flooding the territory of the State of Kuwait and
constituting huge oil lakes. The sky of the whole of Kuwait was burning and became
very dark. Acid rain and smoke were everywhere. Even mines and traps were
planted all over the country. The Kuwait we knew and loved was no more; only
destruction and devastation were everywhere. Pollution and contamination were the
utmost concern of all peoples of the world for fear of the global effects on all mankind
and life on earth.
In almost all recent armed conflicts the environment has suffered, in one way
or another, considerable damage or injury, some conflicts have witnessed great
environmental destruction or devastation. Even more important is the use of the
environment and its various component as a weapon of war and devastation. The
Vietnamese war, the second Gulf Armed Conflict, the wars and armed conflicts in
former Yugoslavia have been, so far, the uttermost outrageous examples of conflicts
which witnessed widespread and severe destruction of the environment and the use of
the environment and its components as weapons of war. The widespread
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environmental damage which took place in Vietnam did indeed have its impacts on
the development and codification of many new and additional rules of armed
conflicts, mainly the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions and the
Enmod Convention as will be seen in relevant parts of the research. Whether these
and other developments in the area of international humanitarian law and the law of
armed conflicts were adequate to provide effective protection to the environment and
its various components in armed conflict situations were not seriously tested until the
outbreak of hostilities in the second Gulf War and the widespread and severe
environmental destruction and devastation caused by that war. The challenges facing
international law rules in this area were so serious and great to the extent that many
have expressed the view that such rules were not capable of adequately protecting the
environment in armed conflict situations and that new rules were needed.
In fact, the international community faced the challenges posed by the second
GulfWar and dealt with it through collective security measures under chapter seven
of the UN Charter. Even environmental damage and destruction and the
responsibility of Iraq in this connection were among the issues dealt with by the
Security Council under chapter seven. The U.N. Compensation Commission was
established to deal with claims against Iraq including claims for environmental loss,
damage or injury as a result of the Iraqi illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
All such developments reshaped the rules of international law concerning the
international responsibility for environmental damage and destruction as a result of
armed conflicts.
What are those rules? Are they adequate? Do we need new rules to protect the
environment in times of war or armed conflict situations? Do we need a permanent
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machinery in existence to protect the environment during those dreadful times and to
decide matters of international responsibility and compensation for environmental
damage as a result of armed conflict? Or should ad hoc committees be adequate
enough to deal with such matters? What about the rules of international criminal
responsibility regarding environmental damage? How can such rules be employed
and implemented?
All such issues are indeed involved and must be dealt with if an adequate
examination of the subject-matter of international responsibility for environmental
damage as a result of armed conflicts is to take place.
The reasons for selecting this topic to be my doctoral dissertation are not in
fact all personal; but some of them are. When a person suffers what we in Kuwait
suffered as a result of the illegal invasion and occupation of our home-country by the
Iraqis and when a people suffers from the serious and atrocious destruction and
devastation of our property and environment and the loss of life and health ofmany of
our beloved brethren and sisters, this would be an enough reason for anyone to select
this topic or a very closely related one to examine and study. But non-personal
reasons had the greatest effects which made me decide to research this topic. Chief
among those reasons are the unclarity, uncertainty, incohesiveness, inconsistency and
inconclusiveness of the relevant rules and the problems of enforceability of such
rules, all which appear polemical on all levels.
The objects and purposes of this research is to attempt to clarify the relevant
rules of law and deal with any inconsistency which may appear and make a
comprehensive showing and illustration of the body of rules and principles of law
insofar as their applicability to the cases and situations of war environmental damage
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and the international responsibility for such damage. In addition whether such rules
and principles are adequate and whether they are enforceable or are capable of being
uniformly enforced are all to be examined and commented on with the aim of
providing our recommendations related thereto.
But we must emphasize that we aim to protect the environment and its
components broadly defined and connected with human beings or humanity as a
whole and not just the natural environment includes all what surrounds man and all
what might have any impact on him, or on human life, health, welfare and human
culture and thought. This is a reflection of the consensus reached at the Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment.
For all those reasons the writer selected to study "International Responsibility
for Environment Damage as a result of Armed Conflicts: With Special Reference to
Kuwait" as a doctoral dissertation. The study will be divided into several chapters as
follows :
Introduction:
Chapter One: Protection of the Environment in International Law: during
The Armed Conflicts.
Chapter Two:The Security Council and the Environment.
Chapter Three:The U.N. Compensation Commission and the Environment.
Chapter FourTnternational Crimes Against the Environment.
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General Conclusions and Recommendations.
I hope that this work will help clarify existing rules and shed some light on the
new and necessary rules yet to be developed.
CHAPTER ONE
The Protection of the Environment
In International Law during the Armed Conflicts
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Chapter One
The Protection of the Environment
In International Law
This introductory chapter is necessary to introduce the subject matter of this
dissertation on "International Responsibility for Environmental Damage as a Result of
Armed Conflicts with Special Reference to Kuwait". Some generalities and
introductory notes are due before embarking on the bulk of the research. It is
important to note that in the past several decades immense efforts have taken place to
emphasize the delicate balance on earth and its environment and that environmental
concerns have arisen in all parts of the world. The international character of the
problems of the environment, the global environmental interdependence, the
obligation of all States to protect and not damage or harm the environment, and their
responsibility to adopt all necessary policies, standards and measures to prevent,
combat and reduce pollution are all emphasized as expressive of the general
international law now binding upon all states. The general obligation to protect and
not harm the environment has been so firmly established in international law that any
violation of which is certain to provoke the international responsibility of the State
committing the violation.
The international obligation of states to protect and not harm the environment
is the essence of the international responsibility of states for environmental damage or
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harm; such responsibility cannot exist without the existence of the said obligation.
The generality, firmness, preciseness, and clarity of the obligation do constitute the
essential foundations upon which the international environment responsibility is built.
Some authority view that the field of the environment has been witnessing the
gradual rise of the strict or absolute liability and that any state which damages or
harms or causes damage or harm to the environment of other states or to areas beyond
its national jurisdiction is, in fact, violating its international obligation to protect and
not damage the environment and must be held liable under international law for that
violation. The injured state is entitled to full reparation upon the mere fact that its
environment has been harmed. Thus, there is no need to prove or establish the
wrongfulness of the state causing the environmental harm or damage. However, there
is a widely held view, to which we adhere, that the general rule in the field of the
environment is that states are liable only for breach of an obligation and that most of
the obligations impose only a duty to act diligently. Yet, there is a growing opinion
that strict liability is applicable to environmental harm caused by dangerous or
potentially dangerous activities, whereas fault liability is applicable to environmental
harm caused by non-dangerous activities. Thus, a state which suffers environmental
harm has to establish the wrongfulness of the state claimed to have caused that harm
in case of non-dangerous activities. All such views will be discussed in some detail in
this chapter. But it should be stressed that our study will focus on the international
responsibility and liability of states and not on the individual or civil liability of
private persons from such states. The state is a guarantor of the conduct of its
nationals and of persons under its jurisdiction or control, but the state's responsibility
is direct, "not vicarious".1 Our study of the topic emphasizes the developments of the
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states' obligation to protect and not harm the environment and the states'
environmental responsibility in customary international law and in treaty law in the
first two parts of this chapter. The third part deals with the definition of
environmental harm and compensable environmental damage. Issues of reparation
for environmental damage are dealt with in part four.
I
Customary International Law and the
Obligation of States not to Harm, Damage
Or Injure the Environment
The thesis which we stress is that a general rule that states are under the
obligation to protect and preserve the environment and that they bear the
responsibility not to cause any serious, considerable or noticeable harm, damage or
injury to the environment, particularly the environment of other states and areas
beyond national jurisdiction and not to harm, damage or injure such environment has
indeed developed as an established and rooted rule of customary international law.
State practice, as evidenced by judicial decisions, dispute-settlement resolutions,
consecutive resolutions and declarations of international organizations and
international conferences, and various treaties and agreements on the subject, supports




A number of cases which have been decided or settled by courts, international
arbitration, and other dispute-settlement mechanisms do affirm our notion that rooted
rules of customary international law bind all states not to cause harm, damage or
injury to the environment of other states and that states are legally liable for violations
of such rules.
The Corfur Channel is the important case in the contributing to the
development of the customary international law rules on the responsibility of states
not to harm, damage or injure other states' environment is the Corfu Channel Case
which contributed to the developments of customary international law on states'
international responsibility not to harm or damage other states' property and not to
cause any damage or loss of human life. This case involved the finding by the
International Court of Justice that Albania was liable for the consequences when
British warships hit mines in the Albanian waters of the Corfu Channel and that
"Albania is responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred...
and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them and that there is
a duty upon Albania to pay compensation to the United Kingdom."2 The I.C.J, based
its findings on the customary norm "every state's obligation not to allow knowingly
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states".3 The mere
presence of mines and the failure of Albania to warn the approaching vessels were
adequate to establish Albanian liability and there was no need to prove any
wrongfulness on the part of Albania.
In the Lac Lanoux arbitration between Spain and France the Arbitral Tribunal
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declared that Spain's claim to an infringement of rights might have been upheld if
Spain could have shown that the hydroelectric project proposed by France would
cause pollution or other actual damage.4 This case involved a claim by Spain to
prevent the construction by France of a hydroelectric project comprising a barrage to
divert 25 percent of the water of the Carol River and channel it through a
hydroelectric power plant. The diverted water was planned to be returned to the river
at a point to enable Spanish farmers to use it. The Tribunal found that France was
acting within her rights and that the proposed French works did not constitute an
infringement of the rights of Spain under treaties existing between Spain and France
or under general international law and that Spain did not prove that the construction of
the barrage would cause any damage or pollution in Spain, nor did Spain try to prove
or present any argument that such pollution or damage might result from the French
project.5 Had Spain proven that the proposed project might have caused pollution or
actual damage, Spain would have then been entitled to claim that her rights had been
impaired.6
The Nuclear Test cases (1974 and 1995) are relevant to the development and
illustration of the states' international obligation not to harm the environment and not
to cause any noticeable or considerable harm, damage or injury to other states'
environment or their property and other interests. France conducted a series of
atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific region from 1966 to 1972 and prepared
for a new series of tests which were to commence in May 1973. The French policy
concerning nuclear testing and the actual conduct of nuclear tests faced strong
oppositions from countries in the pacific area. These oppositions climaxed into legal
proceedings before the International Court of Justice instituted by Australia and New
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Zealand to stop those tests and other atmospheric nuclear tests in the pacific area.
Australia asserted that the tests would :
(a) violate its rights to be free from atmospheric nuclear weapon
tests by any country;
(b) allow the deposit of radioactive fall-out on its territory and
airspace without its consent;
(c) allow interference with ships and aircraft on the high seas and
in the superjacent airspace, and the pollution of the
high seas by radioactive fall-out, thereby infringing
the freedom of the high seas.7
As a result, Australia requested the International Court of Justice to declare
that the carrying out of further atmospheric nuclear weapon tests was contrary to
applicable rules of international law. Australia requested further that the Court order
France not to carry any further such tests.8
New Zealand claimed, on the other hand, that the French atmospheric nuclear
weapon tests violated the rights of all members of the international community to be
free from nuclear tests and any radioactive fallout resulting therefrom and violated the
right to be protected from "unjustified artificial radioactive contamination of the
terrestrial, maritime and aerial environment" 9 New Zealand, therefore, bases its
claims on an obligation erga omnes owed to the members of the international
community as a whole as well as on New Zealand's right to be free from any
radioactive fallout resulting from atmospheric nuclear testing and the right to be
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protected from unjustified artificial radioactive contamination of the terrestrial,
maritime and aerial environment resulting from such tests.
Both Australia and New Zealand requested the Court to impose interim
measures of protection requiring that France avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of
radioactive fallout on their territory, pending the I.C.J.'s judgement.11'
France did not appear in the case but in June 1973 the Court did issue its
decision indicating interim measures of protection asking France not to take any
action which might aggravate the dispute or prejudice the rights of Australia and New
Zealand in carrying out whatever decision the Court might render.11 Nevertheless, the
Court did not address the merits of the case as a result of a unilateral declaration by
the French Prime Minister that France would cease to carry out further atmospheric
tests in the Pacific region. In December 1974 the I.C.J, held that the French
declaration made it unnecessary for the case to proceed as the claims of Australia and
New Zealand were satisfied by the French declaration and no further object would be
achieved ; the Court was therefore not called upon to give a decision.12 But it must be
clear that the Court did recognize the rights of Australia and New Zealand to rely on
the French declaration and to expect that France would act accordingly and respect its
unilateral obligation.13 It is even more important to stress Australia's position that the
1963 Test Ban Treaty "embodied and crystallised an emergent rule of customary
international law" which prohibited atmospheric nuclear tests, a rule which might
have transformed into a rule ofjus cogens14 This position is important as France was
not, at that time, a party to the Test Ban Treaty and it could have not conventionally
been bound by the treaty rules on the subject.13 In addition, Australia stressed that:
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where, as a result of a normal and natural use by one state of its
territory, a deposit occurs of a territory of another, the latter has no
cause of complaint unless sit suffers more than merely nominal
harm or damage. The use by a state of its territory to the conduct
of atmospheric nuclear tests is not a normal or natural use of its
territory. The Australian government also contends that the
radioactive deposit from the French tests gives rise to more than
merely nominal harm or damage to Australia.16
It should be emphasized, however, that Australia and New Zealand did not ask
the I.C.J, to decide any matters concerning reparation or compensation. The Court did
not, therefore, find it necessary to proceed any further with the case as the French
declaration satisfied the claims of Australia and New Zealand.
A new phase of the case took place in 1995 following a French declaration dated
13 June 1995 according to which "France would conduct a final series of eight nuclear
weapons tests in the South Pacific starting in September 1995";17 on August 21, 1995,
the Government ofNew Zealand filed its "Request for an Examination of the Situation
in accordance with paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in
the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case"18 in which New Zealand indicated
that its request "ari[es] out of a proposed action announced by France which will, if
carried out, affect the basis of Judgement reneded by the Court on 20 December 1974
in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case"19 Paragraph 63 of the 1974
Judgement of the I.C.J, in the said case reads:
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Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a
commitment concerning its future conduct it is not the
Court" function to contemplate that it will not comply with
it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this
Judgement were to be affected, the applicant could request
an examination of the situation in accordance with the
provisions of the Statute; the denunciation by France, by
letter dated 2 January 1974, of the General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which is relied
on as a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, cannot
constitute by itself an obstacle to the prevention of such a
. 20
request.
Furthermore, New Zealand claimed in its request that :
Both by virtue of specific treaty undertakings (in the
Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and
Environment of the South Pacific Region of 25 November
1986 or "Noumea Convention") and customary international
law derived from widespread international practice. France
has an obligation to conduct an environmental impact
assessment before carrying out any further nuclear tests at
Mururoa and Fangataufa;21
New Zealand, moreover, asserted that:
France's conduct is illegal in that it causes, or is likely to cause,
the introduction into the marine environment of radioactive
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material, France being under an obligation, before carrying out its
new undergound nuclear tests, to provide evidence that they will
not result in the introduction of such material to the environment,
in accordance with the "precautionary principle" very widely
accepted in contemporary international law;22....
New Zealand asked the Court to adjudge and declare:
(One) that the conduct of the proposed nuclear tests will
constitute a violation of the rights under international law of
New Zealand, as well as of other States;
(Two) that it is unlawful for France to conduct such nuclear tests
before it has undertaken an Environmental Impact
Assessment according to accepted international standards.
Unless such an assessment establishes that the tests will not
give rise, directly or indirectly, to radioactive contamination
of the marine environment the rights under international law
of new Zealand, as well as the rights of other States, will be
violated. 23
New Zealand did, in addition, request the indication of the following provisional
measures as a matter of priority and urgency:
(1) that France refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests at
Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls;
(2) that France undertake an environmental impact assessment of the
proposed nuclear tests according to accepted international standards
and that, unless the assessment establishes that the tests will not give
18
rise to radioactive contamination of the marine environment, France
refrain from conducting the tests;
(3) that France and New Zealand ensure that no action of any kind is
taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to
the Court or prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of the
carrying out of whatever decisions the Court may give in this
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case.
Australia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, and the Federated States
of Micronesia filed applications for permission to intervene in the case and referred
both to the "Request for an Examination of the Situation" and to the "Further Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures" submitted by New Zealand.25 Those five
states associated themselves with the requests ofNew Zealand. New Zealand on the
other hand, based its requests on treaty law and on customary international law. From
these requests and from non-official aide memoires presented to the Court, exchanges
taking place in the public sittings held by the Court, written statements presented to
the Court, and other proceedings before the Court, it was clear that New Zealand
invoked and relied on customary international law of the environment and treaty law
to support its claims that France was in breach of its obligations towards New Zealand
and other states when it proposed to carry out a further series of underground nuclear
tests in the Pacific area.26
Accordingly, New Zealand asserted that under treaty law and customary
international law, (the introduction of radioactive material into the marine
environment was forbidden, and that, specifically, "any introduction of radioactive
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material into the marine environment as a result of nuclear tests" was forbidden).27
New Zealand did also maintain that the "precautionary principle" was indeed adopted
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as a rooted principle of international environmental law.
France claimed that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.29 The
Court dismissed requests made by New Zealand ("Request for an Examination of the
Situation," and "Further Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures") and it
further dismissed all applications for permission to intervene submitted by the other
five Pacific states concerned.30 The Court based its findings on the fact that all such
requests and application did not relate to any "further atmospheric nuclear tests" and
therefore, the basis of the 1974 Judgement in the Nuclear Test (New Zealand
V.France) Case was not affected.31 But the Court stressed in one of the important
passages of its Order that :
Whereas moreover the present Order is without prejudice to the
obligations of States to respect and protect the natural
environment, obligations to which both New Zealand and
France have in the present Instance reaffirmed their
commitment,32...
In this quoted passage the Court seems to recognize the very important rules and
principles of treaty and customary international law concerning the protection of the
natural environment to which New Zealand has referred, and which will be a subject
of further study in this chapter.
The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons33 is yet another important step in the
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clarification and illustration of the rooted principles of environmental protection and
the rooted obligations of all States to protect and not damage the environment. The
Court stressed, in its Advisory Opinion, the "obligations of States to respect and
protect the natural environment," and it considered that such obligations are
applicable not only in the context of nuclear testing but also in the context of "the
actual use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict".34 The Court went on to proclaim:
The Court thus finds that while the existing international law
relating to the protection and safeguarding of the environment
does not specifically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it
indicates important environmental factors that are properly to be
taken into account in the context of the implementation of the
principles and rules of the law applicable in armed conflict.3"
The Advisory Opinion will be subject to further detailed comments in chapter
two of this research dealing with the law of environmental responsibility in
relationship with armed conflicts. But what we stress here is the I.C.J.'s emphasis on
the international obligations of states to protect and safeguard the environment even
in times and situations of armed conflict, Further more, the Court stressed that :
the environment is not an abstraction but represents the
living space, the quality of life and the very health of
human beings, including generations unborn. The
existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national
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control is now part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment.,6
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary-v-Slovakia) Case decided by
I.C.J, on 25 September 1997, the Court had a good chance to address various issues of
environmental law and states obligations to protect and safeguard the environment and
37the responsibility of states for activities harming the environment of other states. In
our view, the most important passages dealing in general with environmental
protection and states'general and customary obligations in this regard in the judgement
of the Court are the following:
The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental
protection, vigilance and prevention are required on
account of the often irreversible character of damage to the
environment and of the limitations inherent in the very
mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other
reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this
was often done without consideration of the effects upon
the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a
growing awareness of the risks for mankind - for present
and future generations - of pursuit of such interventions at
an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and
standards have been developed, set forth in a great number
of instruments during the last wo decades. Such new
norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new
standards given proper weight, not only when States
contemplate new activities but also when continuing with
activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile
economic development with protection of the environment
is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable
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development."
The case dealt also with the validity and termination of treaties for
environmental necessity and issues of responsibility and reparation for
environmental damage, such issues will be dealt with in other places in
this chapter where there will be further comments on the judgement in this
case.
The last set of cases which dealt, among other things, with the protection of the
environment and the obligation of states to protect and safeguard the environment and
not damage such environment and its components are the Yugoslavia cases, the most
important of which is the Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia V.
United States of America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
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{1999): What concerns us here is the strong emphasis on the general obligations of
states not to damage the environment which was stressed in the application by the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia instituting proceedings before the LC.J. against the
United States for violation of the obligation not to use force, and in the request for the
indication of provisional measures.40 The Court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.41
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The importance of the above-mentioned cases and other cases to be discussed or
referred to throughout the research is their contribution to the establishment,
development and continued evolution and progress of the international environmental
law and of the general obligations of all states to protect, safeguard and not harm the
environment, particularly the environment of other states and of areas beyond national
jurisdiction. As has been seen, general principles such as the precautionary principle
and the preventive principle have been referred to as customary and rooted principles
of general international. But, it is useful to follow the development in the declarations
and resolutions of international organizations and conferences42.
Declaration and Resolutions of Intenational
Organizations and Conferences:
In the past several decades immense efforts have taken place to emphasize the
delicate balance on earth and its environment, environmental concerns have arisen in
all parts of the world. The international character of the problems of the environment
and its interdependence and the responsibility of all states to adopt all necessary
policies, standards and measures to ensure the adequate and effective protection,
preservation and the enhancement of the environment and adopt all necessary policies,
standards and measures to prevent and reduce pollution and prevent any loss, damage
or harm to the environment have been repeatedly emphasized on all levels. Among
the most important international efforts in this regard is the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment which was held in Stockholm from June 5 to June 16,
1972. This Conference achieved consensus on a declaration of principles and adopted
a set of recommendations.43 The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, sometimes referred to as the Stockholm Declaration, contains a
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preamble and a set of principles which are widely held to be reflective of general
international law.44
The second paragraph of the preamble of the Stockholm declaration reads:
The protection and improvement of the human environment
is a major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and
economic development throughout the world, it is the
urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the
duty of all Governments.4"
Commentators suggest that this part of the preamble proclaims a legal
obligation which lies on all governments the content of which is to protect and
preserve the human environment and to prevent any damage or harm to the
environment from occurring. The paragraph was praphrased to read: "The protection
and improvement of the environment is the duty of all governments."46
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration states in part:
Man has the fundamentasl right to freedom, equality and
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality
that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a
solemn responsibility to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations.47
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This part of Principle 1 balances between man's right to freddom, equality and
adequate conditions of life and his responsibility to protect and improve the human
environment for present and future generations. Thus, the Stockholm declaratrion
proclaims a legal obligation to protect and improve and not damage or harm the
environment. This obligation lies on governments as well as individuals.
Principle 7 of the Declaration is important and imposes an obligation reflective of
customary and treaty international law, it reads :
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of
the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to
human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to
damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses
of the sea.48
The principle thus imposes an obligation on states to "take all possible steps'To
prevent pollution of the sea. This principle is not limited to pollution which might inflict
serious or irreversible damage upon ecosystems but it covers pollution caused by
substance that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and
marine life, to damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea. Any
such pollution affects the interest of other states and not just the state causing pollution.
The content of this principle is similar to the content of relevant provisions in treaties
dealing with the law of the sea,49 and is a reflection of the customary obligation of all
states to exercise due diligence to prevent pollution of the seas as states are under an
obligation to "take all possible steps" to prevent pollution of the sea. It is indeed clear
from the wording of the principle that the obligation of every state is dependent upon and
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hinges on the ability (financial, economic, scientific, technological, technical, ...etc) of
the state concerned. As such the principle does not contain absolute obligations nor does
it relate to any absolute liability or responsibility.50
Closely connected with this and evern more important is Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development. 51 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration reads:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas
• • • .... 59
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
This Principle balances between the sovereign right of every state to exploit its
own resources pursuant to its environmental policies and its responsibility to ensure that
activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
The United States interpreted this principle asserting that :
[Njothing contained in this principle, elsewhere in the
Declaration, dminishes in any way the obligation of States to
prevent environmental damage or give rise to any right on
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the part of States to take actions in derogation of the rights of
other States or of the community of nations. The statement
on the responsibility of States for damage caused to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction is not in any way a limitation on the
above obligation, but an affirmation of existing rules
concerning liability in the event of default on the
obligation.55
The Principle did in fact reflect existing and firm rules of international law
concerning the sovereign right of every state to exploit its natural resources and its
responsibility to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause any
damage to the environment of any other state or to areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the rule of responsibility applies to damage caused to the
environment of any other State and it equally applies to damage caused to the
environment of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The rule of
responsibility applies, furthermore, to state activities and it equally applies to activities
of individuals, corporations, and other juridical persons acting or exercising such
activities either within the jurisdiction or under the control of the state."56
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration reads :
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and developmental policies, and the
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responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or to areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.57
As has been pointed out in connection with Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration, Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration balances between the sovereign right of
every state to exploit its own resources pursuant to its own environmental and
developmental policies and its responsibility to ensure that activities within its
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of any other State or to
areas beyond national jurisdiction. It should be noted that the only variation between the
wording of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration is that Principle 21 used the the phrase "pursuant to their own
environmental policies" while Principle 2 used the phrase" pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies; the words "and developmental" which were
included in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration do not limt in any ways the responsibility
of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause any
damage to the environment of other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction. The
comments stated in connection with Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration remain
true and valid with regard to Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. It has been asserted that
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration corresponding to Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration is the cornerstone of international environmental law.58 The drafting history
of the Stockholm Declaration proves that this Principle obtained the approval of all
states.59 The practice of states prior to the adoption of the Principle in 1972 and
afterwards proves that this Principle is indeed a rooted principle of customary
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international law.60 It is indeed an application of the most basic and general principle of
customary international law that states shall not cause damage or injury to other states,
nor shall they permit their territories or areas under their jurisdiction or control to be
used in such a way as to cause damage or injury to other states or their territories,
sovereignties, or soverign rights or interests.61
The problem however is with the definition of certain terms such as environmental
damage or injury, prohibited environmental damage, and compensable environmental
damage. Such issues will be discussed under a separate part of this chapter. But it
should be noted also that the wording of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and
that of Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration did not specify the standard of care applicable
to state's national jurisdiction or control; the issue to be addressed is whether Principle
21 and 2 require a due diligence obligation or an obligation of result, that is whether
states are absolutely responsible not to cause pollution or environmental damage and are
absolutely liable for the injury or damage that occurs without having to prove their fault
or wrongfulness, or that their obligation not to damage the environment covers only a
due diligence obligation and that they may not be liable for environmental damage
unless their fault or wrongfulness is established. Principles 21 and 2 could be interpreted
to support either of the two positions and the issue will be dealt with under another
separate part in this chapter.
Closely connected with Principles 21 and 2 are Principle 22 of the Stockholm
Declaration and Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration.62 Both principles 22 and 13
recognised the present state of international law on the subject of liability and
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage but
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demanded that further developments be achieved. Principle 22 of the Stockholm
Declaration states:
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities
within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas
beyond their jurisdiction.63
This Principle builds upon Principle 21 and is very much connected with it.
Although Principle 22 contains an obligation imposed upon states to cooperate to develop
further international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution
and other environmental damage, it recognized the existing international law rules on the
subject when it used the word ''further".64 It should also be noted that Principle 22
includes not just an obligation to cooperate regarding procedural matters or duties or
standards such as exchange of information, notification, or consultation, but it covers all
kinds of rules and principles which could be developed to cover and deal effectively with
liability and compensation for pollution and environmental damage. This is a kind of
recognition that pollution and environmental damage have to be controlled and that states
causing such pollution or enviornmental damage are bound to accept liability and pay
compensation for the victims. This, of course, covers pollution and environmental damage
whether caused during peace-time or times of armed-conflicts. 65
On the other hand, Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration reads:
31
States shall develop national law regarding liability and
compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further
international law regarding liability and compensation for
adverse effects or environmental damage caused by
activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond
their jurisdiction.66
Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration is a development of Principle 22 of the
Stockholm Declaration. Principle 13 includes certain additions which are considered as
adding new obligations upon states and strengthening and enhancing the existing ones.
First, Principle 13 imposed a new obligation upon states to "develop national law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental
damage." Although this obligation appears as a new addition in Principle 13 and not
included in Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, it was in fact a reflection of the
developments in the national laws of many states in the world each of which has enacted
at least one or two laws on the matter dealing with pollution and environmental damage.
Secondly, Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration is wider in scope than Principle 22 of
the Stockholm Declaration insofar as international law is concerned. Principle 22 covers
only the obligation of states to "co-operate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims ofpollution and other environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas
beyond their jurisdiction".67 [Emphasis added]. But principle 13 covers the obligation of
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states to "cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further
international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of
environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas
beyond their jurisdiction".68 Thus the words ((for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage)) included in Principle 22 were replaced by the words "for adverse
effects of environmental damage" as included in Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration.
Accordingly, environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or
control of any state to areas beyond its jurisdiction whether areas belonging to any other
state or areas beyond the jurisdiction of all states is compensable and the state causing it
must be held liable and pay such compensation as required by the relevant rules of
international law.
Furthermore, just as recognized by Principle 22, new Principle 13 recognizes the
existing rules of intenational law concerning liability and compensation for adverse
effects of any environmental damage; but Principle 13 imposes a stronger obligation
upon all states to cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop
further internaitonal law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of
environmental damage.
Thus, Principles 2 and 13 of the Rio Declaration dealt in a comprehensive and more
determined manner with trans-frontier and international pollution and transfrontier and
international effects of any activity causing environmental damage, the two principles
recognize the rules of international law concerning liability and compensation for such
environmental damage. In our view, Principle 2 of these two provides a basis for
holding a state responsible for failure to protect the environment from damage where as
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Principle 13 requires states to develop the law, and gives some indications of the basis of
further development.
Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration is also relevant with regard to transfrontier
pollution and transboundary environmental effects of any activity. Providing prior and
timely notification and relevant information and consultation are considered as procedural
duties of states which must be respected and observed in good faith in any case in which
any activity may have a signsificant adverse transboundary environmental effect.69
Of particular importance is Principle 24 of the same Declaration which is directly
connected with sthe subject matter of this research. This principle reads:
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable
development. States shall therefore respect international law
providing protection for the environment in time of armed
conflict and cooperate in its further development, as
necessary.70
This Principle recognizes the very strong obligation imposed upon all states to fully
respect and observe the rules of international law providing protection for the environment
in time of armed conflict. It also requires states to cooperate to develop further
international law on the subject.
In sum, the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration have included a general
and overriding obligation upon all states to protect and preserve the environment in all its
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aspects in peace times and in times of armed conflicts, and not to cause environmental
damage or injury. The two declarations have recognized and affirmed the rules of
international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental
damage and the responsibility of states causing such damage. The two declarations do
represent and reflect the customary rules of isnternational law as developed over the years
as evidenced by the consesus of the international community, and have influenced the
developments of treaty law and the resolution of environmental disputes and problems as
will be seen later in the coming part, but it must be stated that the practice of states prior to
and after Stockholm supports sthe existence of the customary obligation that states are
bound to respect and not violate the sovereignty, sovereign rights and the integrity and
inviolability of the territory of other states including their environment and environmental
rights. We did not find any person who claimed that such an obligation did not exist.71
n
Treaty Law and the General Obligation
not to Cause Damage to the Environment
There are many international treaties which contain a general obligation
imposed upon states to protect and preserve and not to cause damage or injury to the
environment. Examples of such treaties which are of particular importance to the
subject-matter of this research are the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
Kuwait Regional Convention. These two conventions and a number of other
important conventions or treaties will be examined or referred to below:
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The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention:
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concluded in 1982 and
entered into force in 1994 dealt comprehensively with the marine environment and
marine pollution.72 The Convention includes plenty of provisions dealing with various
aspects of the marine environment and marine pollution but part XII of the
Convention was reserved for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. The very first article in that part article 192, proclaimed the general
obligation that: "States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment." Article 193 is based on and reflects Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment. Article 193 reads:
States have the sovereign right to exploit their
natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies
and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve
the marine environment.
This article balances between the sovereign right of each state to exploit its
natural resources and its duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.
Paragraph I of article 194 obligates all states to take "all measures... necessary to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source "
Moreover, paragraph 2 of the same article declares:
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that
activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to
cause damage by pollution to other states and their environment, and
that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction
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or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise
sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.
This paragraph is also based on and is considered a reflection of Principle 21
of the Stockholm Declaration previously referred to.73 Thus article 193 and paragraph
2 of article 194 of the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention prove that Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration have been transformed
into conventional or treaty rules of law insofar as the marine environment is
concerned. Thus rules dealing with transfrontier or transboundary pollution and
environmental effects and the rules of international responsibility for such pollution
and environmental effects are firmly established in both customary and conventional
international law.
The third paragraph of article 194 of the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention
stipulates: "The measures taken pursuant to this Part (Part XII of the Convention)
shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine environment..."
Furthermore, article 235 of the Convention stresses that:
1. States are responsible for the fulfilment of their
international obligations concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment. They shall be
liable in accordance with international law.
2. States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance
with their legal systems for prompt and adequate
compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused
by pollution of the marine environment by natural or
juridical persons under their jurisdiction.
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3. With the objective of assuring prompt and adequate
compensation in respect of all damage caused by pollution
of the marine environment, States shall co-operate in the
implementation of existing international law and the
further development of international law relating to
responsibility and liability for the assessment of and
compensation for damage and the settlement of related
disputes, as well as, where appropriate, development of
criteria and procedures for payment of adequate
compensation, or compensation funds.
Thus, article 235 of the Law of the Sea Convention expressly recognizes the
international responsibility of each and every state to fulfill its international obligation
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment and its liability
under international law regarding any violation of that obligation. In addition, the
same article obliges every state to provide national means for prompt and adequate
compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine
environment by any natural or juridical person under its jurisdiction. States are also
required to cooperate in the further development of international law relating to
responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for damage and the
settlement of related disputes. Furthermore, states are under an international
obligation to cooperate in the further development of international law regarding
responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for damage and the
settlement of related disputes. Moreover, states are under a further international
obligation to develop "criteria and procedures for payment of adequate compensation,
such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds." All such obligations are not
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new but they are reflective of the developments of customary and conventional
international law rules. In fact such rules as stated in the Law of the Sea Convention
are widely accepted as reflective of customary international law binding upon all
states.74
The Space Liability Convention:
The Space Liability Convention or the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damage caused by space Objects7" is one of very few multilateral treaties which
included clear provisions imposing absolute obligations and establishing the absolute
liability of states for violating such obligations, the Space Liability Convention
stipulated that a state which launches a space object is absolutely liable to pay
compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight."76 Not every type of damage is covered by this obligation the
Convention defined damage as "loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of
health; or loss of or damage to property of states or of persons, natural or judicial, or
property of international intergovernmental organisations."77 Although this definition
seems to be very limited and covers only some types of serious damage which do not
include environmental damage or harm, the fact is the opposite. The words that are
used in the definition are very broad and can be interpreted to cover almost every type
of damage including environmental damage or damage to the environment which is a
"property of states"; as has been pointed out by some, the term "property of states"
covers "environmental assets or other natural resources".78
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The Space Liability Convention has, in addition, provided for due diligence
responsibility or fault liability for damage other than on the surface of the earth to
79another space object or persons or property on board.
The Convention was tested only once when Canada presented in 1979 to the
former USSR a claim for damage caused by the crash of the Soviet Cosmos 954
which disintegrated over Canada, this claim was finally settled by a 1981 agreement
between the two parties according to which the USSR agreed to pay to Canada the
sum of three million U.S. dollars in full and final compensation which was accepted
by Canada as a final settlement of the matter.80
The Basel Protocol:
The 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting
from the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal81 has
been adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on Hazardous
Wastes82 to provide for a comprehensive regime for liability as well as adequate and
prompt compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes and other wastes including incidents occurring because of illegal
traffic in those wastes. As stated in Article 1 of the Protocol:
The objective of the Protocol is to provide for a
comprehensive regime for liability and for adequate and
prompt compensation for damage resulting from the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes
and their disposal including illegal traffic in those wastes.
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The area of the application of this Protocol is specified in paragraph 1 of
article 3 which reads:
The Protocol shall apply to damage due to an incident
occurring during a transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes and other wastes and their disposal, including illegal
traffic from the point where the wastes are loaded on the means
of transport in an area under the national jurisdiction of a State
of export. Any Contracting Party may by way of notification to
the Depositary exclude the application of the Protocol in respect
of all transboundary movements for which it is the State of
export, for such incidents which occur in an area under its
national jurisdiction, as regards damage in its area of national
jurisdiction. The Secretariat shall inform all Contracting parties
of notifications received in accordance with this Article.
Thus damage occurring in any area during a transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes and other wastes and their disposal including illegal traffic is
covered by the protocol and is considered compensable damage unless an export state
elects not to apply the Protocol to . damage occurring in an area under its jurisdiction
provided that such state so notifies the Depositary.
The Protocol has created a two-scheme responsibility, first, strict liability
under article 4 and, second, fault based liability under article 5 which adopts the
general rules of fault liability under international law83
The Kuwait Convention:
Most relevant to this research is the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co¬
operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution and the
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accompanying protocol of 1978 and other related instruments.84 This Convention
defines marine pollution as follows:
Marine pollution means the introduction by man, directly or
indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment
resulting or likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to
living resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine
activities including fishing, impairment of quality for use of sea-
• • 85
water and reduction of amenities'.
The Kuwait Convention imposes upon all states parties to it a general
obligation to, individually and/or jointly, take all appropriate measures to prevent,
86abate and combat pollution of the marine environment in the Sea Area of the Gulf.
In addition, these states are under another general obligation to "co-operate in the
formulation and adoption of other protocols prescribing agreed measures procedures
and standards for the implementation of the (Kuwait) Convention.87 Furthermore, the
Contracting States are under a third general obligation to establish national standards,
laws and regulations as required for the effective discharge of the general obligation
to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the marine environment in the Sea Area of
the Gulf and to endeavour to harmonize their national policies in this regard.88 A
fourth general obligation imposed upon the Contracting States is that such States
"shall cooperate wwith the competent international, regional and sub-regional
organizations to establish and adopt regional standards, recommended practices and
procedures to prevent, abate and combat pollution from all sources and to assist each
other in fulfilling their obligations under the present Convention."89 A fifth general
obligation is that all Contracting States "shall use their best endeavour to ensure that
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the implementation of the present Convention shall not cause transformation of one
type of pollution to another which could be more detrimental to the environment ."90
Pollution from ships whether caused by intentional or accidental discharges is
prohibited under article IV of the Kuwaiti Convention,91 while pollution caused by
dumping from ships and aircraft are prohibited under article V.92 Article VI prohibits
pollution from land-based sources,93 article VII prohibits pollution resulting from
exploitation of the territorial sea and its subsoil and the continental shelf,94 and,
finally, article VIII prohibits pollution from other human activities.9" The Kuwaiti
Convention has, in addition, dealt with the important matter of liability and
compensation', article XIII states:
The Contracting States undertake to co-operate in the
formulation and adoption of appropriate rules and
procedures for the determination of:
(a) Civil liability and compensation for damage resulting
from pollution of the marine environment, bearing in
mind applicable international rules and procedures
relating to those matters"; and
(b) Liability and compensation for damage resulting
from violation of obligations under the present
Convention and its protocols
To implement these provisions of article XIII the Council of the Regional
Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment established under the
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Kuwait Convention adopted the 1981 Statute of the Judicial Commission for the
Settlement of Disputes.96 This Commission was given the jurisdiction to settle the
disputes between the Contracting States inter alia concerning:
(I) the interpretation or application of the Convention or any of its
protocols;
(ii) the General Obligations provided for under Article 111 of the
Convention;
(iii) the fulfilment of the obligations provided for under the Action
plan;
(iv) the measures provided for protection of marine
environment and combating pollution in the Convention
and its Protocol.97
In addition the Commission was empowered to settle disputes relating to the
determination of civil liability and compensation for damage resulting from pollution
of the marine environment."98
The decisions of the Commission are final and binding;99 such decisions are
enforceable in the contracting states through their respective executing agencies.100
Moreover, the Commission has an advisory jurisdiction under article 23 of its
Statute which reads:
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1. The Commission shall have jurisdiction to give an advisory
opinion in all legal questions at the request of the Council
concerning:
(i) the interpretation of a treaty on the protection of the
marine environment from pollution;
(ii) application of rules of International Law relating to
prevention, abatement and combating of marine
pollution
(iii) the existence and extent of liability of any fact which
if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation concerning the protection of
marine environment;
(iv) the interpretation of rules and procedures of the Organization;
(v) any other matter referred to it by the Council.
2. Advisory Opinion has no binding force and does not constitute res
judicata, but it is expected to be treated with respect and as
authoritative statement of the Law.
Thus, disputes between the contracting states concerning the interpretation or
application of the Kuwait Regional Convention or any of its protocols, disputes
between the contracting states concerning the general obligations provided for under
article III of the Convention which were referred to earlier in this text,101 disputes
between the contracting states concerning the fulfilment of the obligations provided
for under the Action plan referred to in article 1(e) of the Convention, and disputes
between the contracting states concerning the measures provided for the protection of
the marine environment and combating pollution in the Convention and its Protocols'
Area are all within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Commission. In addition, disputes
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relating to the determination of civil liability and compensation for damage resulting
from pollution of the marine environment come within the jurisdiction of the
Commission. But the Statute of the Commission did not specify the requirements or
the conditions according to which it is to exercise its jurisdiction concerning civil
liability and compensation cases; nor did the Statute provide for any requirements
concerning the parties to any such disputes.
The Commission shall apply the principles of Islamic Law and International
Law and, in particular, it shall apply the Kuwait Regional Convention, international
conventional law and international rules relating to the preservation and protection of
the marine environment or the rule of international environmental law, and the
general principles which are common in the laws of the Contracting States;102 the
Commission also has the power to decide the case ex aequa et bono upon the
agreement of the parties.103
It should be emphasized, however, that the Judicial Commission has so far not
been constituted owing to the fact that Iraq has waged two wars of aggression against
Iran and Kuwait which made it impossible for the Contracting States to nominate their
nominees to be approved by the Council. Had it not been for the Iraqi wars of
aggression, the Judicial Commission would have been constituted and could have
been effective in exercising its functions and the environment could have been better
protected.104
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The Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by
Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Case of Emergency accompanying the Kuwait
Convention has also been incorporated into the Kuwaiti internal legal system and has
become internally binding upon all authorities.105 This Protocol has defined the term
" marine emergency" as follows:
"Marine Emergency" means any casualty, incident,
occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in substantial
pollution or imminent threat of substantial pollution to the
marine environment by oil or other harmful substances and
includes, inter alia, collisions, strandings and other incidents
involving ships, including tankers, blow-outs arising from
petroleum drilling and production activities, and the presence of
oil or other harmful substances arising from the failure of
industrial installations,106
It is argued that this definition covers every type of casualty, incident,
occurrence or imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine environment by
oil or other harmful substances whether the casualty, incident, occurrence or situation
takes place during peace-time or times of armed-conflicts. The measures and other
provisions stipulated in the Protocol to deal with such marine emergencies are binding
upon all States parties to the Kuwait Convention and the Protocol, and have been
passed into the domestic laws of such States including Kuwait and Iraq.107 The
Contracting States parties to the Kuwait Convention wanted to strengthen the
Convention by giving more adequate treatment to land-based sources of the marine
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pollution. The State parties concluded the 1990 Protocol for the Protection of the
Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based Sources. This Protocol
redefined the term "Area" for its purposes to mean: "The area to which this Protocol
applies (hereinafter referred to as the "Protocol Area") shall be the Sea Area as
defined in Article II, paragraph (a) of the (Kuwait) Convention, together with the
waters on the landward side of the baselines from which the breath of the territorial
sea of the Contracting States is measured and extending, in the case of watercourses,
up to the freshwater limit and including intertidal zones and salt-water marshes
communicating with the sea." [Article II],
Paragraph 8 of article I of the Protocol defined "land-based sources" to mean
"municipal, industrial or agricultural sources, both fixed and mobile on land,
discharges form which reach the Marine Environment, as outlined in Article III of this
Protocol," Article III of the same Protocol reads:
This Protocol shall apply to discharges reaching the
Protocol Area from land-based sources within the
territories of the Contracting States,
In particular:
(a) from outfalls and pipelines discharging into the sea;
(b) through rivers, canals or other watercourses,
including underground resources;
(c) from fixed or mobile offshore facilities serving
purposes other than exploration and exploitation
48
of the sea bed,, its subsoil and the continental
shelf; and
(d) from any other land-based sources situated within
the territories of the Contracting States, whether
through water, through the atmosphere or directly
from the coast."
The Protocol consists of 16 articles and three annexes and aims at protecting the
marine environment from all land-based sources of pollution and filling the vacuum in
108the systems and regulations in various State parties.
Parties to the Kuwait Regional Convention have recently concluded a 1998
protocol concerning the Control of Sea Transboundary Transport of Dangerous and
Other Wastes and their Discharges which aimed at controlling, reducing, abating and
preventing the production, generation, and transport of such wastes. 109
From all the above stated treaties and from all other environmental and
pollution treaties and agreements one could easily conclude that such treaties have
participated in the development of customary international law rules, independent of
those treaties and representing state practice that states are under a general obligation
to protect and preserve the environment and control, reduce, prevent and combat
pollution of all types and all sources; that states bear the general responsibility not to
violate the said general obligation and not to cause damage or injury to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond their jurisdiction; and that states are
liable under international law for damage or injury they cause to the environment of
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other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction. In fact treaties, declarations and
resolutions referred to in this chapter and many more do constitute and reflect state
practice and the customary developments of international law on the subject.110
Ill
Compensable Environmental Damage
To some, damage under international law means something more than injury.
The mere violation by a state of any of its international obligations towards any other
state constitutes an injury to that other state; but damage is something more.111 But,
in general, most writers and judicial decisions make no difference between "injury"
and "damage;" thus, an international delict is defined, by some, as an internationally
wrongful act from which emerges a damage for another subject of international
law".112 Damage includes "all impairments suffered by the other State on it or its
citizens' rights so far as they are protected by international law". 113 The definition
covers both material damage and moral damage; if the reputation, dignity or honour
of a state is affected, a moral damage is involved. The mere flying over a state's
territory without its consent constitutes a moral damage which is sufficient to produce
an obligation to reparation. Every breach of international law constitutes, at least, a
moral damage or injury that produces an obligation to reparation.114 But if we focus
on the definition of environmental damage or injury, we find that various approaches
were followed and that treaties and state practice did not agree on any one definite
approach. Philippe Sands suggests:
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A narrow definition of environmental damage is
limited to damage to natural resources alone (air, water,
soil, fauna and flora, and their interaction); a more
extensive approach includes damage to natural
resources and property which forms part of the cultural
heritage; the most extensive definition includes
landscape and environmental amenity. On each
approach environmental damage does not include
damage to persons or damage to property, although
such damage can be consequential to environmental
damage. .. Loss of environmental amenity... could be
treated as environmental damage or damage to property,
depending on the definition of the latter. 115
Another writer, Julio Barbosa, adopts a similar view and suggests that
environmental damage is "damage done to the components of the environment, as
well as the loss or diminution of environmental values caused by the deterioration or
destruction of such components."116 He further suggests that "[m]ost aspects of
damage caused to persons or property as a consequence of the deterioration of the
environment are already covered in the existing notion of damage to persons or
property"117, and, therefore, damage caused to persons and property cannot be
included under the definition or concept of environmental damage as damage to
persons or property is damage to environmental components and values.118 The same
writer suggested that the term harm to the environment" should include:
(a) the cost of reasonable measures taken or to be taken to restore or
replace destroyed or damaged natural resources or, where
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reasonable, to introduce the equivalent of these resources into the
environment;
(b) the cost of preventive measures and any further damage caused
by such measures
(c) the compensation that may be granted by a judge in accordance
with the principles of equity and justice if the measures
indicated in subparagraph (i) were impossible, unreasonable or
insufficient to achieve a situation acceptably close to the status
quo ante. Such compensation should be used to improve the
environment of the effected region .119
This quoted proposal was introduced by the said writer to be included in a
report submitted to the International Law Commission for its consideration as the
writer being the Special Rapporteur for the topic of Liability for the Injurious
Consequences Arising Out ofActs Not Prohibited by International Law.120
However, we tend to consider that environmental damage does indeed include
damage to persons and damage to property if any such damage is caused by or as a
result of damage to environmental components or values broadly defined.
Other concepts were used and included under the title "environmental
damage" such as "pollution" and "adverse effects".121
Convention on Civil Liability for oil pollution damage, London, 27
November 1992 and Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 27 November 1992, with protocols
of 1992.
These two conventions were adopted by "IMO" in 1992 to replace earlier
treaties with the same title concluded at Brussels on 24 November 1969 and 18
52
December 1971 respectively. They are notable because they deal with liability for
ultra-hazardous activities by facilitating direct recourse against the polleuter, without
involving states. The liability convention creates a common scheme of civil liability
for oil pollution damage, including environmental damage, caused by oil tankers.
This scheme is based on the principle of strict but limited liability, channelled, in this
case, to shipowners. The fund convention provides for additional compensation
funded by industry, in this case primarily the cargo owners.
Both conventions were amended by protocols in 1984 which did not enter into force
and were replaced by further protocols in 1984 which did not enter into force and
were replaced by further protocols of amendment, adopted 27 November 1992.
The relationship between the 1992 conventions and earlier texts is referred to in
resolutions 1-5 of the final act of the conference on the revision of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention and the 1971 fund convention, IMO/LEG/CONE. 9/7/1992.
The 1992 Liability Cibvebtuib reqyures ten parties, including four states each with
not less than one million units of gross tanker tonnage, before it can enter into force.
The 1992 fund conventions requires eight parties with a liability to contribute in
respect of at least 450 million tons of oil before it can enter into force. Both
conventions: 6 parties 24 february 1995.12z
Convention on Civil Liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the
environment. Lugano. 21 June 1993.
This is a Council of Europe Convention which makes provision for harmonization of
national laws on environmental liability in member states, in accordance with
principle 13 of the 1992 Rio declaration on environment and development (q-v) it
imposes a common scheme of strict liability for dangerous activities or dangerous
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substance on the operator of the activity in question, or in the case of permenently
deposited waste, or the operator of the site. Unlike earlier liability conventions,
liability is not limited in amount, but recovery is similarly assured by compulsory
insurance or other financial security. Damage is widely defined and includes
impairment of the environment, which may include the cost of reasonable
preventative measures, reinstatement, and loss of profit. Jurisdiction is based on the
provisions of the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments in Civil and Commercial matters, OJEC L 304/77. Although not yet
widely ratified, the liability convention, provides an illustrative example of the
elements required for regional harmonization of environmental liability.
The Convention had no parties in 1994. It requires three ratifications to enter into
force in accordance with article 32. Reservations may only be made in the terms of
article 35. Text reper.32 ILM(1993) 1228; 4 YIEL (1993) 691; ETS 150 for
commentary see council of Europe, explanatory report (1992); CDCJ (92) 50,
Addendum. See also D Wilkinson, The Council of Europe Convention on Civil
Liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment. A
comparative review, European Environmental LR(1993) 13 off; A Bianchi, The
Harmonization of laws on liability for Environmental Damage in Europe; 6 JEL
(1994).
The problem which faced the efforts to define environmental damage or harm,
however, is the assessment of damage and determining which environmental damage
is "compensable environmental damage." Very few writers consider all environmental
damage as compensable damage;123 most writers, however, do not accept that view
and require certain qualifications to be included; thus, terms such as "significant",
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"substantial", or "serious" are used in this regard to qualify "environmental
damage".124 As a result, compensable environmental damage must be significant,
substantial, or serious. The word "appreciable" is also used to qualify environmental
damage' this suggests a marginally less onerous threshold for liability to be
triggered.125 It is further suggested that not every transmission of chemical or other
matter into another state's territory, or into the global commons, will create a legal
cause of action in international law.126 This view was reflected in the exchange
between the President of the International Court of Justice and the Government of
Australia in the Nuclear Tests Case,127 It was also held, by the Arbitral Tribunal in
the Trail Smelter Case, that the injury justifying a claim must have a "serious
consequence". States which made relevant claims used terms such as "irreparable
damage to, or substantially prejudice" the legal rights or interests;128 the term "unfit
129for use" was used to describe damage to land caused by the Soviet Cosmos 954.
But in fact the violation by any state of its obligation not to cause damage or injury to
the environment is, in our view, sufficient to establish and maintain a claim under
international law in favour of the injured state or the state whose rights or legal
interests are infringed. Any violation by a state of its obligation not to cause damage
or injury to the environment of another state or to areas beyond national jurisdiction
and not to cause transfrontier or transboundary pollution is in itself a wrongful act
which is not allowed under international law and which gives rise to international
claims against the state committing such violations. The terms "damage" and "injury"
do not refer to ordinary matters but to intolerable, unusual, or unacceptable
occurrences, events, incidents, or situations. The term "pollution" has, however, not
been uniformly used in various international instruments: a precise definition of the
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term has not been universally agreed upon. Each instrument or treaty dealing with
any aspect of pollution defines that term for its purposes.130 But it should be stressed
that pollution which causes damage or injury to the environment is to be prevented,
reduced or controlled under the general obligation to protect and not to cause any
damage or injury to the environment.
Sandvik and Suikkari tried to assess environmental damage and recognized
that compensable environmental damage would cover elements such as personal
injury, property damage, economic losses, damage to the environment per se, and
costs of preventive measures.131 Professors Birnie and Boyle refer to the difficulties
relative to the definition and assessment of environmental harm and the threshold to
be followed in individual cases; the harm or damage must, in their view, reach some
level of seriousness in order to qualify as compensable and they quoted the word
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"appreciable" as used by the ILC to qualify the degree of harm or pollution. They
also considered the concept of "equitable considerations or balance of interests" to
connect it with the threshold of environmental harm and suggested that the threshold
depended upon that concept. The two writers recognized, however, that "[wjhile
states may choose to regulate transboundary pollution in this way, neither the
international case law nor treaty definitions of harm or damage support thresholds
determined by equitable balancing outside the context of international watercourse
law or living resources."133
The two writers continued:
Nor is the case for making customary threshold of serious
harm dependent on a balance of interests a strong one. The
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notion that states must act with due diligence to prevent serious
harm is a formula which already allows for flexibility in
individual cases and excludes de minimis pollution. To add
more variables would be subversive of efforts to establish
minimum standards of environmental protection and prove too
favourable to the polluter. Only if the obligation of prevention
is an absolute one might it then be justifiable to resort to
equitable manipulation of the threshold of harm in order to
mitigate the rigors of an otherwise extreme rule.134
In another important article, Professor Boyle has illustrated difficulties that face states
and other factors in practical situations when environmental damage occurs and has
shown that in most cases of transboundary environmental harm "the matter is nsot
dealt with through inter-state claims, either because no claim is made, or because the
issue is handled in a different way."135 With regard to damage or harm to common
spaces, Boyle reaches the following conclusion:
Securing compensation for harm to common spaces through the
law of state responsibility, in situations where there is no
tangible harm to other states and no clean-up or restoration
costs,is unrealistic, unprecendented, and largely unworkable.136
Another problem which is of relative importance is the distinction between the
so called "direct" and "indirect" damage to the environment. In fact, it has been
asserted that the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" damage is no more than
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an illusion and an obsolute criterion; indeed, "international law recognizes no
distinction whatsoever between "direct" and "indirect" damage, but rather only
between damage that is compensable and damage that is not."137 Richard B. Lillich
and Charles Brower have studied the topic and the many cases related thereto and
reached the conclusion that for liability purposes "international law recognizes no
distinction whatsoever between "direct" and "indirect" damage, but rather only
between damage that is compensable and damage that is not". They concluded also
that the term "direct" "has no meaning other than to emphasize the principle of
causality."138 They further stated that :
[T]he terms "direct" and "indirect" have no dispositive meaning
in contemporary international law. In determining liability for a
loss international law requires simply that there be a causal
connection between an unlawful act and such loss, and, once
such nexus is established, compensates all proximately caused
loss, whether it proceeds immediately from the act, i.e., is
"direct" or occurs remotely, i.e. is remote or "indirect".139
Thus, once causation exists between the state's wrongful act and the
environmental damage or injury, that damage or injury becomes compensable whether
"direct" or "indirect". This topic will further be studied in detail in Chapter Four of
this research which deals with the United Nations Compensation Commission
established under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 to deal with issues of liability
and compensation for the damage, injury, or loss resulting from Iraq's illegal invasion
and occupation of Kuwait.
58
The Work of the I L C and Compensable
Environmental Damage or Harm:
The issues of transboundary harm and transboundary environmental harm have
been dealt with by the International Law Commission under the title "International
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law (Prevention of Transboundary Damage from Hazardous
Activities);" this topic was first placed on the Commission's agenda in 1978 and
several reports were prepared and discussed, 140 but our study here will depend on the
last reports of the Commission Convention on the Prevention of Significant
Transbounday Harm states :
The present draft articles apply to activities not
prohibited by international law which involve a risk of causing
significant transboundary harm throughs their physical
consequences.141
Article 2 of the same draft is particularly relevant and it deals with the use of
certain terms; this article states:
Use of terms
For the purposes of the present articles:
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(a) "risk of causing significant transboundary harm" means such a risk
ranging from a high probability of causisng significant harm to a
low probability of causing disastrous harm;
(b) "harm" includes harm caused to persons, property or the
environment;
(c) "transboundary harm" means harm caused in the territory of or in
other places under the jurisdiction or control of a State other than
the state of origin , whether or not the states concerned share a
common border;
(d) "State of origin" means the State in the territory or otherwise under
the jurisdiction or control of which the activities referred to in draft
article 1 are carried out;
(e) "State likely to be affected" means the State in the territory ofwhich
the significant transboundary harm is likely to occur or which has
jurisdiction or control over any other place where such harm is
likely to occur;
(f) "States concerned" means the State of origin and the States likely to
be affected.142
The ILC emphasized the fact that prevention of transboundary harm arising
from hazardous activities was stressed by principle 2 of the Rio Declaration and was
declared by I.C.J, to be forming part of the corpus of international law.143 The ILC
also emphasized that the prevention principle was stressed in many other fora and in
multilateral treaties.144 The important thing about transboundary harm is that it must
be "significant". Thus as defined in article 2 of the draft Convention, the risk of
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transboundary harm means "such a risks ranging from a high probability of causing
significant harm to low probability of causing disastrous harm". This threshold is
designed so as not to cover every type of activity orginally not prohibited under
international law in order to strike a balance between the interests of the states
concerned.14" The report of the Commission stated that the definition of "risk of
causing significant transboundary harm":
allows for a spectrum of relationships between "risk and harm",
all of which would reach the level of "significant". The
definition identifies two poles within which the activities under
these articles fall. One pole is where there is a low probability
of causing disastrous harm. This is normally the characteristic
of ultrahazardous activities. The other pole is where there is a
high probability of causing other significant harm. This
includes activities which have a high probability of causing
harm which, while not disastrous, is still significant. But it
would exclude activities where there is a very low probability of
causing significant transboundary harm. The word
"encompasses" in the second line intended to highlight the
intentions that the definition is providing a spectrum within
which the activities under these articles will fall.146
The Commission recognized the ambiguity of the word "significant" and
asserted that:
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a determination has to be made in each specific case. It involves
more factual considerations than legal determination. It is to be
understood that "significant" is something more than
"detectable" but need not be at the level of "serious" or
"substantial". The harm must lead to a real detrimental effect on
matters such as, for example, human health, industry, property,
environment or agriculture in other States. Such detrimental
effects must be susceptible of being measured by factual and
objective standards.147
The Commission continued :
The ecological unity of the planet does not correspond to political
boundaries. In carrying out lawful activities within their own
territories States have impacts on each other. These mutual
impacts, so long as they have not reached the level of
"significant", are considered tolerable. Considering that the
obligations imposed on States by these articles deal with activities
that are not prohibited by international law, the threshold of
intolerance of harm cannot be placed below "significant".148
The Commission has further stressed that the term "significant" is determined
by factual and objective criteria as well as value determination depending on the
circumstances of each particular case and the period in which such determination is
made; scientific knowledge and human appreciation for any particular resource do
change from time to time and from case to case.149
In our view the work of the ILC did not clarify the definition of compensable
damage or harm and the threshold to be used according to the draft articles but it
added more ambiguity to already ambiguous rules. The only sure thing is that each
and every case will be settled differently according to the specific circumstances and
merits of each particular case, the factual and objective criteria used in each case,
value determination and value judgement, the time of the determination of each case,
the scientific knowledge available to the parties at the time of determination, human
appreciation of each particular resource, and the equitable balance of interests of the
parties to each case. Thus, no uniform rules and no uniform solutions are or will be
available.
The Standard of Care and
the Type of Liability Involved:
The prevailing view among writers is that responsibility for environmental damage or
harm is based on the breach of a treaty or customary international law obligation and
that the mere occurrence of environmental harm is not sufficient to establish the
responsibility of states, i.e. state environmental responsibility is a fault-based or a
fault-caused responsibility, and that in a very limited number of cases based on
express treaty provisions, state responsibility for environmental damage is strict or
absolute. Thus, a failure of due diligence obligation must be proven in order to
establish states' responsibility for environmental damage or harm.150 Arguing against
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the ILC attempt to distinguish between liability for lawful activities and responsibility
for wrongful ones and its suggestions that "an alternative conceptual basis is needed
in order to accommodate strict or absolute liability for lawful activities which cause
environmental harm without any failure of due diligence" Professors Patricia Birnie
and Alan Boyle wrote:
The cogency of this thesis is doubtful in the view ofmany writers, who
argue that the case law, such as Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel, is
based on responsibility for breach of obligation and not on some
alternative theory, and that what matters is the content of the relevant
rules of international law. Moreover, the point has already been made
that the Commission" attempt to avoid prohibition of enviornmentally
harmful activities by distinguishing between liability for lawful
activities and responsibility for wrongful ones is fundamentally
misconceived. It fails to appreciate that much of the law of state
responsibility, including the Trail Smelter case, is concerned with
lawful activities which have caused harm and that it is not the activity
itself which is prohibited, but the harm which it causes. This is the
perspective from which the tribunal in Trail Smelter approached the
issues: its final order required that the smelter be prevented from
causing damage through fumes, and to that end it prescribed a control
regime. Nowhere was it suggested that the operation of such industrial
plants was prohibited or wrongful.
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Thus the reasons advanced by the ILC do not make it necessary
to depart, even in an environmental context, from the view that
responsibility in international law rests primarily on some breach of
obligation, however defined.151
Fault as the basis of international responsibility in international law is based on
an objective test and not a subjective one; accordingly, intention, malice and/or
recklessness are not required to be proven as elements of fault of grounds upon which
fault is based.152 Only the breach of an international obligation which is required to
prove fault and establish state responsibility; the most important thing in this
connection is, however, how to define due diligence.153 This is important because, in
general, international law obligations concerning the protection of the environment and
the prevention of pollution and environmental harm are obligations of due diligence,
and only in very rare circumstances absolute obligations of results are or would be
involved. Due diligence obligations entail the adoption and introduction by states of
legislation, administrative controls and other measures applicable to public and private
conduct "which are capable of effectively protecting other states and the global
environment, and it can be expressed as the conduct to be expected of a good
government.154 The flexibility of this standard makes it justify differing degrees of
diligence depending upon considerations of the effectiveness of territorial control, the
resources available to the state and the nature of the activity.155 The standard is thus
ambiguous and leaves much room for every state to define for itself the contents,
extent, and limits of its due diligence obligations in environmental matters. A more
useful and helpful approach is to follow internationally accepted minimum standards
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specified in treaties and/or in resolutions and decisions of relevant international
organizations.1"6
It should be stressed, however, that the rule of absolute or strict liability has
been accepted in very few situations and that this rule is gaining increasing acceptance
in the international community, particularly in the field of dangerous and ultra-
hazardous activities. Arguing in favour of strict liability, the Commission of the
European Communities in its mot recent white paper on Environmental Liability
stated:
Strict liablity means that fault of the actor need not be established, only
the fact that the act (or the omission) caused the damage. At first sight,
fault based liability may seem more ecnomically efficient than strict
liability since incentives towards abatement costs do not exceed the
benefits from reduced emissions. However, recent national and
international environmental liability regimes tend to be based on the
principle of strict liability, because of the assumption that
environmental objectives are better reached that way. One reason for
this is that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to establish fault of the
defendant in environmental liability cases. Another reason is the view
that someone who is carrying out an inherently hazardous activity
should bear the risk if damage is caused by it, rather than the victim or
society at large. These reasons argue in favour of an EC regime based,
as a general rule, on strict liability.157
The same white paper took the position that strict liability would cover
damage to persons and goods, contaminated sites, damage to biodiversity and





It is a rooted principle of international law that a state committing or causing
the commission of an internationally wrongful act is under an overriding legal
obligation to make reparation for the consequences of its act. The Permanent Court of
International Justice used a very wide formula of reparation in its most frequently
quoted judgement in the Chorzow Case, the Court declared:
... reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of
the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution
in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to
the value which restitution in kind would bear, the award, if need be, of
damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in
kind or payment in place of it such are the principles which should
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary
to international law.139
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This formula as used by the PCIJ is so wide and far-reaching that it covers all
aspects and all forms of violations of international obligations and the all resulting
consequences including any environmental injury or damage. Reparation for the
violation of an international environmental obligation mays take any or a combination
of the following forms; (1) restitution in kind, (2) compensation, (3) satisfaction, and
(4)assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.162 Philippe Sands adds to these forms
the form of "a declaration by an international tribunal on the legal position which is
favourable to the person who has been wronged."160 State practice supports the use of
all such forms whether singly or in combination.
It is interesting to note that the International Court of Justice has, in a recent
case, emphasized the formula used by its predecessor, the PCIJ, and added new
illustrative dimensions; the I.C.J, considered that the resumption of cooperation by the
parties would wipe out all the consequences of the wrongful act of both parties to the
dispute "as far as possible" and, as a result, the resumption or re-establishment of
cooperation would be a form of reparation.161
It is useful to quote an EC Commission Green Paper on Environmental
Liability which acknowledges some of the difficulties of legal and policy issues
regarding some forms of reparations concerning environmental damage or injury:
An identical reconstruction may not be possible, of course. An
extinct species cannot be replaced. Pollutants emitted into the air or
water are difficult to retrieve. From an environmental point of view,
however, there should be a goal to clean-up and restore the environment
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to the state which, if not identical to that which existed before the
damage occurred, at least maintains its necessary permanent functions.
Even if restoration or clean-up is physically possible, it may not be
economically feasible. It is unreasonable to expect the restoration to a
virgin state if humans have interacted with that environment for
generations. Moreover, restoring an environment to the state it was in
before the damage occurred could involve expenditure disproportionate
to the desired results. In such a case, it might be argued that restoration
should only be carried out to the point where it is still "cost-effective".
Such determination involve difficult balancing of economic and
environmental values. 162
In addition, the ILC has proposed an important qualification with regard to
reparation when it adopted paragraph 3 of proposed article 42 on "Reparation". This
paragraph reads: "In no case shall reparation resuslt in depriving the population of a
State of its own means of subsistence."163 Reparation must, therefore, take a form
that does not result in depriving the population of the state making reparation of its
own means of subsistence. For example, if the costs of clean-up and the financial
value of compensation are too high to be borne by that state to the extent that payment
in full and at one would result in eating up the whole or substantial part of the national
income of the state and depriving its population or substantial part thereof of its own
means of subsistence, then arrangements have to be made for periodic installments.
Some members of the Commission have however objected to the inclusion of
paragraph (3) of the proposed article 42 and took the view that "the provision was
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inappropriate and that in any event the provision should not apply where the
population of the injured state would be similarly disadvantaged by a failure to make
full reparation on such grounds."164 The Commission has nevertheless adopted the
provision and noted that:
There are examples in history of the burden of "full reparation"
being taken to such a point as to endanger the whole social system
of the State concerned, for example in the context of a peace treaty
following the defeat of a particular state. These are of course
extreme cases, but within the whole spectrum of possible cases of
responsibility the extreme case may not be excluded. Accordingly,
paragraph 3 provides that reparation is not to result in depriving
the population of a State of its own means of subsistence. This has,
of course, nothing to do with the obligation of cessation, including
the return to the injured State, for example, of territory wrongfully
seized. But in other contexts-e.g. the payment of sums of money
by way of compensation or satisfaction- the amounts required, or
the terms on which payment is required to be made should not be
such as to deprive the population of its own means of
subsistence.165
The Commission has stressed the fact that the language of paragraph 3 of
proposed article 42 was drawn from article 1, paragraph 2, of the International
Covenants on Human Rights of 1966.166 Paragraph 2 of article 1 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights167 and paragraph 2 of article 1 of
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 168 are identical; they read as
follows:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose
of their wealth and resources without prejudice to any
obligations arising out of international economic co¬
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its
own means of subsistence.
Thus, the principle that in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence and that in no case shall reparation result in depriving the population of a
state of its owns means of subsistence "reflects a legal principle of general
application"169 or a fundamental principle of world public order. But it should be
stressed further that the application of this principle shall not result in or lead to
depriving the population of the injured State of its own means of subsistence. If the
application of the principle would cause this result, the principle will be inapplicable.
In a later development the Drafting Committee of Commission dropped the text
of paragraph 3 of article 42 commented on above on the grounds that it need not be
inserted as its part of existing treaty law as explained above. 170
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Concluding Remarks
The introductory chapter deals with important introductory issues before
embarking on the main research on the international responsibility for environmental
damage because of armed conflict, with special reference to Kuwait. Customary
International Law and the responsibility of states not to damage or injure the
environment, treaty law and the general obligation not to cause harm or damage to the
environment, compensable environmental damage, and reparation for such damage or
injury are important introductory subjects which are studied in this chapter. In fact we
have reached the conclusions that although international law incorporates a firmly
established general obligation binding upon all states to protect and not harm or
damage or cause harm or damage to the environment, not every environmental harm
or damage is compensable, but only significant environmental damage is. Significant
environmental damage is less than serious but more detectable. Every case is or will
be decided or settled upon its own merits, circumstances, time, and place of
occurrence. International law now does not recognize any distinction between direct
and indirect damage but it recognizes only compensable environmental damage which
is significant environmental damage. In environmental matters fault-based or fault-
caused liability arising out of the violation of due diligence obligations is the
generally accepted type of state liability but strict liability is emerging to be
applicable in cases of particularly serious, dangerous, hazardous and ultra-hazardous
activities. Any act of state which causes significant environmental damage to any
other state or to areas beyond national jurisdiction or which causes transboundary
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adverse environmental effect or pollution is proscribed under international law
irrespective of the fact that the act or activity itself was not originally prohibited. The
injured state is entitled to full reparation, reparation may take any one form or a
number of forms but it "must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed." Restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction, and
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are the common forms of reparation, but
the parties may agree to other forms. Nevertheless, reparation may not and shall not
result in depriving the population of the state concerned of its own means of
subsistence.
But what about the rules of responsibility of states for environmental damage
or injury they inflict or cause to be inflicted during or because of armed conflict? The
following chapters attempt to deal with this question and the issues arising in
connection therewith, and attempt to find solutions to the problems and issues posed
by the question as have been raised in actual cases to be dealt with in the bulk of this
research.
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"Whereas during its oral statements New Zealand further contended
that changes in the law were capable of affecting the basis of the 1974
Judgment; since the Court must have been aware at the time of the Judgement
in 1974 of "proposed of a significant forward surge in the evolution of
standards and procedures" in the field of international environmental law; that
such an evolution had indeed taken place both in customary international law
and by virtue of the Noumea Convention; that, under current customary law,
especially stringent controls applied to the marine environment, so that, in
general, the introduction of radioactive material into the marine environment
was forbidden' and that, specifically, "any introduction of radioactive material
into the marine environment as a result of nuclear tests" was forbidden; that the
standard of proof to which New Zealand should be subject in seeking to
demonstrate that France was in breach of its obligations was a prima facie test;
and that by virtue of the adoption into environmental law of the "Precautionary
Principle", the burden of proof fell on a State wishisng to engage in potentially
damaging environmental conduct to show in advance that its activities would
not cause contamination;
Whereas New Zealand reiterated in its oral statements that Article 12 of
the Noumea Convention required France to "take all appropriate measures to
prevent, reduce and control pollution in the Convention Area which might
result from the testing of the nuclear devices"; that Article 16 of that
Convention required the carrying out of an environmental impact assessment
before any major project "which might affect the marine environment" was
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moreover, such obligation was not subject to any exception recognized in
international law concerning national security; that the Precautionary Principle
required France to carry out such an assessment as a precondition for
undertaking the activities, and to demonstrate that there was no risk associated
with them; and that France's failure to comply with these obligations had
affected the basis of the 1974 Judgment;" id. at 298-99.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 292 et seq.
31. Id. at 307-308
32. Id. at 305-306.
33. Id. at 306.
34. I.C.J.'s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
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(Judgment), I.C.J. Reports 1997, 1.
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40. Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugosla\>ia v. United States of
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1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999.
41. Id. at paras 1-8.
42. Id.
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One of the other most frequently cited cases and referred to in this
regard is the Gut Dam Arbitration between the United States and Canada; this
case involved the construction of a dam between Adams Island in the
Territory of Canada and Les Galops belonging to United States for the
purpose of improving navigation in the St. Lawrence River. The dam was
constructed in two stages and was completed in 1904 after the approval of the
competent authorities in both Canada and the United States. But during the
period from 1904 to 1951 several manmade construction and changes took
place which affected the flow ofwater in the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence River
basin. The Gut Dam itself was not altered or changed in any way, but the level
of water in the river and nearby Lake Ontario increased because of the
construction and changes taking place from 1904 to 1951. In 1951-52 the level
of water had sharply increased and reached unprecedented heights. Due to
this unprecedented increase in water levels and other natural phenomena,
extensive flooding and erosion damage on both the north and south shsores of
all the lakes occurred. A dispute had arisen between Canada and the United
States concerning U.S. claims for damages allegedly resulting from the
presence of the Gut Dam. A claims tribunal, the Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal
was set up by the two countries to settle the claims. Canada removed the dam
in 1953 as a part of the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The claims
tribunal found that Canada had an obligation to all citizens of the United States
and not just to the owner of Les Galops; it found also that such responsibility
was not limited in time to some initial testing period. The tribunal reached the
conclusion tht the dam caused the damage for which claims were filed and
approved a negotiated settlement of a lump-sum payment from Canada to the
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United States "in full and final satisfaction of all claims of United States
nationals for alleged damage caused by Gut Dam." The tribunal refused to
consider any arguments for or against fault or negligence in planning and
construction of the Gut Dam and it refused to consider whether Canada knew
or ought to have known what injuries might occur. The Tribunal thus based its
decision on the rules of liability without fault.
For the details of the Case see; Canada-United States Settlement ofGut
Dam Claims, Sept. 22, 1968, Report of the Agent of the United States before
the Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal, in 8 I.L.M. 118 (1969). For the Tribunal's
Decision of February 12, 1968 see, id. at 138. For the settlement approved by
the Tribunal see: Agreement on Settlement of Claims Relating to Gut Dam,
Nov. 18, 1968, (1968)6 U.S.T. 7863; T.l.A.S. No. 6624. See also the Decision
of the Tribunal in 8 l.L.M. 138 (1969).
43. For several reasons, Dr. Alan Boyle in his 2nd edition set out the claim that the
precautionary principle is customary law because in his view untenable and
wholly unsupported by authority or state practice.
44. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment is
contained in the REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973) at 3-5. The text of the Recommendations appears at
6-28, id.
45. See; e.g. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 Harv.
Int'lL.J. 433, passim, (1973).
46. Supra note 44 at 3.
47. Sohn, supra note 45 at 440.
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48. Supra note 44 at 4.
49. Id.
50. The U.N.Convention on the Law of the Sea contained a whole part dealing with
the protection of the marine environment; relevant provisions of this part will be
referred to in this text above notes 71 et seq. Infra. See, in particular, arts. 192 &
194 of the Convention.
51. For a somewhat similar view see; Sohn, supra note 45 at 463.
52. The Stockholm Declaration, supra note at 5; The Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1; (13 June 1992). The Rio
Declaration was republished in 31 l.L.M. 874 (1992).
53. Supra note 44 at 5.
54. U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 48/14, at 118 (1972).
55. Shon, supra note 45 at 492-93
56. The Rio Declaration, supra note 52.
57. Philippe SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, Vol.1, at 186(1995).
58. Id. at 186 et seq. & 190 et seq.
59. Professor Sands adopts a similar view; he asserted that principles 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration and 2 of the Rio Declaration do constitute "the basic
obligation underlying international environmental law and the source of its
further elaboration in rules of greater specifity." Id. at 186. He further states that
"principle 21 is widely recognized to reflect a rule of customary international law,
placing international law limits on the right of states in respect of activities carried
out within their territory or under their jurisdiction." Id. at 190-91.
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64. See chapter 2 of this research.
65. Supra note 52.
66. See the text of principle 22 above note 62 supra.
67. Emphasis added.
68. For a detailed study of procedural duties of States and procedural standards of the
protection of the environment and prevention and control of pollution of
significant international effects see e.g. G.HUSSEIN, ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, (1986), AT 123 et seq.
69. The Rio Declaration, supra note 52.
70. See this text above note 57 et seq. and see notes 57-60 the International Court of
Justice and the International Law Commission referred to principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration as considering a customarily basic and rooted principle of
international Law and recognized the obligation that states are bound to respect
and not violate the sovereignty and the integrity and invoilability of the territory
of other states, see e.g. Legality of the threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports [1996] p.241; I.L.C. Report 1998
Chapter 4 p.8 (http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1998/chp4.htm).
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71. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at Montego Bay,
December10, 1982, U.N. Docs A/CONF.62/122(1982), A/CONF.62/122/Corr. 3
(1982); A/CONF. 62/122/Corr.8 (1982). The text of the Convention appears also
in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
72. See this text above note 53 et seq.
73. see, e.g. Sands, supra note 57 at 183-242 & 291-345, Hussein, supra note 68 at 73
et seq.
74. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
(London, Moscow, Washington) 29 March 1972, in force 1 September 1972, 961
UNTs 187, [hereinafter cited as the Space Liability Convention],
75. Id. art. II.
76. Id. art (a).
77. Sands, supra note 57 at 646.
78. The Space Liability Convention; supra note 74, art III
79. For the Canadian claim against the U.S.S R. see, Canada Claim against the USSR
for Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, 23 January 1979, 18 I.L.M. (1979),
899-908. For the settlement see, Protocol between Canada and U.S.S.R. 2 April
1981, 20 I.L.M.(1981), 689.
80. Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, adopted on
14 December 1999 by the Conference of the Basel Convention, UNEP News
Release( 15/12/1999).
81 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, (Basel) 22 March 1989, in force 24 May 1992, 28 I.L.M.
(1989) 657.
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82. Article 4 of the Protocol defined the persons and states strictly liable during the
movements of hazardous and other wastes and their final disposal. On the other
hand, article 5 dealt with fault-based liability it states:
"Without prejudice to Article 4, any person shall be liable for damage
caused or contributed to by his lack of compliance with the provisions
implementing the Convention or by his wrongful intentional, reckless or
negligent acts as omissions. This article shall not affect the domestic law of
the Contracting Parties governing liability of servants and agents."
83. KUWAIT REGIONAL CONVENTION FOR CO-OPERATION ON THE
PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT FROM POLLUTION &
THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING REGIONAL CO-OPEATION IN
COMBATING POLLUTION BY OIL AND OTHER HARMFUL
SUBSTANCES IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, 1978; this Convention entered into
force on 30 June 1979.
84. Kuwait Convention. Id. art I, para (a).
85. Id. art. Ill, para (e).
86. Id. art. Ill, para.(b).
87. Id. art.Ill, para., ©.
88. Id. art. Ill, para (d)
89. Id. art, III,para(e).
90. Id. art. IV which reads:
"The Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures in
conformity with the present Convention and the applicable rules of
international law to prevent, abate and combat pollution in the Sea Area
caused by intentional or accidental discharges from ships, and shall ensure
effective compliance in the Sea Area with applicable international rules
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relating to the control of this type of pollution, including load-on-top,
segregated and crude oil washing procedures for trankers.
91. Id. art. V which reads:
"The Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent,
abate and combat pollution in the Sea Area caused by dumping of wastes and
other matter from ships and aircraft, and shall ensure effective compliance in
the Sea Area with applicable international rules relating to the control of this
type of pollution as provided for in relevant international conventions."
92. Id. Art. VI which reads:
"The Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent,
abate and combat pollution caused by discharges from land reaching the Sea
Area whether water-borne , air-borne or directly from the coast including
outfalls and pipelines".
93. Id. art VII which reads:
"The Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent,
abate and combat pollution in the Sea Area resulting from exploration and
exploitation of the bed of the territorial sea and its subsoil and the continental
shelf, including the prevention of accidents and the combating of pollution
emergencies resulting in damage to the marine environment."
94. Id. Art. VIII which reads:
"The Contacting States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent,
abate, and combat pollution of the Sea Area resulting from land reclamation
and associated suction dredging and coastal dredging."
95. STATUTE OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES, adopted by the Council of the Regional Organization for the
Protection of the Marine Environment, April 1981.
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96. Id. Art. 18.
97. Id. Art. 19.
98. Id. Art. 20, para. 1.
99. Id. Art. 21.
100. The Kuwait Convention, supra note 83.
101. Statute of the Judicial Commission, supra note 95, art. 24, para. 1.
102. Id. Art. 24, para. 2.
103. see chapters 3 and 4, infra.
104. The Protocol, note 83, supra.
105. Id. Art. 1, para 2.
106. But it should be emphasied that the Regional Organisation for the Protection
of the Marine Environment (ROPME) established in accordance with the
Kuwait Convention has not been successful in dealing with some of the most
important marine environment and marine pollution problems of the Gulf Area
resulting from the Iraq-Iran armed-conflict and Iraq's illegal invasion and
occupation ofKuwa.it. On May 10, 1997, we forwarded a number of questions
to the ROPME Secretary-General concerning the application of the Kuwait
Convention and the successive protocols to the Iraq-Iran dispute and the cases
arising out of or as a result of the Iraqi illegal invasion and occupation of
Kuwait and the Iraqi environmental aggression against Kuwait and the Gulf
Area. The Secretary-General did not reply. The present writer concludes that
ROPME has nsot been effective in dealing with serious environmental
problems of the Gulf Area such as those arisig out of or as a result of Iraq's
aggression against Kuwait and the ilegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
ROPME did not even condemn the Iraqi environmental aggression or the
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illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the environmental effects of
such aggression.
Iraq's membership in ROPME has in fact be suspended because of the
existence of ROPME headquarters in Kuwait and not because of any legal
action adopted by the Oraganization. The writer recommends the
reinvigoration of ROPME and enhancing its role and the role of its Judicial
Commission in order to be able to take effective decisions concerning serious
environmental problems and violations by any Contracting State party to the
Kuwait Convention.
It should also be noticed that in his reply to a question by Kuwaiti M P.
Dr. Hasan Gohar concerning whether Iraq has violated the Kuwait Regional
Convention, whether Iraq is legally responsible for any such violations and
whether compensation can be demanded from Iraq for its violation of the said
Convention, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Kuwait stated the following points:
First: During its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq did indeed commit serious
violations of the Kuwait Regional Convention and its protocols, polluting the
marine environment through pumping of Kuwaiti oil into the sea and drowing
ofmany ships and vessels carrying crude oil.
Second: ROPME and the Kuwait National Environmental Agency
requested the Kuwait Institute For Scientific Research to assess all
environmental losses and damage suffered by Kuwait in order to, well, prepare
Kuwaiti claims in this connection. ROPME, prepared further claims on behalf
of other Gulf States.
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Third. The Kuwait Regional Convention did not include any specific
sanctions or penalties to be applied to the states violating the Convention. But
the freezing of Iraq's membership in ROPME by the Ministerial Council of
the Oraganization amounts to a strong condemnation of Iraq by ROPME. See
letter dated Feb. 9, 2000, by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait to the Speaker of the Kuwaiti National
Council, a copy of which was provided to the present wrtier by Kuwaiti M P.
Dr. Gohar who presented his questions upon the initiative of the present
writer.
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through this research.
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170. ILC Report (1996), supra note 167.
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A/C N.4/L. 574 and Corrs. 1 (English only), 2 (French only), 3 and 4 (Spanish
only); U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/L. 600, 21 August 2000. The Drafting Committee
dropped the proposed rule referred to in former paragraph 3 of article 42 and




The Law of International Environmental
Responsibility Relative to Armed Conflicts
This chapter will be devoted to the law of International responsibility as it
relates to armed conflicts. Treaties or conventional international law and customs or
customary international law do constitute the most important sources of the law of
such responsibility. Subsidiary sources for the determination of such law do exist and
they mainly include judicial decisions and resolutions and works of international
organizations and conferences. Some of the rules and principles of the law of the
international responsibility for environmental damage caused during or because of
armed conflicts have developed to constitute peremptory norms of general
international law (jus cogens).
Our study in this chapter will focus on the treaty or conventional sources and
customary international law. Subsidiary sources will be referred to as far as they relate
to the constitution of any treaty or customary rule. Resolutions and acts of
international organizations will be discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4 dealing with
the "the Security Council and the Environment" and "the U.N. Compensation
Commission" respectively. These two chapters will focus mainly on the GulfWar and
Kuwait environmental damage and the Iraqi responsibility as "a case study". Chapter
1 dealt, in some respects, with some aspects of the resolutions and acts of international
organizations, agencies and conferences. Out study in this chapter will therefore deal
with the following issues, each ofwhich will be studied in a separate section
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1. The General Prohibition on the Threat or Use ofForce which causes
Environmental Damage and the Self-Defence Exception.
2. Protected Areas in International Law Limitation on the Use of Force.
3. The International Law Applicable to the Actual Conduct ofWar
(jus in bello) and the Relevance to Environmental Damage.
4. Conclusions.
1. Environment impacts ofwar.
The environmental impacts ofwar are often multi-dimensional. They also often have
repercussions in areas long distances away from those of concentrated battle and over
prolonged periods of time, long after the wars have ended. Several possible
environment impacts ofwar are explored below.
Impacts of Land:
Land is affected both by direct war actions and by military operations preparations
for war). Bombs and missiles contribute to the formation of craters, compaction and
erosion of soil, and soil contamination by toxic and hazardous residues. Land use
patterns often change over prolongedf periods of time due to the continued presence
of landmines and other remants of war. Use of biological chemcial and nuclear
weapons is also likely to change land use patterns significantly by precluding and
productice use of land for very long periods of time- even centuries.
There are also those activities that specifically target land resources, for example,
delibeate deforestation efforts can alter the prevailing land, water and biotic regimes
with any number of resulting adverse consequences. Another example is the
degradation of soil conditions that resulted from oil fires in Kuwait.
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Use of land for military operations also constribute significantly to environment
damage. Globally, it is estimated that the amount of land used for these purposes
ranges between 750,000 and l,500,000Km2, an area that is likely larger than the total
surface areas ofFrance and United Kingdom combined(797,000Km2),
Impact on water:
Water contamination (of both surface and ground water) is also a common result of
various types of warfare. Use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons can
contribute to long-term water pollution, with attendant health hazards for humans and
the associated eco-systems. Appropriate remedial techniques for such contamination
are often technologically impossible or extremely expensive, technologically
complex and require very high levels of scientific expertise.
Impacts of Air quality
In addition to the atmospheric emissions from the vehicles and other equipments used
during routine war activities and military operations, serious air pollution often occurs
as a result of the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The aggressive
act of setting fire to the Kuwaiti oilfields resulted in extensive air pollution in the
region. Depending on the extent and nature of the air pollution and the prevailing
topographical and atmospheric conditions around the area where it originates,
airborne pollutants can travel over long distances, contribute to acid rain, and cause




The General Prohibition on the Threat




In past centuries war and the use of force by states had been recognized as
legitimate under international law; the role of international law was to recognize and
give effect to the results of war. Gradually rules of law were introduced to regulate
the conduct of combatants and lessen the atrocities and horrors of war. But until the
early part of this century, resort to war by states was still legitimate and no serious
attempts had been made to outlaw war and the use of force. The first major attempt to
outlaw war was incidental, limited and dependent upon the operation of the dispute-
settlement mechanisms of the League of Nations, but the Covenant of the League of
Nations did not pronounce war illegal.1 Most important of all efforts during the
period between World War I and War II was the signing of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
pact which sought to eliminate war of aggression and proscribe the use of force in
international relations.2 But all of those efforts had failed and World War II broke out.
Unlike previous efforts, the Charter of the United Nations included clear
provisions, proscribing not just the use of force, but, even more assertively and
decisively, proscribed the threat to use force, the use of force and acts of aggression
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.3 Under the U.N.
Charter, the use of force by states is permitted only in case of individual or collective
self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter).4 In addition, the Security Council is
97
empowered to take action which may include the use of force in cases involving
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and/or acts of aggression, and it may
authorize regional arrangements or agencies to take enforcement action provided that
such action is taken under the authority of the Security Council.3
It is now accepted in international law and international relations that the U.N.
Charter provisions concerning the prohibition of the threat or use of force have been
firmly rooted in the realm of peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens) 6 Thus any violation of such provisions gives rise to the international
responsibility of the violator, But under the U.N. Charter can the unlawful use of
force which caused environmental damage be considered as an act giving rise to the
international responsibility of the violator? And can the environment and/or the
environmental damage be considered as "force" the threat or use of which is
prohibited under the Charter and gives rise to the international responsibility of the
violator? One would not find any difficulty in asserting that any unlawful use of force
by a State which causes any damage including environmental damage, to any other
State, would satisfy the requirements of a "wrongful act" giving rise to the
international responsibility of the State using force unlawfully regardless of Security
Council Resolution No. 687 of 1991 which covers only direct loss or damage.7
General international law of State's international responsibility for damage or loss
caused by its unlawful use of force or other unlawful activities does not limit such
responsibility to only direct loss or damage (this point will be elaborated in detail in
chapter 4 of this research since this chapter "2" focuses only on the determination of
wrongful acts or other acts giving rise to the international responsibility for
environmental damage in respect with war or armed conflict).8
98
With regard to the second, question, it is considered, by far, one of the most
important issues generating an overwhelming challenge to international law, that is
whether the use or that to use the environment as a weapon can be considered as
"force" which is prohibited under the U.N. Charter; and therefore, any threat or use of
such a weapon as "force" raises the international responsibility of the violator? The
term "force" was not defined in any international instrument attempting to outlaw
war; the U.N. Charter itself did not include any definition of that term. But,
traditionally, the term "force" in the context of "war" was used to including not only
"armed force" or "military force" but also any kind of force that wins a war or helps
in winning a war. Some writers have, however, attempted to restrict the term "force"
embodied in Article 2/4 of the U.N. Charter to include only "armed force" since this
latter term was used in the preamble of the U.N. Charter.9 Other have rightly rejected
this view and stressed that it is groundless since the text of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of
the Charter does not contain any qualification or restriction suggesting that the term
"force" be confined to only "armed forces" and since any attempt to introduce any
qualification or restriction was intentionally avoided.10 Recent practice suggests that
the term "force" as used in Article 2/4 of the U.N. Charter is free from any
qualification or restriction.11 Thus, the threat or use of any type or degree of force
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations will be considered as a
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations (Article 2/4) and an undisputed
breach of International law which constitutes the wrongful act giving rise to the
international responsibility of the violator. Consequently, the threat or use of
environment and/or environmental damage as a weapon of war will fulfill the
requirements of force, which is prohibited under the U.N. Charter if directed against
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the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or if used in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. In connection with
this, some writers suggest that "deliberate employment of natural forces by a state",12
"the release of large quantities of water down a valley" and "the spreading of fire
through a built up area or wood land across a frontier",13 are examples of the use of
force. Some other examples which may be introduced by the present writer may
include poisoning the sea adjacent to a state and killing the fish constituting the vital
source of food and income for the people of the state, building a dam to cut of
completely water flowing down a river or a stream running into another state, thus
threatening and/or attacking the life and very existence of that other state and its
people. In fact destruction of forests, burning of oil, destruction of cultural properties
and other aspects of environmental "force" were deliberately used in recent wars to
achieve political and military objectives.14 In at least one of these events the Security
Council has recognized the illegality of the use of force and the international
responsibility of the state damaging or causing damage to the environment of another
state.15
A relating issue is the possibility of the use of oil as a war weapon constituting force
and the possibility of its selection as a target for military attacks. Has oil been used as
a weapon of war to achieve military or warlike objectives? Has it been selected as a
military target or an object of military attacks? As we will see in chapter 3 of this
research, oil has indeed been used as a weapon of war constituting force and has been
targeted as an object ofmilitary attacks. The use of oil in recent conflicts as a weapon
of war on the one hand and targeting it as an object of military attacks on the other
hand have led some to speak of "environmental aggression" and "environmental
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terrorism", terms which have been widely used during and after the two recent Gulf
conflicts.16 Thus if a state uses oil as an instrument of aggression in violation of
article 2/4 of the U.N. Charter or in violation of the requirements of self- defense, that
use will be illegal and constitute the wrongful act establishing the international
responsibility of the state using oil as an instrument of aggression. And if oil is
targeted, by a state, as an object of military attacks, this will be illegal if it is targeted
in violation of the U.N.Charter provisions or other rules of international law
prohibiting aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any other state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations. If the state targeting oil as an object of military attacks is the
aggressor state, all of its actions become unlawful under international law and do
constitute wrongful acts establishing the responsibility of the aggressor state just as the
case of Iraq which was the aggressor state when it invaded and illegally occupied
Kuwait in August 1990 and beyond.17 But if the State uses oil as a weapon or
instrument of defense against an armed attack or aggression or the state targets oil as
an object of attacks as necessary defensive measures, then the case might be different.
If such use or targeting is within the confines and strict conditions of self-defense and
does not violate any of the law18, such use or targeting becomes perfectly legitimate
under international law.19 Nevertheless, if the use of oil as a defensive weapon or
instrument exceeds the limits and confines of self-defense or if targeting oil is of a
manner, degree or scale so as to cause unnecessary human sufferings or to cause
massive damage to the environment,20 then such use or targeting becomes unlawful.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the use of the environment or any of its
components and elements as a weapon ofwar and the targeting of the environment as
101
an object for military attacks are prohibited under the U.N. Charter whenever used or
targeted in violation of article 2/4 as explained above, whenever used or targeted in
excess of the limits and requirements of the lawful use of force allowed under the
Charter or under general international law such as the excessive use of force in
violation of the requirements of the right of self-defense as recognized under article
51 of the Charter and general international law.21 In all such cases and the like the
violator would be considered as the party committing the wrongful act establishing
his liability under international law.
Self-Defence as a Claim to
Permissible Use of Force which
May Affect or Cause Injury
To the Environment
The plea of self-defence is perhaps the most frequently heard justification for a
particular use of force. Obviously, it is closely related to the charge of initiation of
coercion, for a state acting in self-defence is by definition not the initiator of illegal
use of force. But even given the fact of the initiation of coercion there remains much
to be said about self-defense. Traditionally rules of international law, whether derived
from customary practices, conventional law or the United Nations Charter, have
recognized the right of every sovereign state to self-defense. This involves the
recognition of the characteristics of the right itself, the legal requirements and the
values intended to be conserved.
A meaningful conception of self-defence seems to have been established under
an organized global system of law as enshrined in the U.N.Charter (Article 51). The
League of Nations and the United Nations centralized, at different levels of
effectiveness, the necessary powers for law enforcement as well as measures for the
juridical qualification of coercive measures. Within this legal framework, the
distinction between self-defence on the one hand, and self-help and other uses of
force on the other hand, is no longer valid. Rather, the demarcation line is drawn
between lawful and unlawful use of coercion or force. Force exercised in self-defence
or authorized expressly by an organized world or regional institution is permissible.
All other major uses of coercion on the international level are not permissible.22
Professor McDougal and Dr. Felciano stated that from a perspective seeking
movement toward a world order of human dignity:
The coercion characterized as "permissible" and authorized by
the general community in the cause of "self-defense," should
be limited to responses to initiating coercion that is so intense
as to have created in the target state reasonable expectations, as
those expectations may be reviewed by others, that a military
reaction was indispensably necessary to protect such
consequential bases of power as territorial integrity and
political independence.23
The Basic Legal Requirements of Self-Defense:
The legal limits of the use of fore by sovereign states rank and among the most
important and the most controversial problems of international law. The basic rule
that force may not be imposed aggressively but only in self-defense is too broad to be
of much guidance. It is uncertain what is covered by the term "aggression" and what
is left for self-defense. For this reason the basic community interest in restricting
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coercion resulted in the formulation of two essential requirements imposed by law
upon measures taken in self-defense. The first is the requirement of "necessity" and
the second is "proportionality". In assessing the responding coercion, a third party
decision-maker must take into account these two requisites in concert.
A) Necessity:
The element of "necessity" in self-defense should be first distinguished from the
"doctrine of necessity"24 The latter after categorized as an aspect of self
preservation was used by States to justify whatever measures allegedly taken for
securing essential interests. This doctrine has been widely criticized on the ground
that it is "destructive of the entire legal order."25
In addition, "necessity" as a prerequisite for the legitimate use of force in self-
defense must be distinguished from "military necessity" used as a limitation,
qualification, or even justification for the use of a certain kind or degree ofmilitary
force or weapons or certain activities and/or the infliction of a certain type or
degree of damage under the rules ofjus in bello, military necessity will be dealt
with in some detail under the title "Customary International Law Applicable to the
Actual Conduct of Military Operations and the Relevance to Environmental
Damage" which will be referred later in this chapter.
Defensive "necessity" is a condition which compels the target state to use force
in response to initiated coercion. It is prerequisite, legitimizing the function of
self-defense. But since every aggressive act does not necessarily justify a
defensive reaction, there are certain qualifications of that "necessity". The
Webster formula provided certain characteristics that "necessity" should be
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"instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."26 These restrictive specifications of necessity, it should be recalled,
were formulated in the context of anticipatory self-defense which always requires a
high degree of necessity. The policy reason for this is to avoid an open-ended
conception of self-defense which might be employed as a screen for deliberate
aggression.27
This formulation, however, has been criticized as being abstract and narrow. A
U.S. State Department legal analysis noted that the cases which would exactly fit
Webster's formula are "rare"28. Professor Mallison, criticizing its highly narrow
scope, stated that:
In the contemporary era of nuclear and thermo¬
nuclear weapons and rapid missile delivery techniques.
Secretary Webster's formulation could result in national
suicide if it actually were applied instead of merely
repeated.29
International law has never recognized a hard and fast instrument which
mechanically measures the degree of necessity required for self-defense.30 Necessity
should always be construed in the context of serving the policy objective of self-
defense, the conservation of the community's major values. The decision-makers of
the target state, in exercising defensive use of force, are required to conduct a
comprehensive appraisal of the type, intensity and dimension of the means of coercion
utilized by the initiating state.31 Their decision will always be subject to the review
and assessment of the world community.
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The International Court of Justice has recognized the requirement of necessity
as one of the essential requirements of self-defense under customary international law,
thus in the Nicaragua Case the I.C.J, stated: "there is a specific rule whereby self-
defense would warrant only measures which are proportionate to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law"32
Again the I.C.J, has repeated and stressed this stand in its Avisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons of 1996 in which the Court stated:
"The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defense to the conditions of
necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law. This dual
condition applied equally to Article 51 of the Charter , whatever the means of force
employed."33 The I.C.J, seems to limit the right of self-defense to situations where
armed attack occurs against the state taking the defensive measures necessary to deal
with the attack, as it clearly appears from the text quoted from the Nicaragua Case.
B) Proportionality:
The customary right of self-defense involves the assumption that the use of force
must be proportionate to the threat. If necessity is a qualitative requirement,
proportionality is quantitative in character, the responding coercion must be
proportionate to the initiated violence.34 The formula used by Webster in relation to
the Caroline incident has attracted writers because of his insistence that self-defense
must involve "nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by the
necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within
it".35 The legal concept of self-defense comprehends proportionality, and the emphasis
on proportionality as a special requirement in the law of nations may represent an
attempt to create the necessary distinction between self-defense and self-help in
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reaction to the historical tendency to confuse them. It was not until the period of the
League that proportionality was mentioned with any frequency. In his report to the
League, Mr. Broucekere said, "Legitimate defense implies the adoption of measures
proportionate to the seriousness of the danger.36 Bowett advances the view that the use
of force is lawful as exercise of the right of self-defense in the case of subversion or
economic threats to the political independence of a state.3' The fact that such views of
the law are expressed indicates the controversial aspects of proportionality. In
summation, to use Secretary Hull's words, "The breadth of our self-defense must be at
all times equal to the breadth of the dangers which threaten us."38
As with the element of necessity, proportionality has been subject to criticism.
Professor Mallison contends that the simplistic characterization of proportionally as a
mere relationship between the initiating coercion and the responding coercion
"without regard to meaningful factual context and international community objectives
in maintaining at least minimum world public order, irrational, and indeed suicidal,
decision would be facilitated."39 Although the requirement of proportionality as
customarily established is narrow and rigid, Professor Kunz went further to discard it.
Kunz, who is of the opinion that Article 51 narrowed down the customary concept of
self-defense, erroneously stated that "necessity and proportionality are no conditions
for the exercise of self-defense under Article 51 "because every armed attack is
illegal".40 Higgins, on the other hand, considered that Article 51 "in no way impaired
the traditional requirement of proportionality and reasonableness" and that this fact
was "clearly shown by the United Nations practice."41
The underlying policy of the requirement of proportionality, subject always to
all the variables of a given situation, is that measures taken in self-defense should not
involve more coercion than is necessary for protection of substantive rights.
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McDougal and Feliciano correctly wrote:
The objective is to cause the initiating participant to diminish its
coercion to the more tolerable levels of "ordinary coercion".... The
principle of proportionality is seen as but one specific form of the
more general principle of economy in coercion and as a logical
corollary of the fundamental community policy against change by
destructive modes.42
Support of this rationale was voiced in the debate of the Special Committee on
Defining Aggression. The Thirteen power draft suggested the inclusion of the
requirement of "proportionality" in the proposed definition. A number of participants
argued that it was in the interest of th world community that the amount of force used
to repel armed attack must commensurate with the attack, and that the unlimited use
of defensive force could not provide protection.43
We must stress again that the I.C.J, has indeed recognized the condition of
proportionality as being one of the requirements of self-defense under customary
international law. We have previously quoted texts from the Nicaragua Case and the
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons of 1996
which include the requirement under customary international law.44
In addition, in the I.C.J. Order in the Request for an Examination of the
Situation in Accordance with paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 December
1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case45 and in its 1996 Advisory
Opinion, referred to above, the I.C.J, stresses the obligations of states to respect and
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protect the natural environment in all times and in assessing the conditions of necessity
and proportionality.46
National Self-Defense Measures and
Environmental Damage or Destruction:
It has been recognized that measures, methods and means taken or used by the
state exercising its right of national self-defense within the prescribed self-defense
requirements, necessity and proportionality, may cause environmental damage or
destruction. Thus, we find that paragraph 5 of article 54 of the 1977 Protocol I
tolerates the use, by a state, of measures, tactics, methods and/or means which may
destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population provided that such objects are located within its "territory under its own
control where required by imperative military necessity.47 It is further recognized that
under general customary international law of self-defense, such measure tactics,
methods and/or means may be taken even against objects indispensable to the survival
of civilian population located within the territory of the enemy state provided that such
tactics, methods and/or means satisfy the strict requirements of national self-defense
(necessity and proportionality as specified above)48. Moreover, the text of article 56 of
Protocol I does not prevent the taking or use ofmeasures, tactics, methods and means
which may include attacks on dams, dykes, or nuclear electrical generating stations
provided that such measures, tactics, methods and/or means satisfy the strict
requirements of national self-defense.49 Furthermore, it seems that the text of article
55 of the same Protocol does not prevent the use of methods or means of warfare
which cause or may cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment provided that such measures or means satisfy strict requirements of
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national self-defense/"0 In fact, the International Court of Justice has made it clear that
it does not consider Protocol I, the Enmod Convention, and all other environmental
treaties and norms "could have intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its right
of self-defense under international law because of its obligations to protect the
environment."51
The International Court of Justice stressed, however, that environmental
considerations must be taken into account by states exercising self-defense "when
assessiang what is necessary and proportionate," and that "Respect for the
environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in
conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality."52 Despite their
widespread, long-term and severe effects on the natural environment and all humanity,
nuclear weapons can lawfully be used only in extreme cases of self-defense, "in which
the very survival of a State would be at stake,"53 but this must be within the very strict
requirements of self-defence.54
From all of the above one can conclude that the requirements of self-defense
tolerate measures, tactics, methods, and/or means which may cause environmental
damage or destruction provided that such measures, tactics, methods and/or means
must meet the strict requirements of self-defence, necessity and proportionality, and
that failure to meet any of the two requirements renders the measures, tactics,
methods, and/or means illegal. The state violating any of the requirements of self-
defense becomes, ipso facto, responsible for any environmental damage or destruction
that caused its action.
But, can it be suggested that the use of oil by Iraq as a weapon or force and the
targeting by Iraq of Kuwaiti oil as an object ofmilitary attacks satisfy the requirements
of self-defense and are therefore legitimate under international law? Although the use
of oil as a weapon or force and the targeting of oil as an object of military attacks
mught have been considered to have achieved certain military objectives, which is a
doubtful conclusion, such use and targeting could not be accepted to satisfy the
prerequisites or requirements of self-defense. Iraq was the aggressor when it invaded
and occupied Kuwait, Iraq was again the aggressor when it rejected to withdraw its
forces from Kuwait in accordance with the requirements of various Security Council
resolutions dealing with the situation beginning from resolution 660 to resoltuion 678
which demanded that Iraq unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait and
implement all Security Council resolutions and authorized member states cooperating
with the Government of Kuwait "to use all necessay means to uphold and implement
Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area."55 Iraq had no right to defend itself
against the military measures taken by the member states cooperating with the
Government of Kuwait to oust the Iraqi forces from Kuwait in accordance with
U.N.Security Council resolutions including resolution 678 and in accordance with the
great and immutable law of self-defense. An aggressor does not have any right to
defend itself against any act taken in self-defense against the aggression committed by
that aggression. Again, an aggressor does not have any right to defend itself against
measures or acts adopted or taken under or in accordance with a Security Council
authority or authorization. If the aggressor is said to have a right to self-defense
against defensive acts taken by the state against which the aggression was or is still
being committed or against acts of collective defence or against measures and acts of
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collective security adopted by or under a Security Council authority or authorization,
then the whole base and foundation and the very existence of the world or
international public order, the United Nations system and international law will be
dismantled and eliminated all together.
Ill
The International Law Applicable To the
Actual Conduct of War (Jus in bello)
And
The Relevance to Environmental Damage
This section will be divided into three sub-sections. Sub-section one deals
with Treaties Prohibiting Certain Weapons which have Significant Environmental
Impacts, sub-section two deals with Treaties Prohibiting Military Activities,
Operations, and/or Conducts which Significantly Affect the Environment. Finally,
sub-section three deals with the Rules and Principles ofCustomary International Law
Applicable to the Actual Conduct of War (Jus in hello) and the Relevance to
environmental damage during or because of armed conflicts.
III.1
Treaties Prohibiting Certain
Weapons which have Significant
Environmental Impacts
The field of chemical and biological weapons was one of the fields that
witnessed the earliest attempts to outlaw certain types of such weapons and to prohibit
them completely. Thus, the Hague Declaration (IV.2) concerning Asphyxiating
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Gases of 1899 proscribed the use of projectile, the sole object of which is the
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.56 The Hague Convention (IV)
Respecting the laws and Customs ofWar on Land of 1907 prohibits the employment
of poison or poisoned weapons.57 The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of
the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological
Methods ofWarfare prohibits the use of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases, it also
prohibits all analogous materials, liquids, or devices. Bacteriological methods of
warfare are proscribed as well.58 The most comprehensive convention concerning
bacteriological weapons is the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction which proscribes, inter alia, the use, in war or
armed conflicts or other hostile purposes, of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
weapons.59
The 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereinafter
cited as the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) aims at excluding"completely
the possibility of the use of chemical weapons"60 As a result, the Convention included
in its first article the general and basic obligation of states in this connection. This
article reads:
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under
any circumstances:
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(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or
retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or
indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical
weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage, or induce in any way, anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under
this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it
owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its
jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons
it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical
weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that
are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as
a method ofwarfare."
All those basic obligations will, indeed, insure the complete exclusion of all
types of chemical weapons from ever being used in warfare or armed conflicts or in
any other hostile situations. The absolute proscription of chemical weapons is a
significant first step towards the elimination of all weapons of mass-destruction.
It should in this connection be noted that, as widely reported, Iraq did in fact
use poisonous, bacteriological and chemical weapons against Iran in the first Gulf
Armed Conflict (1980-88) and against Kurds in northern Iraq several times, and it
should also be noted that as will be seen in chapter three, Security resolutions oblige
Iraq to disclose all information it has concerning its weapons of mass destruction.
Such resolutions order the dismantling and elimination of all Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction.
With regard to the remaining type of weapons of mass-destruction not yet
completely proscribed, the nuclear weapons, we referred earlier to examples of treaties
establishing nuclear-free-zones or areas; but most important are the declarations made
by the five nuclear-weapons states on the occasion of the extension of the 1968 Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nucelar Weapons (NPT). These declarations include
commitments by each of the five states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapon states that were parties to the NPT; the U.N.Security Council noted with
appreciation these commitments in its resolution No.984(1995) which was adopted
unanimously on the eleventh of April, 1995. Thus, we may fairly assert that the
commitments made by the five-nuclear-weapons states on the occasion of the
extension of the NPT do amount to an almost, but not yet total, proscription against the
use of nuclear weapons in warfare or armed conflicts or other hostile situations. The
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) did not, however, find that all nuclear weapon
treaties have, so far, amounted to "a comprehensive and universal conventional
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prohibition on the use or the threat to use those weapons as such.61 But, the Court
noted also that according to the said treaties and the declarations made by the five-
nuclear weapon states, "a number of States have undertaken not to use nuclear
weapons in specific zones (Latin America, the South Pacific) or against certain other
States (non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons).62
The use of conventional weapons in warfare and other hostile situations have
been subject to increasing restriction. Expulsive projectiles under 400 grammes,
dum-dum bullets, mines, booby traps and other devices have been either proscribed or
restricted. But the treaty which is of utmost importance insofar as this research is
concerned because of its environmental relevance is the 1980 Convention on
Prohibitions or restrictions on the use ofCertain Conventional Weapons which may be
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (hereinafter cited
as the Inhumane Weapons Convention).63 This convention restricts the use of certain
weapons including those methods and means ofwarfare which are intended, or may be
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment, in addition, it bans making "forests or other kinds of plant cover the
object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to




Treaties Prohibiting Military Activities
And Operations which Significantly
Affect the Environment
Most relevant in this regard are the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of
1977 which will be discussed below, but we must first refer to relevant provisions in
the Geneva Convention IV.
A) Geneva Convention IV:
Although the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not say much about the protection
of the environment, Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time ofWar signed at Geneva on 12 August 1949 (hereinafter the Geneva
Civilians Convention)65 included a provision which is directly relevant; article 53
reads:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectively to private persons,
or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.
Although this article applies only to occupied territories, it provides
considerable protection against environmental damage or destruction as such damage
or destruction occurs in most cases by the occupying forces during the time of
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occupation and, in particular, at the time during which such fores are being fought out
and forced out. In the armed conflict in the Gulf, much of the environmental damage
and destruction occurred as a result of massive destruction of property carried out in
occupied Kuwaiti territory by the Iraqi forces; the destruction of hundreds of Kuwaiti
oil wells by the Iraqi forces is a clear example.66 In addition, the environment of the
state is a property of that state and any damage or destruction of the environment of
the occupied territory of a state is a destruction of the property of that state which is
prohibited under article 53 of the Geneva Civilians Convention and other relevant
rules of international law.67
Furthermore, the Geneva Civilians Convention has included a provision
proscribing the "extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly."68 This provision is also
a ground for claiming the illegality of much of the environmental damage and
destruction that took place in the territory of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces.
The four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 are now considered the most
universally recognized instruments in the law of armed conflict and international
humanitarian law and are considered to have been universally accepted as part of
customary international law binding upon all states. Iraq itself has been a party to the
four Geneva Conventions since 1956 and is of course bound by all the provisions
referred to above. Had Iraq been willing to respect and observe its obligations arising
from the international humanitarian law, it would have never violated the rules of the
Geneva Civilians Convention including articles 53 and 147. And had Iraq been
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willing to respect and observe its basic international obligations, it would have never
thought of invading Kuwait and occupying its territory.
B) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventionof 12
August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts. (Protocol II:
The rise of environmental concerns and fears during the early seventies of the
twentieth century and the international reaction to widespread and severe
environmental damage caused by the war in Vietnam have influenced the formulation
of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
[hereinafter cited as Protocol I] . This Protocol included provisions concerning the
protection of the environment and environmental objects during armed conflicts.
First: Article 54ofProtocol I dealt with the protection of objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population; paragraph 2 of this article states:
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as
foodstuffs, agricultural area for the production of foodstuffs,
crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and
irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party,
whatever the motive, whether in order to stave out civilians, to
cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
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Although it appears that this provision offers a wide and high-level of
protection to the objects or targets stated in it, qualifications and exceptions introduced
in the same paragraph and other paragraphs in article 54 severely weaken this
protection. The first qualification was stated in paragraph 2 itself when it declared that
the prohibition against the attack or destruction of the said objects applies "for the
specfic purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population
or to adverse Party"; therefore, if the purpose is not to deprive civilians of the
sustenance value of such objects, then such objects may be subjected to any attack or
destruction which would be legal unless proscribed by some other rules of law. The
exceptions to the prohibition are stated in paragraphs 3 and 5 in the same article;
paragraph 3 reads:
The prohibition in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as
are used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces, or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support ofmilitary action, provided, however,
that in no event shall action against these objects be taken which may be expected to
leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its
starvation or force its movement.
Thus, the object, otherwise protected, may be lawfully attacked or destroyed if
used by the enemy as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces or if used
forces or if used to directly support the enemy's military action. Paragraph 5 states:
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In recognition of the vital requiarements of any Party to the conflict
in the defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation
from the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a
Party to the conflict within such territory under its own control
where required by imperative military necessity.
Accordingly, the vital requirements of any party to an armed conflict in the
defence of its national territory against invasion allow that party to attack or destroy
objects, otherwise protected under paragraph 2, provided that such objects are located
within territory under its control. We may add to this exception that an attack against
or destruction of such protected objects may be tolerated under the requirements of
national self-defence even if attacked or destroyed object is located within the
enemy's territory/'9
Secondly: Article 56 of Protocol 1 provides for works and installations containing
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations;
paragraph 1 of this article reads:
Works or installations containing dangerous force, namely
dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall
not be made the object of attack, even where these objects
are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release
of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among
the civilian population. Other military objectives located at
or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be
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made the object of attack if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous force from the works or installations
and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population.
But an attack may lawfully be made against a nuclear electrical generating
station "only if it provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of
military operations" provided that "such attack is the only feasible way to terminate
such support."70 In addition, dams and dykes may be subjected to a lawful attack if
they are used for other than their normal functions and in regular, significant and direct
support of military operations" provided that such attack is "the only feasible way to
terminate such support."71
Thirdly: Article 55 of Protocol I deals with the protection of the natural
environment; it states:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long-term and severe
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of
methods of means of warfare which are intended or may be
expected to cause such damage to natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals
are prohibited.
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In this connection, article 35(3) reads: "It is sprohibited to employ methods or
means of warfare which are intended, may be expected, to cause widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment."
Hence, Protocol I protects the natural environment against only "widespread,
long-term and severe damage." But if the damage to the environment is not
widespread, long-term and severe, the protection under Protocol I will not apply.
But methods of means of warfare will be unlawful if deliberately used or
employed to cause widespread, long term and severe damage to the natural
environment or if not deliberately used or employed to cause such damage, they may
be expected to cause it. However, it should be stressed that Protocol I did not define
any of the terms "widespread", "long-term", or "severe". But the travaux
preparatories to the Protocol included an explanation of the term "long-term" as
being the element of duration which:
was considered by some to be measured in decades. Reference to twenty or
thirty years was made by some representatives as being a minimum. Others
referred to battlefield destruction in France in the First World War as being
outside the scope of the prohibition It appeared to be a widely shared
assumption that battlefield damage incidental to conventional warfare would
not normally be proscribed by this provision.72
The travauxpreparatories did not define or explain the other two terms. The
explanation of the element of duration "long-term" stated above did not include any
widely agreed upon definition of that term; it merely expressed the views of "some"
representatives as to "duration" and as to the exclusion of "incidental damage".
Therefore, one is inclined to accept the view that the definitions of these terms would
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be the same as the identical or similar terms included in the Understanding annexed to
the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any other hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (the Emmod Convention)73 which seem to
be reasonable. "Widespread" would thus mean "encompassing an area on the scale of
several hundred square kilometers"; "long-term" or "long-lasting" as the term used in
the Emmod Convention would mean "lasting for a period of months, or
approximately a season"; and "severe" would mean "involving serious or significant
disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets."74
Thus, in our view, articles 35(3) and 55 ofProtocol I confers upon the natural
environment total and complete protection against any widespread, long-term and
severe damage during or because of armed conflicts without any other qualifications.
In our view, these conventional rules included in articles 35(3) and 55 of
Protocol I proscribing the employment of methods or means of warfate which are
intended or may be expected to cause widespread long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment are obligatory and binding upon all states and all parties to any
war or armed conflicts irrespective of whether or not they have become parties to
Protocol I as these rules constitute part of the general international law binding upon
all states. Although this view is contested by some writers75, the great majority of
those who have written on the subject have adopted the view that the rules included in
articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol I do constitute part of customary international law or
that they are reflective of customary international law.76 Some went even to suggest
that such rules are part of the fundamentals of general international law.77 In addition,
the International Court of Justice seems to have accepted the view that the provisions
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of the Additional Protocols are being expressive of the Hague law and Geneva law
and they, therefore, constitute part of customary international law.78
Thus, it is evident that Protocol I as expressive of the general international law
bestows upon the natural environment in any war situation total and compelte
protection against the use or employment of any methods or means ofwarfare which
are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage.
In addition, it must be asserted that any activity or any method or means which may
be lawful under any provision in Protocol I or under customary international law
would become unlawful if in any particular circumstances could be expected to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
As a result of the customary nature of Protocol I and its binding force, Iraq
was under a fundamental international obligation to fully respect and observe the
rules incorporated in articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol 1 concerning the prohibition of
employment of methods or means of warfare which were intended, or might have
been expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment of Kuwait during the 1990-91 Gulf War even though Iraq had not
ratified Protocol I and has not yet become party to the said Protocol. Iraq's action
against the Kuwaiti environment was deliberate and it caused widespread, long-term
and severe damage to that environment as will be illustrated in detail in chapter three,
infra. Iraq's actions represent a flagrant violation by Iraq of its international
obligations under customary and fundamental general international law embodied in
Protocol I.78 Iraq is liable to pay compensation for such damage (see chapter four,
infra).
125
C) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts:
(Protocol III:
Although the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims ofNon-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) [hereinafter cited as Protocol II] applies only to internal or non-
international armed conflicts, yet it contained a number of provisions giving
protection to certain environmental objects. Thus, article 14 of the Protocol confers
protection, without any qualifications or exceptions, upon works and installations
containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating
stations. Moreover, article 16 of the same Protocol confers protection upon cultural
objects and places ofworship, this article states:
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility
directed against historic monument, works of art or places of
worship which constitue or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to
use them in support of the military effort.
This provision is unique in the sense that a similar provision was not included
Protocol I. It must be stressed, however, that a provision on the protection of natural
environment was not included in Protocol II.
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D) Convention on the Prohibition ofMilitary
Or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmenal
Modification Techniques:
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (hereinafter cited as the Enmod Convention)
was signed at Geneva on 18 May 1977 and entered into force on 5 October 1978.79
This Convention is designed to combat the use of the environment as a method or
means ofwarfare; thus the first paragraph of the preamble states:
The States Parties to this Convention, guided by the interest of
consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cuase of
halting the arms race, and of bringing about general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control, and of
saving mankind from the danger of using new means ofwarfare,
In order to achieve this aim, the Enmod Convention stipulated in its first article that:
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread,
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to
any other state party.
2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or
induce any State, group of States or international organizations to engage in
activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.
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Accordingly, the Enmod Convention prohibits acts, activities or operations
which have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury"; therefore it is enough for the effect of effects to satisfy one
qualification only, either widespread, or long-lasting or severe.80 Widespread was
interpreted to mean "encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square
kilometres;" while "long-lasting"was interpreted to mean "lasting for a period of
months, or approximately a season", on the other hand "severe" was interpreted to
mean"involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and
economic resources or other assets".81
In addition, the environmental modification techniques which are prohibited
under the Enmod Convention must be directed at achieving destruction, damage or
injury; the element of "intent" must, therefore, exist in order to satisfy the
requirements of "prohibition" under the Enmod Convention.82
As a result, the Convention does not prohibit or hinder "the use of
environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.83
The term "environmental modification techniques" was defined in the second
article of the Enmod Convention to mean; "any technique for changing through the
deliberate manipulation of natural processes the dynamics, composition or structure of
the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer
space."
In our view, the prohibition of the military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other State Party services
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three types of purposes; (a) environmental purposes, (b) arms control and
disarmament, and (c) establishing the international responsibility of the violators
whether in peace-time or in war and armed conflict situations. Thus if a state uses
environmental modification techniques as a method or means of warfare to achieve
war or military objective, that state would be internationally responsible for any
destruction, damage or injury to the enemy state, or to any other state.
In this connection, the Iraqis' caused oil spills and oil fires in Kuwait and the
Iraqis' caused damage to the environment of Kuwait have been subject to an extensive
debate centered on the applicability of the provisions of the Enmod Convention and
whether the Iraqi actions causing the oil spills and oil fires in Kuwait were prohibited
under this Convention.84 In our view, Iraq has indeed violated the provisions of the
Enmod Convention, even though Iraq was not a party to the said Convention, for the
following reasons:
Firstly: It is clear that Iraq deliberately used oil spills and oil fires; the element
of intent required by the Enmod Convention did exist.
Secondly: The Enmod Convention does not include an exhaustive list of
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other state, the Convention refers to "any
technique". It is widely accepted that oil spills and oil fires are among the techniques
that would be proscribed under the Enmod Convention if deliberately used to effect
wide-spread, long-lasting or severe destruction, damage or injury to any other state.85
Thirdly: Causing wide-spread, long-lasting or severe destruction, damage or injury
in a deliberate form, to the environment of any other state runs contrary to customary
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international law in time of peace and to customary and conventional international
law in time ofwar (international humanitarian law), and exceeds the requirements of
necessity and proportionality required by the laws and armed conflicts.8'
II 1.3
Customary International Law Applicable
To the Actual Conduct ofMilitary Operations in
War or Armed Conflicts (Jus in hello)
And the Relevance to Environmental Damage
A. The Martens Clause as Customary International
Law and the Customary Principles of Warfare:
The Martens Clause was first included in the 1899 Hague Convention II with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land which stated that "in cases not
included in the regulations adopted by them (the Hague Contracting Parties),
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized
nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience".86
The 1907 Hague Convention(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land
included the same clause with a minor modification in wording; it states that "in cases
not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of law of nations, as they
resuslt from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."87 It appears from the two quoted
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texts that the minor changes in the wording do not effect any change in the meanings
of the two texts which are identical. A modern formulation of the Martens Clause
was included in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol I of 1977 which reads :
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection
and authority of the principles of international law derived from
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience.
The importance of the Martens Clause is represented in the fact that it
manifests the incorporation of customary international law rules protecting civilians
and combatants into conventional norms and the application of such rules to states
that have not adhered to treaties governing or regulating the law of war or armed
conflict. The Martens Clause has universally been accepted to be binding upon all
states. A seemingly wide consensus on certain principles of customary international
law of warfare which have direct bearing on the protection of the environment has
developed ; the most important of these principles are; (a) the principle of humanity,
(b) the principle of proportionaltiy, (c) the principle of discrimination, and (d) the
principle of necessity. It seems that there is a universal agreement that these four
principles constitute the cardinal principles of the custommary international law of
warfare and the essentials of international humanitarian law. A discussion of these
principles insofar as they relate to the protection of the enviornment and the
international responsibility for environmental damage resulting from armed conflict
follows below:
131
1. The Principle of Humanity:
The principle of humanity prohibits the use, in the conduct of warfare or
hostilities, of any weapon or tactic which causes unnecessary suffering to its victims
"whether this by way of prolonged or painful death or is in a form calculated to cause
severe fright or terror."88 The first version of this principle was included in the 1868
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time ofWar, ofExplosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight;89 This declaration proscribed "The employment of arms which
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death, inevitable"
and declared that "the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the
laws of humanity".90 The Regulations Annexed to the 1899 Convention(II) with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land prohibited the employment of
"arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury".91 While the
Regulations Annexed to the 1907 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land prohibited the employment of "arms, projectiles, or material
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering".92 It seems to the writer that the difference
in the wording of the 1899 and 1907 Conventions do not change the meaning of the
two texts which are identical. The principle of humanity which prohibits any weapon
or tactic which causes unnecessary suffering or injury or severe fright or terror has
been recognized as rooted in customary international law binding upon all states. As
a result, all forms of environmental warfare and deliberate environmental damage or
destruction are contrary to the international humanitarian law as they are likely to
cause unnecessary injury or suffering or severe fright or terror. Consequently, any
state which engages in environmental warfare or causes deliberate environmental
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damage or destruction must be legally held in breach of customary humanitarian law
and responsible for any such damage or destruction.93
The ICJ has recognized "elementary considerations of humanity" when it
found that Albania was bound to notify approaching warships of a known danger
from mines.94 The principles of humanity was again recognized by the ICJ when it
declared in another case that : "if a State lays mines in any waters whatever in which
the vessels of another state have rights of access or passage, and fails to give any
warning or notification whatsoever, in disregard of the security of peaceful shipping,
it commits a breach of the principles of humanitarian law..."95
2. The Principle of Proportionality:
In the context ofwarfare, proportionality means that weapons, tactics, methods or
means of attack must be selected in type, size, and degree that is proportionate to
the military objectives to be achieved; and excessive damage or destruction is
prohibited and is contrary to the customary humanitarian law. Any state violating
this rule and causes damage or destruction to the environment of another state
must, therefore, be held responsible.96
3. The Principle of Discrimination:
According to the principle of discrimination, weapons, tactics, means and/or
methods of attack or warfare employed by any of the parties to a military conflict
must clearly discriminate between military and non-military targets, non-military
targets are not legitimate objects of a military attack. Consequently, "indiscriminate
warfare is illegal per se"91 The customary principle of discrimination was first
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incorporated into the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, referred to earlier,98 when it
declared that "the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy".99 Thus, non-military
targets including the environment may not be subject to military attacks. Article 48
of the 1977 Protocol I incorporated the principle of discrimination when it declared
that parties to a military conflict "shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." This Protocol proscribed attacks on the natural environment as it has
been pointed out earlier.100
4. The Principle of Necessity:
The principle of necessity in the context of warfare differs from the requirements
of necessity as one of the essential prerequisites of self-defence as illustrated
earlier.101 The principle of necessity in the context of the conduct of warfate or
armed-conflicts refers to military necessities, thus, only weapons, tactics, methods
and/or means of attack or warfare which are not prohibited by international law and
without which military objectives cannot be accomplished are allowed to be used or
employed to achieve such objectives. Any excessive use or employment of such
weapons, tactics, methods, or means of attack or warfare which is not necessary to
achieve or accomplish the user's military objectives is, therefore, unlawful.102
Article 23(g) of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on
Land annexed to the 1899 Hague Convention (II) and the 1907 Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land103 and article 53 of the 1949
Geneva Civilians Convention (IV)103 include a codification of the customary law
principle of military necessity. Thus it is prohibited to "destroy or seize the enemy's
property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities ofwar".105 Moreover:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to
the Strate or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative
organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations. 106
An essential element of consideration to be used in evaluating the acts of the
state or power inflicting destruction is whether such acts are taken or carried out in the
context of a lawful self-defense or in the context of an unlawful aggression.107
Consequently, any destruction of the environment or any use of any method or
techniques of environmental warfare which is not absoslutely necessary to repel and
defeat the aggressor must be considered unlawful and prohibited. Iraq's actions
against Kuwait's environment and Kuwaiti oil must therefore be considered prohibited
and unlawful.
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The months of January and February of 1991 witnessed the most destructive
ecological crime ever committed in the history of mankind on earth. Responding to
Coalition air force attacks on Iraq's military targets in both Kuwait and Iraq, Iraq
intentionally released millions of barrels of crude oil from the Kuwait Oil Company
Sea Island terminal off Mina Al-Ahmedi and from five oil tankers anchored off Al-
Ahmadi and, also, from oil wells close to the Gulf. In addition, Iraq dumped large
quantities of crude oil from Mina Al-Bakr offshore terminal near the Kuwaiti borders.
Although estimates of the volume of crude oil dumped by Iraq into the Gulf water
varied from as low as 3 million barrels to as high as 13 million barrels or even higher,
Kuwaiti sources put the volume at 6 million barrels or more.1 This is by far the largest
oil spill ever known in the history ofmankind. It was a premeditated crime committed
by the Iraqi authorities against the Kuwaiti environment and the environment of the
whole Gulf area. An oil slick, the largest in history, extending thousands of square
kilometers across the sea area of the Gulf resulted from the spill. This slick
detrimentally affected the whole Gulf and the shores of Gulf states. The very stressed
environment of the Gulf area and Gulf water has been severely damaged. Floating tar
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balls and petroleum hydrocarbon residues in water, sediment and biota caused by the
oil spill have adversely affected the delicate ecosystem of the Gulf Desalination
installations were detrimentally affected. Great losses to bird, mammal, and fish
population of the sea area of the Gulf have been observed. The destruction of shrimp
industry and other sea related industries has been noticed. Fresh water sources have
been harmed.2
Oil Fires:
Another serious crime committed by the Iraqi authorities during the second
GulfWar was the burning of oil wells in Kuwait which was "the most widely known
and obvious consequence of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict."3 When it became clear that
Iraqi forces were being defeated and were preparing to withdraw from Kuwait, these
forces executed the carefully prepared plan to burn Kuwaiti oil wells. A total of 727
oil wells were set on fire.4 Large amounts of other wells were destroyed without being
set ablaze which led to the constitution of huge oil lakes.5 In addition, large oil storage
facilities and two of the largest oil refineries in Kuwait were also set on fire.6 This was
a premeditated serious crime committed by the Iraqi authorities. It caused the world's
greatest environmental disasters in the history ofmankind.
Fires and smoke resulting from burning oil wells have the most serious air
pollution ever known in history; large clouds of smoke have covered the Gulf area
and appeared as far as the countries of eastern Europe, the southern part of the former
Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Black rain and soot were also observed
in the same areas. In Kuwait, huge numbers of plants and birds were killed because of
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the very large oil lakes which were expected to cause major enviornmental damage
and land degradation on a large scale.7 Moreover, "(a) lower temperatures from lack
of sunlight which could shorten agricultural growing seasons; (b) the covering of
crops, grass and palm trees with oil; and (c) consequential damage through the food
chain," all ofwhich did have severe effects on Kuwait and other Gulf states and will
continue to have such effects for many years to come.8 The levels of toxic and
noxious materials and particles which are very harmful to the health and well-being of
the people of Kuwait and other Gulf states are reported to be much higher than the
maximum acceptable levels. Many other harmful effects are being reported.9 Studies
are being carried out in various scientific institutions to determine the exact long-term
harmful effects of the Gulf War environmental crimes committed by the Iraqi
authorities or under orders from those authorities.
Now, what was the Security Council's response to Iraqi crimes against the
Kuwait environment and that of the Gulf and other States? And did the Council have
the power and authority to adopt the measures it adopted?
Below we will study the actions adopted by the Security Council and the
authority of the Council to adopt such actions. The U.N. Compensation Commission
established by Security Council resolution 687 and its role with regard to matters of
liability and compensation concerning environmental losses, damage or destruction





Soon after the end of the second Gulf War and on April 3, 1991 the
U.N.Security Council adopted its Resolution No. 687 in which the Council dealt with
the conditions of a permanent cease-fire and the restoration of peace and security in
the area. This resolution included a number of provisions concerning compensation
for environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources. Thus the Security
Council:
16. Reaffirms that Iraq is liable under international law for
any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and
the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign
Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's
unlawful invasion and occupation ofKuwait;
18. Decides to create a Fund to pay compensation for claims that
fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a
Commission that will administer the Fund;
19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the
Council for decision, no later than 30 days following the
adoption of this resolution, recommendations for the Fund to
meet the requirement for the payment of claims established
in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a
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programmed implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17,
and 18 above, 10
The provisions quoted above from Resolution 687 did, in fact, reaffirm and
eleaborate the provisions stated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Security Council Resolution
674 of 29 October 1990 in which the Security Council:
8. Reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any
loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third
States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
9. Invites States to collect relevant information regarding their
claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for
restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to
such arrangements as may be established in accordance with
international law; 11
The importance of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Resolution 674 quoted above lies in
the fact that it was the first time that the Security Council referred to the Iraqi
liability, under international law, for any wartime loss, damage or injury as a result of
"the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq" and that a claim settlement
process ensuring that restitution or financial compensation by Iraq would be
established and effected. But, Resolution 687 was unprecedented in the sense that it
was the first time in history that the Security Council recognized in very clear and
unequivocal terms that any environmental loss or damage and the depletion of natural
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resources during or as a result of armed conflicts were compensable under
international law.12
Furthermore, Security Council Resolution 687 specified that Iraq's liability is
based on its "invasion and illegal occupation ofKuwait"; thus, the Council selected to
base Iraq's liability on its unlawful use of force in violation of the U.N.Charter
regardless of whether or not Iraq violated the laws governing and regulating the
actual conduct ofwar orjus in bello,13
However, the Security Council acknowledged, in paragraph 16 of its
resolution 687 previously quoted, that only "direct" loss or damage "as a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait" was compensable; but any or all direct
losses and damage were compensable. This is in conformity with international law
which requires a link between the state's action or conduct violating any of that
state's international obligations and the loss or damage occurred or occurring.14
In order to enforce Iraq's liability, the Security Council decided "to create a
fund to pay compensation for claims" and "to establish a Commission that will
administer the Fund".15 The U.N. Secretary-General proposed that the Fund would be
established as "a special account of the United Naiton"16 and would be known as "the
United Nations Compensation Fund'"7 which enjoys the privileges and immunities of
the United Nations.18 In addition, the Secretary-General proposed the Commission
administering the Fund would be known as "the United Nations Compensation
Commission"19 and would "function under the authority of the Security Council"20
and would "be a subsidiary organ thereof."21 The U.N. Security Council approved the
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Secretary-General's report including these proposals by its Resolution No.692 of 20
May 1991 in which the Council:
3. Decides to establish the Fund and the Commission referred to
in paragraph 18 of resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with
section 1 of the Secretary-General's report, and that the Governing
Council will be located at the United Nations Office at Geneva and
that the Governing Council may decide whether some of the
activities of the Commission should be carried out elsewhere;
5. Directs the Governing Council to proceed in an expeditious
manner to implement the provisions of Section E of resolution
687(1991), taking into account the recommendations in Section II
of the Secretary General's report;....
9. Decides that if the Governing Council notifies the Security
Council that Iraq has failed to carry out decisions of the Governing
Council taken pursuant to paragraph 5 of the present resolution, the
Security Council intends to retain or to take action to reimpose the
prohibition against the import of petroleum and petroleum products
originating in Iraq and financial transactions related thereto;...22
Section E of Security Council resolution 687 referred to in paragraph 5 of
Resolution 692 quoted above deals with Iraq's liability under international law for
losses and damage caused because of Iraq's invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait,
Iraq's obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt, the
establishment of the U.N.Compensation Fund and the Commission administering the
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Fund, and the proposals to be made by the U.N. Secretary-General for the operation
and running of the Fund and the Commission.2'
The Governing Council of the Commission was set to be constituted of "the
representatives of the current members of the Security Council at any given time."24
The Security Council decided to set the compensation to be paid by Iraq into the
Compensation Fund at a maximum rate of 30% of the annual value of the exports of
petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq; thus the Security Council in its
Resolution 705 of 15 August 1991:
2. Decides that compensation to be paid by Iraq (as arising
from section E of resolution 687) shall not exceed 30 per cent of
the annual value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum
products from Iraq;
3. Decides Further to review the figure established in
paragraph 2 above from time to time in light of data and
assumptions contained in the letter of the Secretary-General
(S/22661) and other relevant documents.25
Later resolutions of the Security Council set the maximum rate to be paid by
Iraq into the Compensation Fund at 25 per cent of the annual value of the exports of
petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq.26
A detailed study of the Fund and the Commission, its jurisdiction and work in
relation to the environment, the rules it adopted for the establishment of Iraq's
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liability in this connection, and further developments and actions by the Security
Council will be the subject of chapter four of this dissertation.
Ill
THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
DETERMINE ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION AND TO ESTABLISH THE U.N.
COMPENSATION FUND AND THE COMMISSION
THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
TO ACT AS A LEGISLATOR AND JUDICIARY
AND TO ESTABLISH ORGANS FUNCTIONING AS COURTS
Article 24 of the U.N.Charter stipulates :
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for
the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters
VI,VII,VIII, and XII.
Thus, the Security Council is entrusted with "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security." The Security Council must "act in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations" and within the
scope of specific powers granted to it in the Charter as laid down in Chapters VI, VII,
VIII and XII. Chapter VI deals with Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Chapter VII
deals with Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression, Chapter VIII deals with Regional Arrangements, and, finally,
Chapter XII deals with the International Trusteeship System. The question as to
whether the U.N.Security Council has the authority to determine issues of liability
and compensation and to establish the U.N. Compensation Fund and the Commission
and the impacts on issues of environemntal damage caused during or as a result of
armed conflicts have caused many problems and has not been agreed upon between
international law writers. Some writers have criticized the Security Council and the
actions it took as either ultra vires or at least as fallen outside the specific powers of
the Council. Some have suggested that the Security Council should not have acted as
a legislature or a judiciary. But the correct view, in our view, is that the Security
Council has acted legally and has violated none of the provisions of the Charter. In
the following pages we will discuss the two oppossing views regarding this matter.
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A
The Views Criticizine the Security Council
and the Actions it Adopted
Some writers and even some states criticized the Security Council and
claimed that it did not possess the power to determine issues of liability and
compensation. It has been stated that :
The Security Council, under the Charter does not have the power
to made decisions as to liability or to determine compensation or
restitution, such as a court might do. The only references in the
Charter to such matters appear in Article 92, which quite clearly
defines the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. The only reference in the entire
Charter to the issue of compensation or restitution is to be found in
Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.27
This line of argumentation goes to the very heart of the problem of
competence of the Security Council and was used by Cuba to justify its opposition to
resolution 674 reminding Iraq that it is liabale, under international law, "for any loss,
damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and
corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation ofKuwait by Iraq" and
its opposition to resolutions 686 and 687 which included similar clauses. Thus
Cuba's line of argumentation suggests that the Security Council does not have any
judicial power or the power to make decision as to liability or to determine
compensation or restitution; such a power lies with the International Court of Justice
157
or other international courts or arbitration. It is suggested also that, under the Charter
of the United Nations, the Security Council is a "political" and an "executive" organ
which has political and executive powers and should not have judicial or legislative
powers; Thus, the Security Council is not authorized by the Charter "to decide issues
of liability and compensation."28 But it is authorized to "recommend terms of
settlement which may include terms relating to liability and compensation."29 The
powers of the Security Council to decide or to issue binding decisions can only be
exercised under articles 41 and 42 of the U.N.Charter after the Council has made, in
accordance with article 39 a finding that a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace,
or an act of aggression has existed. Article 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate; it
may take such action by air, sea or land force as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces ofMembers of the United Nations.
It is clear then that article 42 deals with measures involving the use of armed
force and it thus becomes inapplicable to the determination of liability and
compensation and the creation of the Compensation Commission as such matters do
not involve the use of force. Nor is article 41 applicable as it deals with sanctions or
enforcement measures not involving the use of armed force. Article 41 provides:
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The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.
Whence, it is claimed that article 41 does not lend support to "the imposition of
liability and the creation of the Compensation Commission"30 and that the "creation
of a Compensation Commission is not an enforcement measure but a means of
settling a dispute."31
Another line of argumentation rests upon the principle of the separation of
powers suggesting that the U.N.Charter envisaged a system which can be compared
with that of any democratic state. The Security Council is entrusted with the political
or executive powers, the General Assembly is entrusted with legislative or semi-
legislative powers, and the International Court of Justice is entrusted with the judicial
powers or the juridical settlement of disputes.32 It is inappropriate for the Security
Council to consider and decide matters that involve legal issues or the juridical
settlement of disputes. The Statute of the International Court of Justice which as
stipulated in article 92 of the U.N. Charter forms an integral part of that Charter vests
the Court with the primary jurisdiction and power to settle legal disputes concerning;
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
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breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or existence of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation;33
Whence, if the Security Council is faced with a legal issue or problem it should refer
it to the I.C.J, for an advisory opinion, or should request the parties to refer it to the
Court for a legal decision. The U.N.Charter declared that the Security Council should
"take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the
parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court."34 Consequently, all legal claims concerning the determination
of Iraq's liability and compensation should have been referred to the I.C.J, or another
judicial form or international arbitration agreed upon by the parties; the role of the
Security Council should have been to recommend the reference of such claims and
disputes by the parties to the appropriate judicial forum of their choice, as such claims
and disputes raise legal issues which require adjudication in a proper international
judicial or arbitration forum.35
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the Security Council should not decide
matters of liability, compensation and restitution and other legal disputes, for it will
be inappropriate for the Council to decide such matters because its decisions are
influenced by national self-interest and that decisions of the Council require political
considerations.36 The Security Council is composed of states each of which has its
national self-interest and uses its voting power to protect such interests, and as it has
been voiced:
When national self-interest generally prejudices an institution, it
cannot be expected to apply the law judicially. A dichotomy exists
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between the rule of law and the interests of states, which influences
a political institution's adjudication of questions Therefore, to
empower the Security Council, which is composed of states
primarily guided by political forces, is to invite a non-judicial
application of the law. The Council's actions are unjust and,
therefore, inappropriate to the extent that a dissonance exists
between a legal conclusion and the Security Council's political
conclusion.37
Thus it becomes clear that whilst the rules of law may provide a certain
answer or solution to a legal dispute or a legal issue, the Security Council may adopt
a different and perhaps an entirely opposite solution, as the Council is certain to be
guided by the political interests of its members in its decision-making process. Such a
solution would obviously be unjust and biased. And, "a biased decision-maker is
repugnant to any notion of fairness or justice."38 Should we then entrust the Security
Council which is a political institution vested with political and executive powers
with the power to decide "juridical question requiring in-depth legal analysis when
there are appropriate fora for the adjudication of such issues"?39
Moreover, it is asserted that Security Council's members' national political
interests do "solely' guide it because of the lack of procedural safeguards and rules
which protect the rights of disputants and ensure due process and the realization of
justice and fairness,40 while it is recognized that "due process rights and procedural
safeguards are general principles of law or customary international law."41 If the
Security Council continues to decide legal issues and legal disputes it must follow
procedural rules that are similar to those followed by courts of law or international
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arbitration and it must respect and ensure procedural rights of the disputants; the
composition of the Council must also be changed to guarantee that at any given time
a member of the Council who is at the same time is a party to a dispute before the
Council may not appear or participate as member or influence the Council to adopt a
particular decision; such a member may only be allowed to participate in the
proceedings on an equal footing with the other party to the dispute.42
It has additionally been maintained:
By failing to refer questions of law - which would normally be
addressed by a court - to the I.C.J., the Council dramatically
diminishes the I.C.J, 's legitimacy as a coordinating organ of the
United Nations... [TjheCouncil's actions seem counterproductive.
By ignoring the clear separation of function and power set forth in
the Charter, the Security Council diminishes the legitimacy of the
entire U.N. system.43
And it has been finally contended that the Council may not and cannot legally
establish judicial or semi-judicial organizations or bodies under article 29 of the
Charter or any other Charter provision to decide on matters of liability and
compensation including those relating to environmental damage or loss, as the
Security Council may not and cannot legally establish subsidiary organs or bodies
which have or exercise powers that the Council itself does not have nor can it
exercise. The Charter does not contain any provision which permits the Council to
act as a judicial organ, and only Security Council's decisions under articles 41 and 42
are legally binding and obligatory while decisions under Chapter VI concerning the
pacific settlement of disputes and decisions under article 40 concerning provisional
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measures are of recommendatory nature. Therefore, the Security Council does not
have the authority to act as a court settling legal disputes, nor does it have the
authority to establish subsidiary organs or bodies having judicial or semi-judicial
powers.44
B
The Views Supporting the Security Council
And the Actions it Adopted
The basic rules concerning Iraq's liability for loss, damage or injury to "foreign
Governments, national and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait" included in Security Council resolution 687 are not
unprecedented. In fact, resolution 686 concerning the temporary cease-fire and earlier
resolution 674 included similar provisions. Resolution 686 of 2 March 1991 included
its second paragraph in which the Security Council:
2. Demands that Iraq implements its acceptance of all twelve
resolutions noted above and in particular that Iraq:(a)
(b) accept in principle its liability under international law
for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait
and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a
result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq.
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Resolution 674 included a reminder that Iraq is liable under international law
for "any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their
nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of
Kuwait by Iraq". Thus it clearly appears that the Security Council is merely stating
the rules of international law concerning the responsibility of any state for grossly
violating its international obligations and its liability for any loss, damage or injury
caused by or as a result of such violation. Resolution 674 purely reminds Iraq of the
rules of international law on the matter whereas resolution 686 demands that
Iraq"accept in principle" its liability under such rules.
Resolution 687, on the other hand, reaffirms, in paragraph 16, Iraq's liability
as stated in previous resolutions. Thus, it is obvious that Security Council's action
concerning the determination of Iraq's liability has in no way violated the rules of
international law. In this respect, Security Council's action is not unprecedented;
there, in fact, exist a good number of resolutions in which the Security Council
affirms the responsibility and liability of states for loss, damage, or injury caused to
other states and the right of injured states to receive compensation for such loss,
damage, or injury. For example, resolution 290 of 8 December 1970 included a
Security Council's demand that "full compensation by the Government of Portugal be
paid to the Republic of Guinea for the extensive damage to life and property caused
by the armed attack and invasion."" In addition, in resolution 387 of 31 March 1976,
the Security Council called upon "the Government of South Africa to meet the just
claims of the People's Republic of Angola for a full compensation for the damage and
destruction inflicted on its state". Moreover resolution 487 of 19 June 1981 included
that the Security Council:
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1. Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation
of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international
conduct;
2. Considers that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the
destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been
acknowledged by Israel; 45
Thus, it is manifestly clear that the Security Council has long been deciding
matters of responsibility of states for violations which could be considered or which
may involve a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, and
has been deciding matters of liability for such violations.
Resolution 687 is, however, unprecedented, insofar as matters of liability and
compensation are concerned, in two main respects. First, the resolution expressly
includes "environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources" among the
compensable loss or damage. Secondly, the resolution created a machinery to enforce
the provisions on liability and compensation; this machinery included the creation of
"a Fund to pay compensation for claims" and the establishment of "a Commission
that will administer the Fund."46 As to the first point, the inclusion of environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources among the loss or damage to be
compensated for by Iraq, it appears that the Security Council did not violate the rules
of international law or the U.N.Charter, as the Council has stated the rules of
international law and did not exceed such rules. 47 The resolution should be
commended since it covers compensation for ecological damage or what is called
"non-property damage".48
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As to the second point which has caused extensive debate, the Security
Council does have the authority to create the Fund and establish the Commission and
empower it with the authority to determine issues of liability thus exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. The Security Council is conferred upon with "the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"49 and,
accordingly, states are obliged to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter." 0 In order to facilitate its functions,
the Security Council is empowered to "establish such subsidiary organs as it deems
necessary for the performance of its functions."51 Thus it appears that the Security
Council can establish subsidiary organs which are necessary for the performance of
"its" functions, but it cannot establish any subsidiary organ which exercises any
function that cannot be exercised by the Council or which falls outside its jurisdiction
or exceeds its powers.
In assessing the functions of the United Nations Compensation Commission
and their nature, the U.N.Secretary-General has stated:
The process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid, the
appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, the listing of claims
and the verification of their validity and the resolution of dispute
claims as set out in paragraph 19 of resolution 687(1991) -the
claims procedure- is the central purpose and object of paragraphs
16 to 19 of resolution 687(1991). It is this area of the
Commission's work that the distinction between policy-making
and function is most important. The Commission is not a court or
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an arbitral tribunal before which the parties appear; it is a political
organ that performs an essentially fact-finding function of
examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses,
assessing payments and resolving disputed claims. It is only in this
52
last respect that a quasi-judicial function may be involved.
Thus, the Commission is intended to be a political organ that performs a fact¬
finding function, but it also performs a "quasi-judicial" function involving the
assessment of payments and the resolution of disputed claims.
The Attitude of the I.C.J.Supports
The Validity of Security Council Actions:
In evaluating whether the U.N. Security Council has the power to exercise
such functions or establish organs that have such powers and exercise such functions
as those conferred upon the U.N. Compensation Commission, one must consider the
attitude of the International Court of Justice in cases which may have a direct bearing
on the subject matter. As stated in Article 92 of the U.N. Charter, the I.C.J, is "the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations" and is empowered to decide on the
legality and validity of actions taken or adopted by other U.N. organs, including the
Security Council, if any of such actions are challenged before the I.C.J, as invalid,
illegal, or ultra vires. This could be done through either a contentious proceeding
between two or more of the States members in the United Nations or an advisory
opinion to be delivered by the I.C.J, upon the request of the Security Council itself or
the General Assembly. The I.C.J, will surely be governed and guided by the law of
the Charter of the United Nations when it delivers its decision or advisory opinion on
the mater. A thorough examination of various I.C.J, decisions and advisory opinions
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proves that the Court's attitude supports the legality and validity of the actions taken
by the Security Council concerning the determination of Iraq's liability and the
establishment of the U.N. Compensation Commission. Thus in its Advisory Opinion
on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, the I.C.J,
declared: "[t]he rights and duties of the entity such as the Organization must depend
upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents
and developed in practice."53 Accordingly, purposes and functions of the Security
Council are not only those explicitly specified in the U.N.Charter, functions which
could be implied from the Charter and those functions that have developed in
practice fall within the competence of the Security Council. This opens the way for
infinite possibilities without any restriction except that the Council must act in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations as stated in
paragraph 2 of article 24 of the U.N.Charter.
In addition, in its Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, the I.C.J, declared that "when the Organization takes action which warrants
the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of
the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires,"54 Thus, the
presumption is that such action is intra vires "since it fell to each organ to determine,
in the first place, its own jurisdiction.'05 U.N. organs do, therefore, enjoy a
presumption that they act intra vires and not ultra vires and that their actions are
legally valid unless and until this presumption is overturned by a competent authority
which has proper jurisdiction, such an authority does not, so far, exist in the strict
legal sense insofar as the Security Council is concerned. This is so because I.C.J.'s
advisory opinions are not legally binding on the Security Council and, as such, they
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cannot overturn any Security Council's action; besides, the decisions or judgements
of the Court issued in contentious cases are binding only upon the states that appear
before the Court as disputants in each case.
Again, the I.C.J., in its Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for Slates of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (The Namibia Case) dealt with
Security Council resolutions which were not explicitly covered by the wording of
various articles in chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. The Court declared that
the Council had, in addition to the specific powers, conferred upon it by the Charter,
certain general powers under article 24(1) of the Charter : those powers relating to
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". This
formula covers a very wide range of actions.56 The Court, in the same opinion
expressed its view that it did not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in
respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned 57 This
supports the view we have just stated above.
In its Order on Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident on Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.;
Libya v. U.S.),5S the I.C.J, did not suggest that the Security Council acted unlawfully
by exercising a traditionally judicial power or that the Council had in any way
exceeded its powers and authorities under the Charter.
In sum, the notions of "implied powers", "the presumption that actions taken
by any U.N. organ are not ultra vires", and "general powers" used by the I.C.J, all
support our view that the attitude of the I.C.J, supports the legality of the actions
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taken by the Security Council concerning the determination of Iraq's liability and the
creation of the Compensation Fund and the Commission administering the Fund, as
illustrated before."9
The Security Council Does Have the Power
to Exercise Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Functions
and to establish Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Organs:
It has been suggested by some that the Security Council did not possess the
power to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions or to act as court and, as a
result, it did not have the power to establish judicial or quasi-judicial organs as the
Council could not establish organs to exercise functions that it could not itself
exercise.60 Truly, the U.N. Charter established the International Court of Justice as
the principal organ of the United Nations and provided that the Security Council
should "take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred
by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions
of the Statute of the Court."61 But, it is absolutely accurate to state that the U.N.
Charter did not specify that the I.C.J, was the only or the sole judicial organ of the
United Nations. The Charter did not even provide the Court with the power to review
or overturn the actions of the Security Council or the General Assembly or any of the
principal organs of the United Nations as specified in the Charter. Although the U.N.
Charter conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security and it suggested that legal disputes should be
referred by the parties to the I.C.J., it did not bar the Council from resolving legal
disputes. The Charter's suggestion that legal disputes should be referred by the
parties to the I.C.J, is limited to disputes or situations which fall within Chapter VI
dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes and not those disputes or situations
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which involve threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression
• 62covered by Chapter VII provisions.
The practice of the Security Council over the years does in fact show that it
has preferred to handle or decide legal issues or questions involved in or arising in
connection with matters under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. The Council has
generally been unwilling to refer issues to the I.C.J.63 The Lockerbie Case is a recent
case which clearly illustrates this point, in this case the Security Council adopted
several actions which prejudice the legal rights of Libya under international law, but
the I.C.J. refused to order provisional measures requested by Libya and declared that
Libya's obligations under Security Council resolution were superior to its obligations
under other treaties or international law.64 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bedjaoui
stated:
[T]he difficulty in the present case lies in the fact that the
Security Council not only has decided to take a number of
political measures against Libya, but has also demanded from
it the extradition of two nationals. It is this specific demand
of the Council that creates an overlap with respect to the
substance of the legal dispute with which the Court must deal,
in a legal manner, on the basis of the 1971 Montreal
Convention and international law in general.65
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In addition, Judge Ni stated:
[T]he Security Council, as a political organ, is more
concerned with the elimination of international terrorism and
the maintenance of international peace and security, while the
International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations, is more concerned with legal procedures
such as questions of extradition and proceedings in connection
with prosecution of offenders and assessment of compensation,
etc. But these functions may be correlated with each other .
What would be required between the two is co-ordination and
co-operation, not competition or mutual exclusion.66
These two judges, although did not agree with the I.C.J. Order, did recognize
the overlap between the functions of both the Security Council and the I.C.J. Judges
of the Court did not suggest that that the Council acted unlawfully when it exercised a
judicial function, all what some suggested is that the Council did exercise a function
that was not among the functions and powers specifically assigned to it in the U.N.
Charter. But, as suggested before, the Charter did not preclude the Council from
exercising judicial functions, and the I.C.J, did not declare that Council's actions were
unlawful.
If the Council is not precluded under the Charter from exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers and functions when it deems it necessary or desirable for the
maintenance of international peace and security on the handling of a dispute or
situation which involves a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of
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aggression; then the Council could not be barred from establishing judicial or quasi-
judicial organs if it deems the establishment of such an organ is necessary or desirable
for the maintenance of international peace and security or the handling of a dispute or
situation which involves a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of
aggression. Actions taken by the Security Council concerning the determination of
Iraq's liability and the establishment of the U.N. Compensation Fund and the U.N.
Compensation Commission are based on Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter. This means
that the Council deemed its actions necessary to handle a situation which involved
breach of the peace and acts of aggression and necessary to restore international
peace and security. Whence, it must be concluded that the Council has acted within its
powers under the Charter and that the Council has violated none of the provisions of
the Charter when it took such actions.
The Charter Authorizes the Security
Council to deal with Matters of
Liability and Compensation:
Although some writers have argued that the Security Council did not have the
authority to decide the issues of liability and compensation and that the U.N.Charter
did not strictly authorize the Council to decide such issues,07 we maintain that he
Security Council has the authority to deal with and decide issues of liability and
compensation in certain cases including those covered by provisions of paragraph 16
of resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions, and that the Charter did not prevent
the Council from dealing with and deciding such issues. The notions suggested by the
I.C.J, including "implied powers", "the practice of the organization," "general powers"
and "the presumption that actions taken by any U.N. organ are not ultra vires"68 and
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the fact that the I.C.J, has never suggested that an action taken by any of the principal
organs of the United Nations was unlawful or ultra vires all are relevant. Any action
which the Security Council deems necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security or necessary to deal with a dispute or situation involving a threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression and/or restore international
peace and security is within the jurisdiction of the Council in accordance with article
24(1), "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security" clause, and article 39 of the U.N. Charter which states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
Examples of measures referred to in article 41 are not conclusive, all measures not
involving the use of force but deemed, by the Security Council, necessary or desirable
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security are included
under article 41. Thus, if the Security Council finds that handling or deciding issues
of liability and compensation, such as those included in resolution 687 and other
relevant resolutions, is necessary or desirable for the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security, then the Council will have the full power and
competence to adopt such measures including the handling or deciding of issues of
liability and compensation.
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In adopting resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions, the Security Council
was explicitly involving Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter. This itself is a clear
indication that the Council was basing its resolution 687 and other relevant
resolutions on its powers under article 41 which are binding upon all states.69
Handling issues of Iraq's liability for "any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources or injury to foreign
Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait" and the creation of the U.N. Compensation Fund and the
establishment of the U.N.Compensation Commission was envisaged by the Council as
constituting some of the measures necessary for the restoration of international peace
and security and the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area so that Iraq may
not, once more, threaten the peace of the area or international peace and security. This
view was justified in view of the Iraq's past and continued aggressive conducts in the
area in violation of the U.N. Charter, international law and the norms of international
conduct. In this connection we may add that paragraph 33 of resolution 687 is a clear
indication that Iraq was bound by this resolution and it had to accept its provisions in
order that a formal cease-fire becomes effective. This paragraph states that the
Security Council:
Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-
General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the
provisions above, a formal cease-fire becomes effective between
Iraq and Kuwait and theMember States cooperating with Kuwait in
accordance with resolution 678(1990);
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Some writers have suggested that this quoted paragraph supported the view that
provisions embodied in resolution 687 including those provisions on liability and
compensation and the settlement of disputes are recommendatory and are not
measures within the ambit of article 41 but are based upon Chapter VI of the
U.N.Charter, since the Security Council has no power to impose a settlement.70 This
view is, however, misleading and is not based on sound legal justifications: The
quaoted paragraph (33) clearly states that a formal cease-fire will not be effective
unless and until Iraq officially notifies the U.N. General Secretary and the Security
Council that it accepts all the provisions of resolution 687. Failing such acceptance
would have meant that the state of belligerency was still existing and that Iraq was
still an outlawed nation subject to enforcement measures involving the use of force
under article 42 of the U.N.Charter and Security Council resolution 687.
Does Resolution 687 Constitute the Terms of a
Peace Settlement Lawfully imposed upon Iraq?
It was suggested by some writers that Security Council resolution 687
constituted a peace treaty concluded between Kuwait and the States cooperating with
it, on the one hand, and Iraq, on the other hand, and that Iraq's consent to the
provisions of resolution 687 constituted its consent to this peace treaty. They
supported their views by claiming that the Security Council did not have the power to
impose a peace settlement or a peace treaty and that it had the power only to
recommend terms of a settlement and if such terms were accepted by the parties,
they constitute the terms of a peace treaty concluded by the parties upon their
consent, and that the provisions included in resolution 687 are "reminiscent of
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties"71 But we agree with
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others who took the view that the provisions of resolution 687 do constitute the terms
of a settlement lawfully imposed by the Security Council upon Iraq. :
If a dispute or a situation reaches the point of being or involving a threat to the
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, then the Council is empowered
to act under Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter. Accordingly, the Security Council
"shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
">73
with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Resolution 687, one of the longest and most comprehensive resolutions ever adopted
by the Security Council, was based upon the powers of the Security Council under
Chapter VII as constituting comprehensive measures, adopted by the Council to end
the second Gulf War and restore international peace and security through the
imposition of formal cease-fire conditions and the imposition of a peace settlement.
The legality and validity of the terms of settlement included in resolution 687 arise
from the essential authority of the Security Council, under Chapter VII, to restore
international peace and security and not from Iraq's consent and acceptance of the
provisions of the resolution.74 By adopting the measures included in resolution 687,
the Security Council tried to restore international peace and security in the area and
eliminate any future threat of aggression or any future aggression by Iraq in view of
its past aggressive behaviour. Provisions on liability and compensation are among
those measure deemed by the Council necessary to achieve such purposes.
To suggest that the provisions of resolution 687 constitute a peace treaty is to
make the legal validity of such provisions dependent upon Iraq's capitulation or
accession. That is to say that Iraq's capitulation or acceptance has no role in
177
conferring legal validity on the provisions of resolution 687 and the resolution cannot
therefore be considered as a peace treaty.75 The resolution comprises the terms of a
peace settlement lawfully imposed upon Iraq by the Security Council in accordance
with its inherent authority under the Charter.
The Practice of the Security Council Afterwards
Includes the Determination of Issues of
Liability and Compensation:
Subsequent practice of the Security Council shows that it has dealt with issues
of liability and compensation. The most important case, apart from the Second Gulf
War and resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions, is probably the Lockerbie
Case. In this case the Security Council, responding to a request made by the United
Kingdom and the United States, adopted its resolution No.731 in which the Council
"urge[d] the Libyan Government immediately to provide a full and effective response
to those requests."76 Requests referred to in this part of the resolution include, inter
alia, the payment of compensation to the victims of the Pan Am flight 103 which was
bombed by the Libyan Government agents over Lockerbie on Dec.21, 1988, as
alleged by the United States and the United Kingdom.77 The Security Council,
furthermore, adopted its resolution 748 while the I.C.J, was about to issue its orders
regarding Libyan request to impose provisional measures against the U.K. and the
78U.S. Security Council resolution 748 was based on Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter
and in it the Council decided "that the Libyan Government must now comply without
any further delay with paragraph 3 of resolution 731" which included the reference,
among other things to the payment by the Government of Libya of full compensation
to the victims of the Pan Am flight.79
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In determining that the Government of Libya must pay full compensation to
the victims of the Lockerbie incident, the Security Council must have decided that
Libya was directly responsible for the explosion and destruction of the Pan Am flight
over Lockerbie.80
The I.C.J. has, in fact, given support to the Security Council's authority to
determine and decide issues of responsibility, liability, and financial compensation in
the Lockerbie Case when the Court declined to deliver the provisional orders
requested by Libya and declared that under article 103 of the U.N.Charter, member
states' obligations under the Charter including their obligation to carry out Security
Council decisions prevailed over their obligations under any other international
agreements and as a result Libya's obligation to carry out Security Council resolution
748, which is based on Chapter VII of the Charter, prevailed over its obligations
under the Montreal Convention, and whatever rights that Libya may enjoy under the
Convention must yield to its obligations under the resolution.81
Developed practice of the organization is one of the sources of powers and
functions of the organization and its organs, this was unequivocally expressed by the
I.C.J, in an advisory opinion referred to earlier.82 It is clear that the practice of the
U.N. Security Council supports the position that the Council has the full authority and
power to deal with and decide issues of liability and compensation and that at no
point, in any of its judgments, orders, or opinions, did the I.C.J, declare that the
Council had acted unlawfully or that its actions were ultra vires*7.
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Subsequent Practice of the Security Council
Includes the Establishment of Judicial Organs:
In order to avert the aggravating situation and to deal with the gross violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law and atrocities committed in
former Yugoslavia and responding to the calls of various groups and organizations,
the U.N. Security Council adopted its resolution 808 on 22 February 1993 by which
the Council decided to establish an international tribunal for the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.84 The Security
Council further requested the Secretary-General to submit for the consideration of the
Council's report on all aspects of the mater concerning the establishment of the
tribunal.85 On the third of May 1993, the U.N. Secretary-General submitted its
report,86 and on the 25lh of May of the same year, the Security Council adopted its
resolution 827 establishing the tribunal.8' Other successive Security Council
resolutions dealt with various aspects of the tribunal.88 The tribunal began its work,
and in its First Annual Report, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia observed that its mandate was "to do justice, to deter further crimes and to
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace."89
Resolution 808, the first of a successive Security Council resolutions dealing
with the establishment of the said tribunal and various aspects thereto, has indicated
that the Council is basing its authority in establishing the tribunal on Chapter VII of
the Charter, the resolution states in the preamble that the Council:
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Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of
widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including reports of
mass killings and the continuance of the practice of "ethnic
cleansing",
Determining that this situation constitutes a threat to international
peace and security,
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for
them,
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former
Yugoslavia the establishment of an international tribunal would
enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the
restoration and maintenance of peace.. 90
In addition, the Report of the Secretary-General prepared in accordance with
this resolution explicitly stated that in adopting the Statute of the Tribunal, the
Council would be acting pursuant to its authority under Chapter VII of the
U.N.Charter 91
The Council's authority to establish this tribunal was tested in the Tadic case
which was settled by the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal 92 In this case Dusko
Tadic, who is a Bosian Serb, and who was the first defendant of whom the Tribunal
had custody, objected to the jurisdiction of Tribunal. He based his objection on
several grounds, the most relevant to the subject-matter of this research are those
relating to the unlawful establishment of the tribunal Tadi attacked the authority of the
Security Council to establish the tribunal and claimed that the Council had no
authority under the U.N. Charter to establish subsidiary organs with judicial powers
and that the establishment of the tribunal was not an appropriate measure under
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Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. He further claimed that the establishment of the
tribunal was contrary to the general principle whereby courts must be "established by
law".93 The Trial Chamber of the Tribunal decided that it had no power to decide
whether the Security Council exceeded its authority under the Charter when it acted to
establish the tribunal but the Appeals Chamber decided that it had jurisdiction to
consider whether it was lawfully established and whether it had subject-matte
jurisdiction. The Appeals Chamber concluded that (the International Tribunal matches
perfectly the description in Article 41 of "measures not involving the use of force",)94
and that (the measures set out in Article 41 are merely illustrative examples which
obviously do not exclude other measures. All the Article requires is that they do not
involve "the use of force". It is a negative definition)95. The Chamber added that
literal and logical analysis of Article 41 supports the view that "the establishment of
the International Tribunal falls squarely within the powers of the Security Council
under Article 41."96
In considering whether the Security Council can establish a subsidiary organ
with judicial powers, the Appeals Chamber declared:
The establishment of the International Tribunal by the Security
Council does not signify, however, that the Security Council has
delegated to it some of its own functions or the exercise of some of
its own powers. Nor does it mean in reverse, that the Security
Council was usurping for itself part of a judicial function which
does snot belong to it but to other organs of the united Nations
according to the Charter. The Security Council has resorted to the
establishment of a judicial organ in the form of an international
criminal tribunal as an instrument for the exercise of its own
principal function of maintenance of peace and security, i.e., as a
measure contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace in
the former Yugoslavia.97
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The Appeals Chamber supported its view with the fact that the U.N. General
Assembly "did not need to have military and police functions and powers in order to
be able to establish the United Nations Emergency force in the Middle East ("UNEF")
in 1956,"; nor did it have to be a judicial organ in order to be able to establish the U.N.
98Administrative Tribunal.
The Appeals Chamber concluded also that because of the wide discretionary
powers enjoyed by the Security Council under article 39, the Council's action
establishing the Tribunal was appropriate under the Charter."
With regard to the defendant's contention that the establishment of the Tribunal was
contrary to the general principle that courts must be "established by law", the Appeals
Chamber declared that the correctness of this argument depended on the meaning of
"established by law". The Chamber concluded that a domestic law test could not
apply within the international legal system, for "[i]t is clear that the legislative,
executive and judicial division of powers which is largely followed in most municipal
systems does not apply to the international setting"100, and for exists no organ
"formally empowered to enact laws directly binding on international legal
subjects."101 An acceptable interpretation would "refer to establishment of
international courts by a body which, though not a Parliament, has a limited power to
take binding decisions" such as "the Security Council when acting under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter".102 The Chamber further suggested that within the
context of international law the term "established by law" must mean that an
international court "must be established in accordance with the proper international
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standards, it must provide guarantees of fairness, justice and even handedness, in full
conformity with internationally recognized human rights instructions."103 The
Chamber then concluded that (the International Tribunal has been established in
accordance with the appropriate procedures under the United Nations Charter and
provides all necessary safeguards of a fair trial. It is thus "established by law")104
Another tribunal was established by the Security Council, "an international
tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of neighboring States between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994". The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was
adopted by the Council and annexed to resolution 955 of 8 Nov. 1994 establishing the
tribunal. In establishing this tribunal and adopting its statute, the Council was acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter. In the preamble of this resolution, the Security
Council used similar justifications as those stated in resolution 808 quoted earlier.106
Thus it is evident that the subsequent practice of the Security Council
supported by the international community, included the establishment of political
organs. This gives an added support to the view that the Council was acting within its
full powers when it established the U.N.Compensation Commission.
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Subsequent Practice of the Security Council
Shows that the Council dealt with various
107
Aspects of the Environment:
The war in the former Yugoslavia and particularly in the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina has caused widespread and almost total destruction in many towns
and villages, heavy losses of human life and massive killings every where, material
damage and destruction of properties on a massive scale, forcible expulsion of persons
from areas where they lives and what became known as the practice of "ethnic
cleansing", the changing of ethnic composition of the population, changing of the
character of cities, towns and other areas as multi-cultural , multi-ethnic and
plurireligious centres, destruction of hospitals and cultural and religious places, and
many other untold human sufferings. The Security Council dealt with all these maters
which indeed constitute different forms of widespread and extensive damage and
destruction to the human environment and its components in Bosnia and Herzegovina .
Dozens of Security Council resolutions based on Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter have
repeatedly condemned such acts, considered them as flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law and declared them to be serious war crimes and crimes
against humanity.108
The Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and entrusted it with the function of trying persons responsible for such
acts and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia.109
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Another situation which involved extensive damage and untold losses of
human life, mass killings, forcible expulsion of hundreds of thousands of people, and
perhaps millions, and pollution of fresh water sources and other forms of pollution is
that of Rwanda. After condemning these acts and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law in a number of resolutions, the Security Council had to
declare that the situations in Rwanda and the serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed there constituted a threat to the international peace and
security, thus paving the way to act under Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter and
establish the International Tribunal for Rwanda Acts, such as genocide and related
crimes, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape, persecutions on
political, racial, and religious grounds, other inhumane acts, and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law are within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal.110
Genocide has been defined by Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal as follows:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such :
(One) Killing members of the group;
(Two) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a
group;
(Three)Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
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(Four) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group
(Five) forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.111
It is clear then that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal extends to acts or crimes
which threaten the very existence of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group and/or
change the composition of the population in Rwanda, thus affecting destructively the
human environment and the very existence of life in Rwanda. For these reasons
paragraph 3 of the same article (2) stipulates:
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide,
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Thus it is evident that Security Council attempted, by its actions concerning conflicts
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the situation in Rwanda, to eliminate very
serious threats not just to international peace and security but to the very existence of
large national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups.
Besides, a question which is being raised is whether the Security Council can
use its powers to preserve or save the environment, and if so, would that be true only
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in times of armed conflicts or in peace time as well. The reason for this question is
what seems as a policy of increasing interferences by the Council in peace-time and
not just in times of armed conflicts. In fact, the Security Council does not possess an
express general or specific power to protect, preserve or save the environment per se.
Nowhere in the Charter does exist any such power. As it has been pointed out by
some, powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter "were not
designed for dealing with environmental rather than military concerns.'"12 The
Council does act when it finds its action is appropriate to maintain or restore
international peace and security. In peace-time, as well as in times of armed conflicts,
the effect of protecting or saving the environment of it finds that such measures are
appropriate to maintain or restore international peace and security in cases where the
Council decides that a threat to the peace exists.
But, it appears that the Security Council has recently adopted a policy of
increasing interference in peace time situations, and not just in times of armed-
conflicts, if such intcrcference is considered, by the Council, as appropriate to
eliminate sources of any possible threat to peace and security or appropriate to
maintain such peace and security. The Security Council has thus declared: "The non-
military sources of instability in the economic, humanitarian and ecological fields
may become a threat to the peace and security.'"13 Thus, if instability in the ecological
fields may become a threat to the peace and security, as the Security Council may find,
then the Council will have a free hand in deciding what measures are appropriate
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Then the Council will be exercising an




By this Chapter on "the Security Council and the Environment: The Authority
of the Council to Deal with Environmental Issues , Case Study on the Iraq-Kuwait
Conflict", we have seen the widespread and serious environmental crimes committed
by the Iraqi regime and its forces against the environment of Kuwait and that of other
Gulf and other States and the widespread, serious, and long-term or long-lasting
environmental damage caused by Iraqi action during the second GulfWar114 and how
the Security Council dealt with these issues by determining Iraq's liability and
establishing the U.N. Compensation Fund and the Commission administering the
Fund. We also dealt with the debate which was centered on whether the Security
Council had the authority to adopt the actions it adopted and whether it had acted
properly. Those who suggested that the Council did not have the authority to act as it
did or that it had acted improperly base their view on the action that the Council did
not have the authority to decide legal issues or legal disputes and, as a result, the
Council did not have the authority to determine issues of liability and compensation
as the determination of such issues is purely within the competence of international
courts or arbitration tribunals. Nor did the Council, in their view, have the authority
to establish judicial or quasi-judicial organs such as the United Nations Compensation
Commission, as the Council itself did not have the authority to act as a court or to act
in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. They also suggested that the U.N. Charter
envisaged a system of the separation of powers, the Security Council is entrusted
with political and executive powers, the General Assembly with legislative or quasi-
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legislative powers and the International Court of Justice with the settlement of
disputes. And the Charter itself requested the Security Council to refer legal disputes
to the I.C.J. They concluded that the Security Council did not have the authority
under the U.N. Charter to act as it did and that it had acted improperly.115
On the other hand, this writer supports those who adopt the view that the
Council acted lawfully and within its powers and violated none of the provisions of
the Charter. It is not true that the Charter created a system of the separation of
powers or that it entrusted the I.C.J, with the settlement of disputes and barred the
Security Council from dealing with or settling disputes of legal nature. Methods of
settling disputes specified in article 33 of the U.N. Charter include negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means chosen by the parties to the
dispute. In addition, article 35(1) of the Charter provides that any member of the
United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
international friction or the continuance of which is likely to endanger international
peace and security, to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly.
The Charter has, thus, created some sort of what may be called "concurrent
jurisdiction of political and judicial organs of the United Nations".116 In fact, under
the Charter, several methods or means of settling disputes, including judicial, non-
r
judicial, and political methods or means, may be employed to settle one single dispute
or more. Hence, the International Court of Justice is not the only organ empowered to
settle "legal" disputes. The Court itself does not have the power to review the
legality, lawfulness, constitutionality, or even the propriety or properness of any act or
decision of any of the political organs of the United Nations. An examination of the
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practice of the Security Council shows that in most cases the Council did not refer
disputes to the I.C.J, even if such disputes did have some legal bearings. In most
cases, the Council elected to exercise its authority and power concerning disputes
brought before it under Chapter VI of the Charter concerning the pacific settlement of
disputes. 117
Furthermore, Chapter VII of the Charter confers upon the Security Council
very broad, indeed unlimited and illimitable, discretionary powers to decide whether
any dispute or situation constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an
act of aggression and select to "make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security."118 Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security
Council may adopt any measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security which may include enforcement measures not involving the use of armed
forces in accordance with article 41 and/or measures not involving the use of armed
forces in accordance with article 42 of the Charter. In dealing with the Iraq-Kuwait
conflict, the Security Council deemed it necessary to decide that it reaffirms Iraq's
liability "under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments,
nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait',119 and to create the U.N.Compensation Fund to pay compensation for claims
of loss, damage, or injury for which Iraq is liable and to establish a Commission to
administer the Fund.120 Other relevant measures were adopted by the Council.
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Although Security Council resolution 687 was unprecedented in some
important respects including the determination of Iraq's liability for environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait, yet it has violated neither the Charter of the United
Nations nor the principles and rules of international law. The Security Council did
merely reaffirm the rules of international law which establish Iraq's liability as it was
stated in resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions. In addition, the determination
of issues of liability and compensation is not outside the jurisdiction of the Council if
it decides that the determination of such issues is among the measures to be adopted
to maintain or restore international peace and security under its primary
responsibility clause and within its powers of determination and decision provided for
in article 39 and other relevant articles in Chapter VII of the Charter.
Similarly, the Council's action creating the U.N. Compensation Fund and the
U.N. Compensation Commission violated neither the U.N. Charter nor any rule of
international law. General international law included no rule which bars the Council
from acting the way it did. In fact the primary responsibility clause of the Charter,
article 29, and Chapter VII of the Charter confer upon the Council the powers to
establish such organs to perform some of its functions concerning the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security and to adopt any measures aimed at
achieving this purpose including the determination of issues of liability and
compensation and the establishment of judicial or quasi-judicial organs.
Moreover, the attitude of the International Court of Justice supported the
validity of Security Council's actions, notions such as "implied powers as developed
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in practice", "the general powers of the organization", "the presumption that any
action taken by any U.N.Organ is not ultra vires", and "the prima facia validity of
Security Council resolution" which all developed and used by the I.C.J, on various
occasions show that the Court would support the legality and validity of Security
Council's actions concerning the determination of Iraq's liability and the
establishment of the U.N. Compensation Commission to administer the Fund and
other relevant measures.
Subsequent practice of the Security Council included the determination of
matters of liability and compensation and the establishment of judicial organs (see
what was previously stated concerning the Lockerbie Case, 121 and the establishment
of the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia and the International
Court for Rwanda.)122 Thus the developed practice of the Council supports its
previous actions concerning the determination of Iraq's liability and establishment of
the Compensation Fund and the Commission including the determination of Iraq's
liability for environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources.
Besides, we might fairly assert that Security Council's actions and measures
embodied in resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions were accepted by the
international community and they did not face any serious objection from states or
major powers. In fact Iraq, itself accepted these measures and pledged to cooperate
fully with the Council regarding the performance of its obligations arising under
resolution 687 and other resolutions.123 The U.N. Compensation Commission and its
work concerning the determination of Iraq's liability for environment
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THE U.N. COMPENSATION COMMISSION
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIM
The authority of the Security Council to establish the U.N.Compensation
Commission and to determine issues of liability and compensation was dealt with in
the preceding chapter; this chapter deals with the U.N.C.C. and the determination of
Iraq's liability for environmental damage, losses, and destruction caused as a result of
Iraq's illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. This Chapter will be divided into
three main parts: the first will deal with the constitutional structure of the U.N.C.C.,
its nature and the nature of its work, while the second deals with the work of the
U.N.C.C. with regard to environmental claims. The third part will deal with the
Kuwaiti environmental claims before the Commission.
I
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE U.N.C.C. AND ITS NATURE
AND THE NATURE OF ITS WORKS
A
The Constitutional Structure of the U.N.C.C.
As has been previously stated, the U.N.C.C. was established by S.C. resolution
687 to administer the U.N. Compensation Fund.1 And as stipulated, the U.N.C.C. or
the Commission functions "under the authority of the Security Council"2 and "a
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subsidiary organ thereof."3 The U.N.C.C. is constituted of a governing board, a body
of commissioners and a secretariat.4
The Governing Council:
The Commission's Governing Council is the principal organ of the
commission and is composed of the representatives of all the current members of the
Security Council at any given time5 (15 members at any given time). The Governing
Council has to exercise two types of tasks; first, the Governing Council is the policy¬
making organ of the Commission and, as such, it has "the responsibility for
establishing guidelines on all policy matters, in particular, those relating to the
administration and financing of the Fund, the organization of the work of the
Commission and the procedures to be applied to the processisng of claims and to the
settlement of disputed claims, as well as to the payments to be made from the Fund." 6
Secondly; the Governing Council performs "important functional tasks with respect to
claims presented to the Commission."7
Decisions of the Governing Council are generally adopted by a majority of at
least nine of its members (any nine members; no veto applies); but decisions
concerning "the method of ensuring that payments are made to the Fund" should be
decided by consensus.8 Any member of the Governing Council may request referral
of any matter to the Security Council for its consideration provided that such matter is
among the matters to be decided by the consensus of the Governing Council and that
such consensus could not be achieved.9
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Members of the Governing Council enjoy the privileges and immunities
enjoyed by representatives of states and provided for in the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 Feb. 1946 .10
The work of the U.N.C.C. Governing Council extends to a number of areas,
mainly, the administration of the U.N.Compensation Fund, the resolution of claims
and some other matters. The Governing Council adopted a number of decisions and
measures concerning the administration of the Fund; legal, financial, market and other
technical aspects of Iraq's oil production and trade, holding and managing revenues
from Iraqi exports of petroleum and petroleum products were subject to study and
decision by the Governing Council. These decisions included arrangements for
ensuring payments to the Compensation Fund.11 The U.N.C.C. Governing Council
has, in addition, adopted a good number of decisions regulating the submission and
processing of claims and the determination of compensable losses; procedural matters
related thereto have been also adopted by the Governing Council.12 Furthermore, the
Governing Council is entrusted with the authority to approve the reports and
recommendations of various panels of commissioners.13
The Commissioners:
The commissiosners are to "carry out such tasks and responsibilities as may be
assigned to them by the Governing Council" of the Commission.14 The exact number
of commissioners are to be determined by the Governing Council in the light of the
tasks to be assigned to them by the said Council. Therefore, the commissioners must
be "experts in fields such as finance, law, accountancy, insurance and environmental
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damage assessment",15 the U.N. Secretary General nominates persons to be appointed
as commissioners and proposes their specific tasks and terms and they are appointed
by the Governing Council.16 "In nominating the commissioners, the Secretary
General will pay due regard to the need for geographical representation, professional
qualification, experience and integrity. The Secretary General will establish a register
of experts which might be drawn upon when commissioners are to be appointed.'"'
Processing claims, including the verification and evaluation of such claims, is
carried out by panels, each of which is comprised of three commissioners.
Recommendations of the panels of commissioners regarding the verification and
evaluation of claims are "final and subject only to the approval of the Governing
Council, which shall make the final determination.'"8
Commissioners enjoy the privileges and immunities enjoyed by experts on
missions within the meaning of article VI of the Convention on the privileges and
immunities of the United Nations.19
Examples of cases decided by panels of commissioners will be referred to or
studied throughout this chapter.
The Secretariat:
The secretariat which was established to service the Commission is composed
of an Executive Secretary and the necessary staff. The secretariat works under the
direction of the Executive Secretary and carried out "such tasks as may be assigned to
it by the Governing Council and the commissioners."20 The primary function of the
Executive Secretary is the technical administration of the U.N.Compensation Fund
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and the servicing of the Commission. With regard to the processisng of claims, the
secretariat makes a preliminary assessment of each claim to determine whether it
meets the formal requirements established by the Governing Council before
submitting it to a panel of three commissioners for verification and evaluation.21 The
U.N. Secretary-General appoints the Executive Secretary after consulting with the
U.N.C.C. Governing Council and appoints the staff of the secretariat. The Executive
Secretary and the staff serve under the U.N. Staff Regulations and Rules. They enjoy
the privileges and immunities enjoyed by "officials" within the meaning of article V
and VII of the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations.22
The role of the secretariat in assisting panels of commissioners and in processiang
claims will be referred to in this chapter whenever necessary.
Headquarters of the Commission:
Although the Secretary-General's Report pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security
Council resolution 687 (1991) proposed that the Headquarters of the Commission
should be in New York, the Security Council decided in its resolution 692 (1991) that
the Governing Council of the Commission "will be located at the United Nations
Office at Geneva and that the Governing Council may decide whether some of the
activities of the Commission should be carried out elsewhere."23
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B
The Nature of the U.N.C.C.
And
The Nature of its Work
The U.N.C.C. has the responsibility to administer the U.N.Compensation
Fund, including the determination of the level of Iraq's contribution to it and the
allocation of funds and payments of claims. In addition, the U.N.C.C. has the
responsibility to organize the procedures and the resolution of claims for losses
resulting from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, including the
procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity, and to
resolve disputed claims.24 In order to exercise all such tasks and responsibilities, the
U.N.C.C. deals with "a variety of complex administrative, financial, legal and policy
issues."25 In an important passage of his report referred to earlier, the U.N. Secretary-
General suggested that :
The process by which funds will be allocated and claims
paid, the appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, the listing
of claims and the verification of their validity and the resolution of
disputed claims as set out in paragraph 19 of resolution 687(1991)
- the claims procedure - is the central purpose and object of
paragraphs 16 and 19 of resolution 687 (1991). It is in this area of
the Commission's work that the distinction between policy-making
and function is most important. The Commission is not a court or
an arbitral tribunal before which the parties appear; it is a political
organ that performs an essentially fact-finding function of
examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses,
assessing payments and resolving disputed claims. It is only in
this last respect that a quasi-judicial function may be involved.
Given the nature of the Commission, it is all the more important
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that some element of due process be built into the procedure. It
will be the function of the commissioners to provide this element.
As the policy-making decision of the Commission, it will fall to
the Governing Council to establish the guidelines regarding the
claims procedure. The commissioners will implement the
guidelines in respect of claims that are presented and in resolving
disputed claims. They will make the appropriate recommendations
to the Governing Council, which in turn will make the final
determination.26
Thus, although the U.N.C.C. was established as a subsidiary organ of the
Security Council under article 29 of the Charter and in accordance with relevant
provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, it exercises tasks and functions of
multifarious nature. But the one function which has so far raised a lot of concerns and
caused significant disagreement is the one that involves "examining claims, verifying
their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving disputed claims."
Despite the fact that the Secretary-General, in the portion of his report just quoted, has
designated such task as fallen within the fact-finding function of the Commission
(U.N.C.C.), they certainly involve judicial or quasi-judicial elements or arbitral
process. This means that the Commission will have to exercise some sort of a judicial,
quasi-judicial or arbitral function, and, as such, the Commission must satisfy and
respect principles and guarantees ofjudicial, quasi-judicial or arbitral settlements.
The U.N.C.C. has in fact been criticized for it does not satisfy and respect
many of the principles and guarantes of judicial, quasi-judicial, or arbitral
settlements.2 This would lead us to investigate the matter more thoroughly. But in
order to be fair and objective we must stress certain points which are relevant to the
discussion:
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First; the U.N.C.C. is a product of armed-conflict involved the aggression of Iraq
against Kuwait and the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by the Iraqi armed
forces.
Second; the U.N.C.C. was established by the Security Council in accordance with its
authority under the primary responsibility clause of the U.N. Charter and under
Chapter VII of the Charter to facilitate the restoration and maintenance of international
peace and security.
Third; the U.N.C.C. is not an ordinary court of law but a subsidiary organ of the
Security Council entrusted with certain tasks and functions including certain quasi-
judicial or quasi-arbitral functions as provided for in the relevant Security Council
resolutions to guarantee the effective restoration and maintenance of international
peace and security.
Therefore, the U.N.C.C. cannot and should not be compared with an ordinary
international court established by a treaty concluded by and between states, such as the
International Court of Justice, to settle normal international disputes under conditions
of normalcy prevailing between states seeking peaceful settlement of their disputes.
Nor can or should the U.N.C.C. be compared with normal international arbitration
tribunals established by the agreements of the parties or in accordance with the
processes and procedures agreed upon by such parties as a normal internaitonal
method of settling their disputes. Probably, the most logical comparison is to be made
with the claims commissions used to be established to settle claims and grievances
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arising out of wars and armed conflicts.28 Although there are considerable differences
between the U.N.C.C. on the one hand, and many of such commissions, on the other
hand, the U.N.C.C. and other claims commissions are similar in many respects.
Points of Differences between the
U.N.C.C. and Claims Commissions:
First: Claims commissions were in most cases established by treaties or
international agreements imposed upon the weak or the defeated state or power by the
victor; such treaties and agreements are now known as unequal treaties,29 while the
U.N.C.C. was established by a U.N.Security Council resolution which represents the
will of the whole international community and is binding upon all states. Hence, the
resolution establishsing the U.N.C.C. and other relevant Security Council resolutions
confer upon this Commission (the U.N.C.C.) the widest and most universal
international legality and legitimacy which could not be conferred upon any claims
commission established by a treaty imposed upon the defeated state by the victorious
state.
Secondly: Claims commissions reflected the power of the victorious state or
states imposing treaties whence such commissions sprang, whilst the U.N.C.C. relfects
the power of the whole community of nations members in the United Nations.
Thirdly: In most cases, the processes of selecting members of many of the
traditional claims and reparation commissions were fixed in a way so as to ensure that
only persons from victorious states could set on such commissions whilst persons from
the defeated states were excluded. This was so to ensure that the final outcome of the
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claims and reparation proceedings were to be in favour of the victorious states and
their citizens.30 In some other cases, a third party arbitration or umpire was referred to,
but conditions of arbitration could not guarantee adequate justice or fairness; such
conditions were imposed by the victor to ensure that only claims and grievances of the
victorious states and their nationals, and sometimes those of neutral states and their
nationals, were heard and favourable decisions were issued.31
But, as it has been previously pointed out, the Governing Council of the
U.N.C.C. is composed of the representatives of all the current members of the Security
Council upon nomination by the U.N. Secretary- General. The Executive Secretary of
the Commission is appointed by the U.N. Secretary -General after consulting with the
Governing Council, while staff members of the secretariat are appointed by the
U.N.Secretary-General. Thus, it appears that methods and processes of the
appointment of the U.N.C.C. commissioners and the secretariat ensure their
credibility, impartiality, efficiency, and experience. Iraq is not represented and is not
expected to be represented on the U.N.C.C. Governing Council as Iraq is not a
member and is not expected to be a member in the U.N. Security Council in the
forseeable future because of the sanctions imposed upon it by the Security Council,
but the rules and processes of selecting commissioners and those concerning the
appointment of the members of the staff of the secretariat are not devised to ensure the
exclusion of Iraqi nationals,32 although none of the Iraqi nationals has so far been
selected or appointed to hold any such offices. However, Iraq's participation in the
work of the U.N.C.C. is contemplated and encouraged.33 Thus in his previously
quoted report, the U.N. Secretary General suggested that: "Iraq will be informed of all
claims and will have the right to present its comments to the commissioners within
213
time-delays to be fixed by the Governing Council or the Panel dealing with the
individual claim."34 The U.N.C.C.'s Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure
developed this by specifying that the Executive Secretary's reports made to the
Governing Council concerning claims received "will be promptly circulated to the
Government of Iraq as well as to all Governments and international organizations that
have submitted claims."35 In order to guarantee prompt reply by Iraq and any other
concerned party and to guarantee that neither Iraq nor any other party will be able to
unduly delay or frustrate the procedures, the said Provisional Rules stipulated:
Within 30 days in case of categories A, B and C, and 90
days in case of claims in other categories, of the date of the
circulation of the Executive Secretary's report, the Government of
Iraq as well as Governments and international organizations that
have submitted claims, may present their additional information
and views concerning the report to the Executive Secretary for
transmission to panels of Commissioners in accordance with article
32. Thereshall be no extensions of the time-limits specified in this
paragraph.36
Article 32 referred to above deals with the submission of claims to panels. In this
connection, paragraph 2 of article 32 of the quoted Provisional Rules stipulates:
Any information received by the secretariat after the
expiration of the time-limits as established in article 16 will be
submitted when received, but the work of the panel will not be
delayed pending receipt or consideration of such information.37
Fourthly: Traditional claims and reparation commissions were usually
entrusted with deciding matters of contracts and properties lost, damaged, or affected
by or as a result of actions of the defeated party or any action relating thereto, whilst
the U.N.C.C. is entrusted with deciding matters of liability imposed upon Iraq for
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"environmental damage and depletion of natural resources" in addition to the other
traditional matters including loss, damage, or injury to foreign governments, nationals
and corporations as a result of Iraq's illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Thus
it is evident that the jurisdiction of the U.N.C.C. with regard to dispute settlement is
wider in scope than jurisdictions which were entertained by traditional claims and
reparation commissions.39
Points ofAgreements between the
U.N.C.C. and Claims Commissions:
First: The U.N.C.C. was established to deal with grievances suffered as a
result of Iraq's aggression and its illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait, just as
traditional claims and reparation commissions were the product of wars or armed
conflicts and rebellions. As claimed by some, claims and reparation institutions or
commissions were "the stepchildren of war and rebellion."40 This is true with the
U.N.C.C. traditional claims and reparation commissions were imposed by the
victorious states upon the defeated ones; the U.N.C.C. was congruously imposed by
the international community represented in the United Nations Security Council,
acting under chapter VII of the U.N.Charter, on Iraq, the defeated aggressor. Thus it
is not surprising to find a lot of similarities between the rules and provisions
establishing and operating traditional claims and reparation commissions and those
establishing and operating the U.N.C.C. as illustrated below.
Secondly: In most cases of traditional claims and reparation commissions,s
the defeated states and their nationals were not allowed to bring cases or claims
before such commissions;41 similarly, the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi nationals
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and corporations are not allowed to bring any claims before the U.N.C.C. Indeed,
the U.N.C.C. is not empowered to receive, hear, or decide any Iraqi claim or any of
the claims of Iraqi nationals or corporations. It is empowered only to receive and
decide claims with regrd to "any direct loss, damage, including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments,
nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraqi's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait."42 This, however, does not cause and should not be interpreted as causing
any injsutices to Iraq or any of its nationals or corporations, for Iraq was the aggressor
and its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait was the unlawful and wrongful
act causing loss, damage, or injury for which Iraq is liable under international law and
for the U.N.C.C. is established by the Security Council under chapter VII of the
U.N.Charter as an appropriate measure to facilitate the restoration and maintenance
of international peace and security breached and threatened by Iraq, the aggressor,
and as such, the U.N.C.C. is not an ordinary court or a dispute settlement body but it
is a body of limited jurisdiction available only to achieve the objectives of the
Security Council under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Thirdly: The U.N.C.C. is not empowered to receive or decide claims
concerning Iraq's debts and other obligations arising prior to 2 August 1990, the date
on which Iraq initiated its military aggression and unlawful invasion and occupation
of Kuwait. Clause 16 of Security Council resolution 687 stipulates that such debts
and obligations "will be addressed through the normal mechanisms." This
corresponds to some past practice under the Versailles Treaty following WorldWar I
according to which debts and financial obligations owed by Germany or its nationals
to the Allied powers and their nationals prior to the War were not referred to the
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Reparation Commission but to another special mechanism created specifically for that
purpose.43
Fourthly: Traditional claims and reparation commissions operated under the
general rule that the defeated states, the aggressors, were responsible under
international law for any damage, loss or injury caused by or as a result of the war
they waged.44 Similarly, the U.N.C.C. operates under the general rule stipulated in
clause 16 of Security Council resolution 687 that Iraq is liable under international law
for any loss, damage, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as
a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
In addition, traditional claims and reparation commissions applied some sort
of international law or international law sources or general principles and rules of law,
equity, or justice as interpreted within the context of international law.45 Similarly,
commissioners of the U.N.C.C. apply:
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and other
relevant Security Council resolutions, the criteria established
by the Governing Council for particular categories of claims,
and any pertinent decisions of the Governing Council. In
addition, where necessary, Commissioners shall apply other
relevant rules of international law.46
Thus, it seems that the U.N.C.C. uses a jurisprudential approach which is
similar in many respects to the approaches used by traditional claims and reparation
commissions.47 Examples of the jurisprudential approach followed by the U.N.C.C.




THE U.N.C.C. AND ENVIRONEMNTAL CLAIMS
LIMITS AND QUALIFICATIONS
In this section we will deal with the general rules adopted by the U.N.C.C. concerning
the admissibility of environmental claims and the determination of compensable
damage. Security Council resolution 687 did not include any reference as to what
was meant by the wording concerning "environmental damage and the depletion of
natural resources", the U.N.C.C. had to deal with the mater, the U.N.C.C. Governing
Council issued a decision on Criteria for additional Categories of Claims which was
adopted by Governing Council during its third session, at the 18th meeting, held on 28
Nov. 1991, and revised it at the 24th meeting held on 16 March 1992.48 These criteria
as revised included a number of provisions concerning environmental claims,
paragraph 35 of these Criteria is most essential. It specifies:
These payments are available with respect to direct
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources
as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. This will include losses or expenses resulting from:
(a) Abatement and prevention of environmental
damage, including expenses directly relating to
fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in
coastal and international waters;
(b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and
restore the environment of future measures which can
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be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and
restore the environment.
(c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the
environmental damage for the purposes of evaluating
and abating the harm and restoring the environment.
(d) Reasonable monitoring of public health and
performing medical screening for the purposes of
investigation and combating increased health
risks as a result of the environment damage, and;
(e) Depletion ofor damage to natural resources.49
In addition, paragraph 36 is also relevant as it states in part that: "These
payments will include loss of or damage to property of a Government,... .',50
These provisions as approved by the Governing Council of the U.N.C.C.
invite and, indeed, require certain comments, explanations, and clarifications.
First: The Requirement of Direct Damage:
As stated in paragraph 35 of the Criteria for additional Categories of Claims, quoted
above, "payments are available with respect to direct environmental damage".
Thus, indirect environmental damage is not compensable under these Criteria; this
might be said to be in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 16 of Security
Council resolution 687 and the rules of public international law on the matter
Resolution 687 reaffirms Iraq's liability under international law for "any direct loss,
damage, including environmental damage'. But it seems to the present writer that
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there is some difference between the wording of paragraph 16 of Security Council
resolution 687 and the wording of paragraph 35 of the Criteria for additional
Categories of Claims. The wording of paragraph 16 of resolution 687 appears to
include every type of environmental damage as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait among the compensable loss or damage or injury for which
Iraq is liable under resolution 687 and international law. Truly, resolution 687
recognizes only Iraq's liability for any direct loss, damage, or injury to foreign
Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait; but, in our view, it is equally true that the resolution considers
"environmental damage" as "direct loss or damage". This means that every type of
environmental damage is always compensable damage because it is included under
"direct" loss or damage for which Iraq is liable under resolution 687. Therefore, the
Criteria for additional Categories of Claims should not have specified that payments
were available "with respect to direct environmental damage" and the word "direct"
should not have been inserted in the wording of paragraph 35 of the Criteria.
Moreover, we tend to agree with some writers who assert that the insertion of the
word "direct" into clause 16 did in no way limit or qualify the liability of Iraq for any
damage, loss or injury caused as a result of Iraq's invasion and illegal occupation of
Kuwait. Security Council resolution 674, 678, 686, 687 and 692 are all connected and
deal with Iraq's liability under international law. Richard Lillich and Charles Brower
astutely claimed:
The only Consistent Reading ofSecurity Council Resolution 674, 678,
686, and 687 in Respect of Iraq's Liability Under International law is
that Iraq is to be held liable for "any" loss, damage, or injury
resultingfrom its unlawful invasion and occupation ofKuwait.5'
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The first Security Council resolution to deal with Iraq's liability under international
law is resolution 674 of 1990 in which the Security Council reminded Iraq that under
international law it is liable for "any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to
Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq."52 In addition, Security Council
resolution 678 of 1990 reaffirmed resolution 674 including the provisions on Iraq's
liability.53 Moreover, Security Council resolution 686 of 1991 reaffirmed the previous
resolutions and demanded that Iraq "[ajccept in principle its liability under
international law for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third
States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal
occupation of Kuwait by Iraq."54 In fact, all the quoted resolutions which dealt with
Iraq's liability did not make any qualification concerning the nature or degree of the
loss, damage, or injury, i.e., any loss, damage or injury suffices to establish Iraq's
liability under international law since such loss, damage, or injury is a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Furthermore, Security Council
resolution 687 which included the word "direct" before the words "loss, damage" did
reaffirm previous resolutions and, in particular, resolution 674. This reaffirmation
coupled with a further reaffirmation included in a following resolution (Security
Council resolution 692)55 proves that the Security Council did in no way intend to
limit Iraq's liability under international law. In this connection, Lillich and Brower
wrote:
Indeed, it would be contrary to the terms of Resolution 687
itself to find that the addition of the word "direct" in that resolution
had any limiting effect. Paragraph 1 of Resolution 687
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"[a]ffir[ed]" Resolution 674, and, consequently, Iraq's liability for
"any loss damage or injury," "except as expressly changed"
thereafter in Resolution 687 itself "to achieve the goals of' such
rsolution. Apart from the fact that a narrowing of Iraq's legal
liability could hardly be thought to "achieve the goals" of
Resolution 687, there is no express change of Resolution 674 in
Resolution 687. Insertion of the word "direct" was not the type of
express change referred to and required by paragraph 1. One
example of the type of express change contemplated by paragraph
1 is found in paragraph 22, in which the Security Council, after
also having affirmed Resolution 661 in paragraph 1, decided that
upon certified compliance by Iraq with various conditions imposed
upon it "the prohibitions against the import of commodities and
products originating from Iraq and the prohibition against financial
transactions related thereto contained in Resolution 661 (1991)
shall have no further force or effect."
Moreover, had use of the word "direct" in Resolution 687
been intended to narrow the scope of Iraq's liability, the Security
Council would not thereafter in Resolution 692 of May 20, 1991
have referred to Resolution 674 and 686, both of which specify
"any loss, damage or injury", together with Resolution 687, in
adopting the Secretary-General's Report of May 2, 1991. The
reference to Resolutions 674, 686 and 687 together in Resolution
692, "concerning the liability of Iraq", emphasize that they are
mutually consistent and that the Security Council never departed
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from the view that Iraq is liable under international law for "any
loss, damage or injury" resulting form its unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait .56
It has been , however, asserted by some that :
More important to the discussion of compensation for wartime
environmental damage, however, is the argument that wartime
environmental damage is compensable only where there is an
obligation protecting the environment directly. Unfortunately
when the only violation of international law is a violation of
obligation affording indirect protection to the environment,
wartime environmental damage is considered indirect and
therefore not compensable. This point is significant in the context
of compensation for environmental damage resulting from the Gulf
War because to the extent that aspects of the environment are not
property, Iraq only violated an obligation indirectly protecting the
environment.57
But this view is, nevertheless, misleading and unacceptable, as it overlooks
the basis and juridical foundation of Iraq's liability for environmental damage it
caused as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The bases of
Iraq's liability is not only the violation of the rules ofjus in be/lo58 but also, and
even more important, the fundamental breach of the U.N.Charter and the rules ofjus
ad helium as previously explained in chapter 2, supra, and as stipulated in relevant
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Security Council resolution (674, 686, 687 and 692) and other relevant resolution.
Below is a discussion of the cases of compensable environmental loss or damage as
referred to in the relevant parts of the Criteria for additional Categories of Claims
adopted by the U.N.C.C. Governing Council, it will be proven that these cases could
be widely interpreted to cover every type and every case of environmental loss,
damage or injury caused to the environment as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait.
It should, nevertheless, be stressed that in other cases not directly involving
environmental matters or claims, the U.N.C.C. seems to uphold the distinction
between direct and indirect damage in some respects. For example the U.N.C.C.
Governing Council acted to exclude from the competence of the Commission claims
"for losses suffered as a result of the trade embargo and related measures" and
recognized that "[djirect losses as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait are eligible for compensation."59 Thus, the U.N.C.C. excluded
from its jurisdiction embargo and other related claims as it considered such claims
not concerning direct losses as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. In addition, in applying the direct loss clause of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 687, the U.N.C.C. Governing Council decided that members of the Allied
Coalition Armed Forces were not eligible for compensation as a consequence of their
involvement in coalition military operations against Iraq except in the following
situation.;
(a) compensation is awarded in accordance with the criteria already adopted by the
Council;
(b) the claimants are prisoners-of-war; and
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(c) the loss or injury resulted from mistreatment in violation of international
humanitarian law.60
Furthermore, panels of commissioners adopted and applied the distinction
between direct and indirect loss or damage in the reports of such panels concerning a
number of claims which were approved by the U.N.C.C. Governing Council. Thus in
the Egyptian Workers Claims the Panel of Commissioners determined that only those
claims relating to deposits made on or after 2 July 1990 were within the jurisdiction of
the Commission as deposits deposited in Iraqi banks for transfer were, on the average,
received in the corresponding banks in Egypt one month after the deposit.61
Accordingly, only claims relating to deposits made on or after 2 July 1990 were
included under the direct loss clause of resolution 687 and were within the jurisdiction
of the Commission, and claims relating to deposits made prior to 2 July 1990 were not
considered as direct losses and as such they were not considered within the
jurisdiction of the Commission.62
(a) Losses and Expenses Resulting from
Abatement and Prevention of Environmental
Damage and Clean up Costs:
Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 35 of the Criteria for additional
Categories of Claims recognized losses and expenses resulting from abatement and
prevention of damage and clean-up costs as compensable. Expenses directly relating
to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international waters
are included as compensable. Clean up costs and costs relating to the restoration of
the environment are also included as compensable. All such expenses and costs can
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actually be counted in pecuniary value. Equally important is the provision that losses
and expenses resulting from "future measures which can be documented as
reasonably necessary to clean and restore the environment" are also compensable
and covered by the available payments.63 This of course is an open-ended provision
which covers the costs and expenses of all future measures to clean and restore all
aspects of the environment so long as such future measures can be documented as
reasonably necessary to clean and restore the environment. It is to be noted also that
the Criteria cover not only the expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires
(irrespective of the sources of such fires) an stemming the flow of oil in coastal
water, but also cover such expenses relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the
flow of oil in international waters. Thus, the international environment is also
covered by the provisions of the said criteria. Some writers cast some doubt " as to
the likely success of claims for clean up costs resulting from the GulfWar incurred
by countries other than Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran."64 They suggest that in view
of the decision in the Amoco Codiz Case.65 in which the judge refused to compensate
for the time of volunteers who participated in the cleaning up of the coasts ofBrittany
from an oil tanker spill. Countries and organizations which "volunteered money and
efforts to put out the oil fires and clean up the oil spill resulting from the GulfWar"
may face problems in getting compensation decisions from the U.N.C.C 66 This view
is however, overly ignoring the fundamental differences between the facts and
circumstances of each case. The Amoco Cadiz Case involved an accidental oil tanker
spill which caused extensive damage to the coast of Brittany while the Gulf War
environmental damage had occurred as a direct result of the flagrant breach by Iraq
of its most fundamental obligations under the U.N. Charter and the most basic
foundations of world public order, i.e. Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
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Kuwait. In addition, the provisions of paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution
687 and the provisions stated in the Criteria for additional categories of claims cover
the money and efforts put up by volunteers or countries and organizations to put out
fires and clean up the oil spill resulting from the GulfWar or armed conflict.
Furthermore, the U.N.C.C. decided, in one of the most important cases which
is of direct relevance to environmental claims, to grant compensation covering fire-
fighting costs and other relevant costs, this is the Well Blowout Control Claim67 which
will be studied in some detail later in this chapter. ins the Report and
Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners appointed to review the
Well Blowout Control Claim (the "WBC Claim"), the panel considered, inter alia,
that costs of international fire-fighting and support services controls,68 post-capping
costs69, and fire-fighting support costs70 were compensable as loss, damage or injury
sustained by the claimant as a direct result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait.
(b) Reinstatement and Restoration Costs:
Contrary to what was argued by some writers that international law does not
recognize ecological damage as compensable,71 the Criteria for additional Categories
of Claims did specifically recognize as compensable losses or expenses resulting
from; (a) reasonable measures taken to restore the environment,72 (b) future measures
which can be documented as reasonably necessary to restore the environment ,73 (c)
reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environment damage for the purpose of
evaluating and abating the harm,4 (d) reasonable monitoring and assessment of the
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environmental damage for the purpose of restoring the environment.75 These rules
cover all aspects of environmental damage including what is known as ecological
damage per se. A reference to domestic law test to decide whether ecological damage
is compensable is not warranted or justified as domestic laws and domestic courts in
various countries did not adopt a unified rule in this regard76 and as the environment
or ecology of any state is an essential component of the elements of the sovereignty of
the state and a basic ingredient over which the state has full sovereign rights that are
fully prevented against any aggression or attack in violation of the U.N.Charter and
the fundamental norms ofworld public order.
It must, nevertheless, be stressed that the Panel of Commissioners in the WBC
Claim Report reached the finding that costs which can be placed under reinstatement
and restoration costs are compensable; thus costs of construction equipment,77 and
costs of support facilites78 were considered compensable as loss, damage or injury
sustained by the claimant as a direct result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait.
(c) Health and Medical Costs:
The Criteria for additional Categories of Claims recognized as compensable
losses or expenses resulting from reasonable monitoring of public health and
performing medical screenings for the purposes of, (a) investigation of increased
health risks; and (b) combating increased health risks, as a result of the environmental
damage. 9 Thus, the U.N.C.C. recognized as compensable not just any damage or
injury to public health but any possible increase of health risks and all measures taken
or to be taken or are likely to be taken in the future to combat increased health risks as
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a result of the environmental damage. It remains to be seem how these provisions are
interpreted by the panels of commissioners in actual claims brought by the various
countries and organizations concerned.
Second: Depletion of Natural Resources:
U.N. Security Council resolution 687 reaffirmed, in paragraph 16, Iraq's
liability under international law for any depletion of natural resources as a result of its
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The U.N.C.C. has recognized as
compensable "depletion of or damage to natural resources"80. A definition of the term
"natural resources" was included in neither Security Council resolution 687 nor in the
Criteria for additional Categories of Claims. The term has however been used for the
past fifty years in countless numbers of resolutions of various U.N. organs, mainly the
U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Economic and Social Council, and organs of
other international and regional organizations.81 Many international treaties and other
instruments have included reference to "natural resources" without defining what is
meant by this term.82 Some have defined the term "natural resources" as "primarily
an economic concept categorizing the various elements of the natural world according
to their usefulness to man."83 Others have defined it to mean "land, fish, wildlife,
biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources
belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled
by" any nation or state.84 This second definition, however, favoured by some, does
not in fact correspond completely to the wider concept given to the term "natural
resources" in international law or international practice. International law and,
indeed, Security Council Resolution 687 did not limit the term to only natural
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resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise
controlled by the state or the nation, international and worldwide resources which are
not subject to the national jurisdiction or control of any state are included under the
concept of "natural resources". In fact different components, elements, features, and
attributes constituting the environment are, in our view, considered as natural
resources. This corresponds to the developments in international law and
international environmental law as represented in principle 2 of the Stockholm
declaration on the Human Environment which declares that the natural resources of
the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna, and especially representative
samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and
future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate.85 Thus,
the term "natural resource" can be defined by reference to nature and nature-created
sources and by contrast to man-made or man-created sources. Any depletion of or
damage to natural resources, as hereinabove defined, as a result to Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait is compensable under U.N. Security Council
resolution 687 and payments will be available in accordance with the provisions
specified by the U.N.C.C. in the Criteria for additional Categories of Claims provided
that a government or an international organization brings a claim to that effect.
Third: Only Governments and International
Organizations Can Claim Compensation for any
Loss or Damage to the Environment or the
Depletion ofNatural Resources:
U.N. Security Council resolution 687 did not specify that only governments
and international organizations could bring claims of compensation for loss or
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damage to the environment or the depletion of natural resources. The wording of
paragraph 16 of the said resolution does in fact allow governments, nationals, and
corporations to claim compensation for such loss or damage. But the U.N.C.C. has
clearly stated that only governments and international organization can bring claims
of compensation for any environmental damage or the depletion of or damage to
natural resources. The Criteria for additional Categories of Claims listed claims of
compensation for environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources under
the heading "Criteria for processing claims of Governments and international
organizations" and specified that :
The following criteria will govern the submission of claims
of Governments and international organizations pursuant to
resolution 687 (1991). Each Government will submit claims of its
own and those of its political subdivisions, or any agency,
ministry, instrumentality, or entity controlled by it.86
This provision of the Criteria for additional Categories of Claims excludes the
submission of claims of individuals and private corporations for compensation for
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources and allows only for the
submission of claims of governments and international organizations. However,
governments may submit claims of their own as representing their states, and they
may submit claims on behalf of their political and administrative organs, constituent
subdivisions and agencies, central and local subdivisions and instrumentalities, and
entities controlled by such governments such as public corporations.
It is understood that loss, damage or injury to individuals and private
corporations resulting from environmental damage or the depletion of natural
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resources as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait would be
submitted under consolidated claims submitted by governments on behalf of their
nationals in accordance with Criteria for additional Categories of Claims, title I
"Criteria for processing of claims of individuals not otherwise covered"87 and on
behalf of corporations in accordance with a the title II "Criteria for processing claims
of corporations and other entities."88
But original claims of compensation for environmental damage and the
depletion of natural resources per se are submitted by governments and international
organizations as specified by the Criteria for additional Categories of Claims.89
Although under the quoted Criteria adopted by the U.N.C.C. Governing
Council only governments and international organizations can claim compensation
for any loss or damage to the environment or the depletion of natural resources, the
present writer has found that at least two claims involving very important
environmental components and deal directly with environmental matters and the
depletion of natural resources were filed by corporations and not by governments or
international organizations and were decided by one panel of commissioners. Those
two cases are the WBC Claim9" and the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation Claims.91 The
Panel of Commissioners in the WBC Claim has found that although reference to
claims for environmental damage and specifically to claims for "expenses directly
relating to fighting oil fires" (Decision 7 of the Governing Council) had been made in
the context of Category "F" claims submitted by governments, claims for those sorts
of losses could also be filed under category "E" by a corporation, as it should be
noted that Security Council resolution 687 (1991) referred to "environmental damage
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and the depletion of natural resources" as potential heads of claim, without making
any qualification as to the legal subject or entity eligible to make such claims, and as
it could not have been the intention of the Governing Council to violate resolution
687 or derogate from its provisions.92 In the Claims ofKuwait Petroleum Corporation
the Panel ofCommissioners adopted the same view and reached similar conclusions.93
Fourth: Rules of Evidence:
Claims of compensation for environmental damage and the depletion of
natural resources "must be supported by documentary and other appropriate evidence
sufficient to demonstrate the circumstances and the amount of the claimed loss."94
This is required since these claims are for substantial amounts.95 In this connection
article 35 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure has specified:
1. Each claimant is responsible for submitting documents and
other evidence which demonstrate satisfactorily that a
particular claim or group of claims is eligible for
compensation pursuant to Security Council resolution
687(1991). Each panel will determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of any documents and
other evidence submitted.
2.
3. With respect to claims received under the criteria for
processing claims of... corporations and other entities, and
claims of governments and international organizations
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(S/AC.29/1991 7/Rev. 1), such claims must be supported
by documentary and other appropriate evidence sufficient
to demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the
claimed loss.
4. A panel of Commissioners may request evidence required
under this article.96
In addition, article 36 of the same Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure
stipulates:
A panel of Commissioners may:
(a) In unusually large or complex cases, request further
written submissions and invite individuals, corporations
or other entities, Governments or international
organizations to present their views in oral proceedings;
(b) Request additional information from any other source,
including expert advice, as necessary.
Thus, it appears that panels of commissioners do have full powers and
complete discretion to decide the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of
any documents and other evidence submitted, request evidence, request further written
submissions, request claimants to present their views in oral proceedings, and request
additional information from any other source. The role of the panels of commissioners
with regard to evidence is that what we may call "functional activism". But it remains
to be seen how these rules are applied and interpreted in claims of environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources. We may however refer to some of the
relevant claims and see how panels of commissioners dealt with the rules of evidence.
Thus, the Panel of Commissioners concerning the Egyptian Workers' Claims9 decided
in one respect to accept a lower standard of proof as " a lesser degree of documentary
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evidence ordinarily will be sufficient..."98 A result, copies of "payment orders" that
would include the names of all of the claimants and the amount claimed for each
claimant as equivalent to the reasonable minimum evidence prescribed by the Rules.99
But in some other respects, the Panel refused to carry out investigations, which would
have been carried out by a court of law, to prove the existence of payment orders
issued from 2 July 1990 that were not received by the Egyptian banks, thus eliminating
the possibility of compensation for otherwise valid claims made under Security
Council Resolution 687. In this connection the panel said:
In addition, the Panel is of the opinion that embarking on
the type of investigation required to deal with Egypt's request
would not be compatible with the nature of the work of the
Commission. In particular the Panel is unable, within the time
period available for its work, to conduct inquiries of this nature
that may or may not determine conclusively the existence, or not,
of payment orders issued from 2 July 1990 that were not received
by the Egyptian banks.100
The Panel did not provide any valid legal reason for its quoted opinion except
the time period which could have been extended in order to allow excluded valid
claims to be proceeded with. Justice has not been served well in this claim.
On the other hand, we find that the Panel of Commissioners appointed to
review the WBC Claim has decided that despite the quasi-judicial function of the
Panel, the Panel must make every effort to ensure that the requirements of due process
were met. Accordingly, the Panel relied not only on the contribution of the Parties but
it assumed an investigative role that went beyond using the adversarial method of
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verifying claims.101 This investigative approach was adopted and followed by panels
of commissioners when verifying and deciding other claims.102
Fifth: Deadline for the Submission of Claims:
The U.N.C.C. had imposed a deadline of Feb. 1, 1997, for the submission of
claims for environmental damage.103 Nine states have submitted environmental claims
which are expected to be decided in the not too distant future. But corporate claims
which have substantial environmental components will be studied under a separate
section as follows:
THE U.N.C.C. AND KUWAITI CLAIMS CONCERNING
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND THE DEPLETION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
A. The Well Blowout Control Claim
As has been pointed out earlier, environmental claims have been submitted to
the U.N.C.C. by nine states but no decision has so far been issued with regard to any
of these claims and decisions are expected to be issued in the near future. But the
U.N.C.C. Governing Council has, on December 18, 1996, issued a decision aproving
the recommendations of a panel of commissioners awarding the Kuwait Oil Company
the sum of 610,048,547 US Dollars as compensation for the costs and losses it
incurred in fighting the massive oil-well fires which were still burning in Kuwait after
the forced withdrawal of Iraq forces and the liberation of Kuwait; the "Well Blowout
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Control Claim " (the WBC Claim)104 is important in many respects as it was the first
category "E" corporate claim to be decided by the U.N.C.C. and as it involved
environmental aspects covered under paragraph 35 of the Criteria for additional
Categories of Claims insofar as matters of environmental damage and the depletion of
natural resources are concerned. This Claim was filed before the Commission on July
30, 1993 by the Kuwait Oil Company ("KOC"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Kuwait
Petroleum Corporation which was wholly owned by the State of Kuwait. The Claim
was filed under category "E" (corporate claims). KOC requested compensation in the
amount of US$950,715,662 for the costs it claimed to have incurred in planning and
executing the work of putting the well-hed fires still burning after the forced
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, stopping the flow of oil and gas from those
wells, and making the well-heads safe for the reinstatement of production.105 the Panel
of Commissioners appointed to review this Claim had to deal first with the issue of
whether environmental claims envisaged by the U.N.C.C. Governing Council to be
filed only by Governments under category "F" claims could be filed by companies or
corporations under category "E" claims; the Panel concluded that Security Council
Resolution 687(1991) referred, inter alia, to "environmental damage and the depletion
of natural resources" as a potential heads of claims, without making any qualification
as to the legal subject or entity eligible to make such claims, and, accordingly,
environmental claims could be filed not only by governments under category "F"
claims but also by companies or coporations under category "E" claims without any
substantive consequences in terms of the law applicable to such claims. 106 Then the
panel of Commissioners appointed to deal with this claim concluded that it had to deal
with two main issues.
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First, the Panel must determine whether all the costs
included by the Claimant in the WBC Claim can be
considered a direct result of Iraq's invasion and occupation
of Kuwait and thus compensable under the applicable law
and the criteria established by the Governing Council.
Second, the Panel must verify, using expert advise where
necessary, that the costs for which compensation is being
sought in the WBC Claim have in fact been incurred by the
Claimant.107
Thus, the Panel of Commissioners recognized its role in this case as a quasi-
judicial organ processisng the claim as such.108 The Panel of Commissioners had to
deal with a primary legal question, i.e. whether Iraq was liable for hundreds of oil-well
fires that were set ablaze in the days prior to the forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait. Responding to Iraq's denial of "any responsibility for the oil-well fires,
arguing that the fires were caused by allied air raids'"09 the Panel of Commissioners
declared that :
Although part of the damage may be a result of the allied
bombing, the bulk of the oil well fires was directly caused
by the explosives placed on the well heads and detonated by
Iraqi forces. In this regard the Panel finds the testimony
presented by the Claimant's witnesses at the oral
proceedings, which included videotapes of the explosives
placed on the well heads, as well as the Kalin Report,
particularly convincing. The Panel also notes that the
evidence referred to by Iraq is consistent with this
conclusion.110
The Panel of Commissioners has further declared that in accordance with
"Governing Council decision 7, Iraq's liability includes any direct loss, damage or
injury suffered as a result ofmilitary operations or threat of military action by either
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side..."111 Decision 7 which was referred to by the Panel of Commissioners is the
decision concerning the adoption by the U.N.C.C. Governing Council of the Criteria
for additional Categories of Claims which we discussed before.112 Paragraph 21 of
said Criteria stated in part that:
These payments are available with respect to any direct
loss, damage, or injury to corporations and other entities as
a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. This will include any loss suffered as a result of
(a) Military operations or threat ofmilitary action by either
side during the period of 2 August 1990 to 2 March
1991;
It is clear that this provision quoted from paragraph 21 of the Criteria for additional
Categories of Claims is a correct application and interpretation of the rules of
international law concerning Iraq's liability as included in paragraph 16 of Security
Council resolution 687 which bases Iraq's liability on its unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, i.e. Iraq's unlawful use of force in violation of the Charter of
the United Nations, and not on just jus in be/lo. The Panel of Commissiosners adopted
a similar line of reasoning when it declared that the Governing Council's decision
No.7 is "in accordance with the general principles of international law.'"13 and as a
result, the Panel declared that "Iraq is liable for any direct loss... caused by its own or
by the coalition armed forces."114
After verifying the Kuwait Oil Company Claim, the Panel of Commissioners
recommended to award the Company the sum of 610,048,547 US Dollars in
compensation for costs incurred by the Company in fighting the oil-wells fires left
burning in Kuwait after the forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces, and the U.N.C.C.
Governing Council approved this recommendation on December 18, 1996.115
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B The Fluid Lost Claim
The Fluid lost Claim116 was one of the claims filed by the Kuwait Petroleum
Corporation ("KPC") which was entrusted by Kuwait with "realizing the economic
value" of Kuwait's hydro-carbon resources. KPC alleged that, prior to the liberation
of Kuwait, Iraqi forces deliberately sabotaged Kuwait's wells and facilities, burning
and destroying crude oil and oil products, and releasing crude oil into the Kuwait
desert and the waters offshore Kuwait. KPC claimed that Kuwait had lost
approximately 1,250.50 million barrels of reservoir fluids to fires and spills as a result
of Iraq's actions. 417 million barrels out of the total asserted fluid loss had not been
covered by any claim and as such they were covered by the Fluid Loss Claim.
Components of this claim included volume of the lost reservoir fluids, valuation of the
lost fluid, and cost savings.117 KPC asserted that losses claimed for under this claim
were direct losses and were, therefore, compensable under U.N. Resolution 687(1991)
and U.N.C.C. Governing Council decision 7.118
The panel of Commissioners accepted KPC's views, cited the WBC Claim
Report, and concluded that "[bjecause the losses alleged in the FL claim are the
product of the well blow-outs, they are, to the extent proved by evidence, compensable
under Security Council resolution 687 and Governing Council decision 7"119. Finally
the Panel recommended compensation in the amount ofUS$1,172,180,632 for KPC's
fluid loss claim.120
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It should be noted here that the Panel did not have to deal with the question of
whether an environmental claim could be filed by a corporation under category "E"
claims as this issue was settled in the WBC claim and as this claim involved clear
economic or business losses arising out of the depletion of oil and gas resources in
addition to the environmental aspects of the claim.
C. Monitoring and Assessment Claims
Monitoring and Assessment Claims were the first category of state
environmental claims to be decided by the Commission. At its 109th meeting held on
21 June 2001 at Geneva, the Governing Council of the U.N.C.C. adopted its decision
concerning the first installment of "F4" claims approving the recommendations made
by the panel of Commissioners and amounts of the recommended awards concerning
such claims. Iran was awarded 17,007,070 US Dollars; Jordan was awarded 7,060,625
US Dollars, Kuwait was awarded 108,908,412 US Dollars. Saudi Arabia was awarded
109,584,660 US Dollars, Syrian Arab Republic was awarded 674,200 US Dollars, but
Turkey's claim was rejected. The total amount of compensation awards reached the
sum of 243,234,967 US Dollars.121 All such awards cover claims for monitoring and
assessment of environmental damage, depletion of natural resources, monitoring of
public health, and performing medical screening for the purposes of investigation and
combating increased health risks submitted by the concerned governments. Such
claims are hereinafter referred to as "monitoring and assessment claims."122
Following the lines of other panels of Commissioners, the panel of
Commissioners appointed to review the monitoring and assessment claims decided to
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apply relevant Security Council resolutions, the criteria established by the U.N.C.C.
Governing Council for particular categories of claims, pertinent decision of the
Governing Council, and other relevant rules of international law.123
The panel of Commissioners dealt with the issue of compensable losses or
expenses and considered "direct environmental damage and depletion of natural
resources" to include losses or expenses resulting from:
(a) Abatement and prevention of environmental damage , including expenses
directly relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in
coastal and international waters;
(b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or
future measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to
clean and restore the environment;
(c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for
the purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the
environment;
(d) Reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings
for the purpose of investigation and combating increased health risks as a
result of the environmental damage; and
(e) Depletion of or damage to natural resources.124
Applying such rules to the monitoring and assessment claims, the panel of
Commissioners concluded that monitoring and assessment expenses that qualify for
compensation are those resulting from:
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(a) Monitoring and assessment of environmental damage that is reasonable for
any of the purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the
environment; and
(b)Monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings that is
reasonable for any of the purposes of investigation and combating increased
health risks as a result of the environmental damage.125
The Claimant sought compensation for expenses resulting from monitoring and
assessment activities undertaken or to be undertaken to identify and evaluate damage
or loss suffered by them as a result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
These activities relate, inter alia, damage from air pollution, depletion of water
resources; damage to ground water; damage to cultural heritage resources; oil
pollution in the Persian Gulf; damage to coastlines; damage to fisheries, damage to
wetland and rangeland; damage to forestry, agricultural and livestock; and damage or
risk of damage to public health.126 As the Claimant alleged, environmental damage,
depletion of natural resources and increased health risks resulted from, niter alia.
(a) The release and transport, into the Claimants' territories, of airborne
pollutants caused by oil fires resulting from the ignition of hundreds of oil
wells in Kuwait by Iraqi forces during Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait;
(b) Numerous oil rivers and lakes formed by oil from the destroyed oil wells
that did not ignite;
(c) The release by Iraqi forces, of millions of barrels of oil into the sea from
oil pipelines, off-shore terminals and oil tankers;
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(d) Disruption of fragile desert and coastal terrain caused by the movement of
military vehicles and personnel, coupled with the construction of
thousands of kilometers of military trenches and the emplacement of
mines, weapons caches and other fortifications, and
(e) Adverse impacts on the environment resulting from the transit and
settlement of the thousands of persons who departed from Iraq and
Kuwait as a result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.127
The panel of Commissioners focused on the monitoring and assessment claims
relating to expenses resulting from three different categories, namely:
(a) Investigations to ascertain whether environmental damage or depletion of
natural resources has occurred;
(b) Studies to quantify the loss resulting from the damage or depletion; and
(c) Assessment ofmethodologies to abate or mitigate the damage or depletion.
Claims relating to activities falling into more than one of the above categories
were also focused on by the panel of Commissioners.128 The monitoring and
assessment claims stated above were given priority by the panel upon the request of
the State Claimants which was approved by the U.N.C.C. Governing Council.129
The fact that monitoring and assessment claims were to be reviewed by the
panel of Commissioners before deciding the compensability of any substantive claims
presented special problems: Monitoring and assessment claims were being reviewed at
a point where it may not have been established that the environmental damage or
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depletion of natural resources occurred as a result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. But the panel concluded that:
The result of the monitoring and assessment activities may
be critical in enabling claimants to establish the existence of
damage and evaluate the quantum of compensation to be claimed.
Hence, although it may be correct in some cases to say that a
claimant is seeking compensation for monitoring and assessment
without prior proof that environmental damage has in fact
occurred, it would be both illogical and inequitable to reject a
claim for reasonable monitoring and asessment on the sole ground
that the claimant did not establish beforehand that environmental
damage occurred. To reject a claim for that reason would, in
effect, deprive the claimant of the opportunity to generate the very
evidence that it needs to demonstrate the nature and extent of
damage that may have occurred ,130
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CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter on "the U.N. Compensation Commission and Environmental
Claims" we discussed the Constitutional Structure of the U.N.C.C. and its Nature and
the Nature of its Work, in section I, while we devoted section II to the study of the
U.N.C.C. and the Qualifications of Environmental Claims, section III focused on the
U.N.C.C. and Kuwait Claims Concerning Environmental Damage and the Depletion
of Natural Resources. The U.N.C.C. was established pursuant to Security Council
resolution 687 to administer the U.N. Compensation Fund and is constituted of the
Governing Council of the Commission, a body of commissioners comprising panels
each of which consists of three commissioners, and a secretariat. The Governing
Council is the policy-making organ of the Commission and performs important
functional tasks with request to claims presented to the Commission.
Commissioners who are appointed by the Governing Council upon nomination
by the U.N. Secretary-General must be experts in fields such as finance, law,
accountancy, insurance and environmental assessment. Panels of commissioners are
responsible for processisng claims including the verification and evaluation of such
claims and their recommendations are final and subject only to the approval of the
Governing Council. Insofar as claims presented to the Commission, are concerned the
secretariat of the Commission makes a preliminary assessment of each claim to
determine whether it meets the formal requirements established by the Governing




With regard to the processisng of claims, the Commission does not act as a
court or an arbitral tribunal before which the parties appear. The Commission is in
fact a "political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding functions of examining
claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving
disputed claims." This work of the Commission involves a function of quasi-judicial
nature. We have seen that the Commission achieved the requirements of fairness and
impartiality and it reflected the universal legality and legitimacy. The Commission
applies Security Council resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions as well as the
criteria established by the Governing Council and any pertinent decisions of the
Governing Council . In addition, the Commission applies other relevant rules of
international law where necessary.
With regard to environmental claims and claims concerning the depletion or
damage to natural resources, the Governing Council of the Commission established
the Criteria for additional Categories of Claims which included certain provisions
regarding claims of environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources as a
result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. These claims involve
direct environmental damage or loss and cover losses and expenses resulting from
abatement and prevention of environmental damage and clean-up costs, reinstatement
and restoration costs and expenses, health and medical costs, and depletion of or
damage to natural resources. With respect to all such claims:
[Pjayments are available with respect to any direct loss,
damage, or injury to Governments or international
organizations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation ofKuwait. This will include any cost suffered as
a result of:
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(a) Military operations or threat of military action by either
side during the period 2 August 1990 to 2 March 1991;
(b)
(c) Actions by officials, employees or agents of the
Government of Iraq or its controlled entities during that
period in connection with the invasion or occupation;...131
It is to be noted that the Criteria for additional Categories of Claims
suggested that only governments and international organizations could claim
compensation for any loss or damage to the environment or the depletion of
natural resources. But the word "government" was interpreted by the Criteria
to give it the widest possible meaning. In addition we have seen claims
submitted by corporations or companies which included substantial
environmental elements.
It is important to note, also, that panels of commissioners do enjoy full powers
and discretion to decide the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any
documents and other evidence submitted, request claimants to present their views in
oral proceedings, and request additional information from any other source. The role
of panels of commissioners with regard to evidence isthat what we have called
"functional activism."
With regard to the two environmental claims filed by the Kuwait Oil
Company ("KOC") and the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation ("KPC"), The Well
Blowout Control Claim and the Fluid Lost Claim, we would like to stress the
following:
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1) The Panel of Commissioners adopted a very constructive
interpretation of the U.N.C.C. Governing Council decisions
and of U.N.Security Council resolution 687, and it resolved
the apparent inconsistency between the Governing Council's
decisions and U.N.Security Council resolution 687 by
appealing to and upholding the resolution and relevant rules
of international law.
2) Although the Panel recognized its quasi-judicial role, it has
emphasized and upheld the requirements of due process, a
cardinal principle of justice, particularly in the Anglo-
American legal systems. This means that the Commissioners
intend to achieve and preserve justice just as courts may do.
3) The Panel adopted and followed an investigative approach
which went beyond any adversarial system before the courts
of law; the Panel of course enjoyed full discretionary powers
with regard to the evaluation and admissibility of evidence
arising therefrom.
The same observations are true with regard to the third type of claims
discussed concerning monitoring and assessment claims filed by states under category
"F4" environmental claims. As we have seen the panel of Commissioners required the
existence of a sufficient nexus between the activity covered by a monitoring and
assessment claim and the environmental damage or depletion of natural resources
whether occurred or expected to occur and which would be the subject of a substantive
environmental claim.
It is expected that panels of commissioners dealing with category'T" claims,
(claims filed by governments and international organizations) will adopt and follow
the same rules and methods in order to serve justice in the best possible manner. It
should also be noted that category "F" claims which total approximately 300 claims
involving the demands of approximately US$210 billion in compensation have been
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sub-categorized into four main sub-categories the fourth of which is reserved for
claims for damage to the environment ("F4"). Environmental claims (F4") have in
turn been classified into two main groups; the first group comprises claims for
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources in the Gulf region
including those resulting from oil-well fires and the discharge of oil into the sea. This
group includes about 30 claims seeking a total ofUS$40 billion in compensation. The
second group of "F4" claims are claims for costs incurred by governments outside the
region in providing assistance to countries that were directly affected by the
environmental damage. This assistance included the alleviation of the damage caused
by the oil-well fires, the prevention and clean-up of pollution and the provision of
manpower and supplies. Such claims seeking a total of approximately US$23 billion
in compensation have been received by the U.N.C.C. The Commission has
established a corresponding secretariat team and a panel of commissioners to deal with
all sub-category "F4" environmental claims. It is expected that the verification and
valuation of these claims will require extensive and time-consuming research and
monitoring. Extensive and far-reaching fact-finding and investigative methods will
have to be followed. It is, furthermore, expected that environmental claims filed by
governments will take until the year 2003 to be finally verified and resolved.132
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2. The Executive Secretary will recommend to the Secretary-General for
nomination as many panels of Commissioners as necessary to process
claims in an expeditious manner.
3. When transmitting to the Governing Council the nominations for
Commissioners, the Executive Secretary will specify the claims or
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communicated to the members of the Governing Council. The Governing
Council may approve replacement Commissioners at international
meetings.
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at each session with respect to claims covered in any reports of
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5. Decisions of the Governing Council and, after the relevant decision is
made, the associated report of the panels of the Commissioners, will be
made public, except the Executive Secretary will delete from the reports
of panels of Commissioners the identities of individual claimants or other
information determined by the panels to be confidential or privileged."
"Article 41. Correction of decisions
1. Computational, clerical, typographical or other errors brought to the
attention of the Executive Secretary within 60 days from the publication
of the decisions and reports will be reported by the Executive Secretary to
the Governing Council
2. The Governing Council will decide whether any action is necessary if it is
determined that a correction must be made, the Governing Council will
direct the Executive Secretary as to the proper method of correction.
"Article 43 Additional procedural rulings
Subject to the provisions of these procedures, Commissioners may make such
additional rulings as may be necessary to complete work on particular cases or
categories of cases. In so doing, the Commissioners may rely on the relevant rules of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for guidance.
Commissioners may request the Governing Council to provide further guidance with
respect to these procedures at any time. The Governing Council may adopt further
procedures or revise these rules when circumstances warrant.
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20. Secretary-General's Report, paras. 6 & 12.
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believe that the information stated in the claims is incorrect;
(d) That all required affirmations have been given by each claimant.
2. In the case of claims of corporations and other legal entities the secretariat will
also verify that each separate claim contains:
(a) Documents evidencing the name, address and place of incorporation or
organization of the entity;
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(b)Evidence that the corporation or the legal entity was, on the date on which
the claim arose, incorporated or organized under the law of the state the
Government ofwhich has submitted the claim;
(b) A general description of the legal structure of the entity;
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S/AC.26/1991/WP. 6; Holding and managing oil revenues, Report by the executive
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In general, when writers speak of the international responsibility under
international law it is thought that the responsibility of states is the one type of
responsibility that is meant and is being talked about. But it is the international
criminal responsibility of the individuals which has been dealt with for sometime and
developed in somewhat clear legal terms under international law as exceptions to the
rules and principles of international law which stipulate that individuals are not
directly responsible under that law are increasingly growing in a most expeditious
way.1 Although theories recognizing the international personality of the individual
(the human being) have not, so far, achieved dominance in international law, the
individual's international criminal responsibility with regard to certain offenses has
been firmly established. The recognition of such responsibility did not require the
recognition of any sort of individual's international personality despite the fact that
some international law writers did require the connection between the kind and degree
of such responsibility and the kind and degree of the required international
personality, i.e., there can be no international responsibility without international
personality comparable in kind and degree.2
The Nuremberg and other recent trials have been firmly giving an enhanced
support for the recognition of the international criminal responsibility of individuals.3
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The establishment of the International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia,4 the
International Criminal Court for Rwanda,5 and the trials of individuals accused of
certain crimes before both courts, and the most recently signed Rome Statute for the
Establishment and Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court6 have all led to the
universal recognition of such individuals' criminal responsibility. All of these
developments and others will be discussed insofar as they relate to, bear on or touch
upon the subject matter of this chapter.
Instances of the determination of the international criminal responsibility of
the individuals before the trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunal had
been very rare and had not constituted any important legal precedents in international
law. In the following pages we will discuss the various categories of international
crimes which bear on the environment and show how they have developed over the
years beginning from the Nuremberg Trials until the present time and how they
affect or bear on the environment. We will also show how Iraqi officials and
individuals, including Saddam Hussein, are liable under international law with regard




(AGGRESSION AND RELATED CRIMES)
Crimes against peace or aggression and other related crimes date back to 1945
when the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis was done at London on 8 August 1945.8 Article 6 of the
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Charter of the International Military Tribunal accompanying the London Agreement
stated in part:
The Tribunal... shall have the power to try and punish
persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis
countries, whether as individuals or as member of
organizations, committed any of the following crimes.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be
individual responsibility:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation
or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing;9
Treaties referred to in this article are the Kellogg-Briand Pact known as the
Paris Pact (1928)10 and some other non-aggression pacts concluded by Germany with
other states. Although none of such treaties provided for individual criminal
responsibility for violating any of the provisions of any of such treaties or initiating or
resorting to war in violation of undertakings stipulated in the said treaties; the 1945
London Agreement declared that crimes against peace including planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of the
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said treaties or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the foregoing were crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg
Tribunal for which their existed individual responsibility. The Nuremberg Tribunal
declared "that those who plan and wage such a war with its inevitable and terrible
consequences, are committing a crime in so doing"11 and declared further that:
. . .it is argued that the (Kellogg-Brained) Pact does not expressly
enact that such wars are crimes, or set up courts to try those who
make such wars. To that extent the same is true with regard to the
laws of war contained in the Hague Convention. The Hague
Convention of 1907 prohibited resort to certain methods of waging
war. These included the inhumane treatment of prisoners, the
employment of poisoned weapons, the improper use of flags of
truce, and similar matters. Many of these prohibitions had been
enforced long before the date of the Convention; but since 1907
they have certainly been crimes, punishable as offences against the
laws of war, yet the Hague Convention nowhere designates such
practices as criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any
mention made of a court to try and punish offenders. For many
years past, however, military tribunals have tried and punished
individuals guilty of violating the rules of land warfare laid down
by this Convention. In the opinion of the tribunal, those who wage
aggressive war are doing that which is equally illegal, and ofmuch
greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the Hague
Convention,12 [Emphasis added]
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The Tribunal based its opinion on what it declared to be general international
law. But some commentators did not agree with the courts opinion and asserted that
the establishment of the international responsibility of the individual or the
individualization of international criminal responsibility was created by the 1945
London Agreement and had not been part of any treaty law or customary (general)
international law prior to the conclusion of the London Agreement and that the
Tribunal erroneously declared that such responsibility was firmly rooted in general
international law.13 But even if this view was accepted, it must be stressed that
developments after the delivery of the judgment of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal have emphasized the universality of the recognition of the
international criminal responsibility of the individuals and that any acts involving
planning, preparation, initiation or waging ofwar of aggression, or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing have indeed been
recognized as international crimes or supreme international crimes as declared by the
Tribunal and by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo.14
Even more important is the fact that the Charter of the United Nations itself
proscribed all acts of aggression and acts involving threats to the peace or breaches of
the peace,15 and has thus created a norm, a jus cogens, or peremptory norm of general
international law declaring the illegality, proscription and criminality of all threats to
the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The United Nations General
Assembly itself affirmed the Charter and the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal;
General Assembly Resolution No. 95 (I) adopted on 11 December 1946, stipulated
that the General Assembly:
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Affirms the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal;
Directs the Committee on the codification of international law
established by the resolution of the General Assembly of 11 December
1946, to treat as a matter of primary importance plans for the formation,
in the context of a general codification of offences against the peace
and security of mankind, or of an International Criminal Code, of the
principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
judgment of the Tribunal.16
Again in 1947 the U.N. General Assembly issued its resolution No. 177 (II) in
which the Assembly directed the 'International Law Commission, which replaced the
Committee on the codification of international law to "'formulate the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the
judgment of the Tribunal." The course of the work of the Commission proceeded on
the fact that the General Assembly did affirm the principles contained in the Charter
and judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal and that the task of the Commission was not
to ascertain to what extent such principles constituted principles of international law
nor was it to express any appreciation of such principles as principles of international
law but rather to formulate them. During the period from 1950 to 1954, the
International Law Commission adopted several drafts including, the 1950 draft
enunciating the Nuremberg Principles and affirming that crimes against peace were
crimes under international law and that "any person who commits an act which
constitutes a crime under international law is responsible thereof and liable to
punishment."17 Again, the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
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Security of Mankind adopted by the I.L.C. declared that aggression was an
international crime and a crime against the peace and security of mankind "for which
responsible individuals shall be punished".18 By the time (1954) it became clear that
a universal and peremptory norm of international law condemning aggression and
related crimes as international crimes and crimes against the peace and security of
mankind for which responsible individuals shall be punished was firmly established
and rooted in international law.19 The problem, however, was with the definition of
aggression.
The Definition of Aggression:
Few terms in international law have been viewed in as many different
meanings and concepts and have caused so many conflicts and controversies as has
the term "aggression". But The failure of the Security Council to deal with many
situations involving threats and use of force and acts of aggression and the enhanced
role of the U.N. General Assembly at the time led the Assembly to establish a
committee to reach an acceptable definition of aggression" In fact, four successive
General Assembly committees worked on "the Question of the Definition of
Aggression" for more than twenty years until a consensus resolution on the subject
was finally adopted by the Assembly in 197420. Although it was labeled by some
commentators21 as political and of no legal value or effect, the Definition of
Aggression was adopted by the U.N General Assembly after long and exhaustive
efforts and the participation of almost all states members of the United Nations in the
work and deliberations which continued for more than twenty years and led to the
adoption of this definition which reflected the unanimous approval of U.N. member
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states. In addition, in at least one case some of the provisions of the Definition were
held by the International Court of Justice to be declaratory of general international
law.22 Moreover, the International Law Commission has declared that any violation
of the Definition of Aggression is an international crime.23 The legal relevance of
Definition was expressed and stressed in the Resolution including the Definition; the
ninth paragraph of the preamble of Resolution No.3314(XXIX) including the
Definition ofAggression reads:
The General Assembly:
Convinced that the adoption of a definition of
aggression ought to have the effect of deterring a potential
aggressor, would simplify the determination of acts of
aggression and the implementation of measures to suppress
them and would also facilitate the protection of the rights and
lawful interests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the
victim,...
Article 1 of the Definition stales:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.
Explanatory note: In this Definition the term "state".
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of
recognition or to whether a State is a Member of
the United Nations;
(b) Includes the concept of a "group of States" where
appropriate.
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Instances of aggression as stipulated in article 3 of the Definition include, inter alia, \
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed force of a State
of the territory of another State, or any military
occupation however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of
force of the territory of another State or part
thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State
against the territory of another State or the use of
any weapons by a State against the territory of
another State;....
In addition, article 5 of the Definition stipulates:
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political,
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a
justification for aggression.
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international
peace. Aggression give rise to international
responsibility.
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting
from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful.
The above quoted articles include the provisions which are most directly
relevant to the subject matter of this chapter. It appears that the quoted provisions are
reflective of the various relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and
the rules and principles of general international law. Thus, any use of force against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations constitutes an act of
aggression which is an international crime. The territory of a state includes its land,
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territorial sea, and air and space above its territory, all are considered the main
components of the environment of the state. But the concept of the environment is
much wider as it includes other main components such as population. Nevertheless,
for the purpose of this chapter, any use of force against the territory of a state would
necessarily involve the environment of that state and any use of force against the
environment of a state is use of force against the territory of that state. Any such use
of force is indeed an aggression against the State and constitutes an international
crime for which the international criminal responsibility of the individual is
established and recognized under international law. Subject-matter of jurisdiction
will be dealt with at a latter stage of this chapter.24 But it should be emphasized that
the Iraqi officials and the Iraqi military forces have indeed committed aggression
against the Kuwaiti environment and the environment of other Gulf states as
explained previously in chapters 2,3, and 4. Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials
must be held criminally responsible under international law for committing such
crimes. Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials planned, prepared, initiated and
waged a war of aggression against Kuwait, its territory and environment.25 This was
stressed and condemned in various U.N.Security Council resolutions as previously
stated in chapter 3 and 4. The issue of Immunity and non-immunity of the Iraqi
president will be dealt with later in this chapter.26 But it remains to be stressed that
Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and its environment is a supreme international crime
containing within itself the accumulation of all the evils of all war crimes.
It remains to be also stressed that the most recently signed Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court has included the crime of aggression among the crimes





War crimes are generally defined as "acts committed in violation of the laws
of war"28 This definition was not unanimously agreed upon.29 The framers of the
London Agreement and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the
Nuremberg Tribunal) chose to enumerate the various categories of war crimes in
general as crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Then they
selected to list war crimes in the narrow sense as follows:
War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or
customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be
limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave
labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of
or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity;...30
Such quoted acts are among the instances of war crimes which were
included within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and for
which individual criminal responsibility under the London Agreement and
international law is established . In this connection the Nuremberg Military
Tribunal held:
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It was submitted that international law is
concerned with the actions of sovereign States, and
provides no punishment for individuals; and further, that
where the act in question is an act of State, those who
carry it out are not personally responsible but are
protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, both these submissions
must be rejected. That international law imposes duties
and liabilities upon individuals as upon States has long
been recognized ....
[T]he very essence of the (Nuremberg) Charter is
that individuals have international duties which
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed
by the individual State. He who violates the laws ofwar
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the State, if the State in authorizing action
moves outside its competence under international law.31
In the same meaning the Court declared that:
Crimes against international law committed by men, not
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced.32
The concept ofwar crimes adopted by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and the judgement of the Tribunal and the recognition of the Nuremberg principles by
the U.N. General Assembly as principles rooted in general international law,33 all have
led to the universal recognition and acceptance of the individual's criminal
responsibility for war crimes under international law and of the enlargement of the
scope of such crimes. Even if it was true as was held by some writers that the
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Nuremberg Charter was "the true legal source of individual responsibility for war
crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity"34; yet it is true that now
international individual responsibility for all such crimes is firmly established rooted in
general international law. The developments in the U.N.General Assembly with regard
to the codification of international crimes and the drafting of the "Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security ofMankind"35 and "the International Criminal Code"36
all lend support to the norm recognizing individual criminal responsibility under
international law. The establishment, by the Security Council, of the International
Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia, with its jurisdiction to try individuals accused
of committing serious violations of the international humanitarian law in former
Yugoslavia, is another important and undisputed proof of the firmness of the rooted
norm concerning the individual criminal responsibility for war crimes under
international law.37 Thus, article 1 of the Statute of the Tribunal states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power
to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with
the provisions of the present Statute:
In addition, article 6 provides:
The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction
over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the
present Statute.38
The stated norm concerning the international criminal responsibility of the
individual for war crimes was reiterated and reconfirmed by the establishment of the
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International Tribunal for Rwanda and the adoption of its Statute,39 which included a
number of provisions on the subject; article 1 of the Statute provides:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have
the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible
for such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the
present Statute.
Furthermore, article 5 of the same statute stipulates:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have
jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions
of the present Statute.40
The most recently signed treaty establishing the International Criminal
Court41 has firmly recognized and accepted the international criminal responsibility of
individuals for war crimes; Article 1 states:
There is established an International Criminal Court
(the Court) which shall have the power to bring persons to
justice for the most serious crimes of international concern,
and which shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction and functioning shall be
governed by the provisions of this Statute.
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Article 5 includes war crimes among the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court.42 Article 8 of the same treaty (Statute) enumerated in detail "war crimes"
which will be referred to later in this chapter.43
Having referred to the most important developments concerning the
recognition of the norm establishing the international criminal responsibility of the
individual for war crimes over a very long period of time, we conclude, that the norm
concerning the individual's international criminal responsibility for war crimes has
become undisputed and universally recognized as a most basic norm of international
law or what is known as a "jus cogens" but, the question is whether war crimes
include crimes against the environment.
As we have previously stated war crimes were defined in the London Charter
of the Nuremberg Tribunal as "violations of the laws or customs ofwar". At a later
stage the term "violations of the international humanitarian law" has been and
continues to be used. The Nuremberg Charter stated that "wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity" 44 was
among war crimes for which international criminal responsibility was established.
These quoted terms from the Nuremberg Charter are general and very broad to the
extent that they cover a very wide range of violations committed against the
environment during or as a result of armed conflicts. The Regulations Respecting the
Law and Customs ofWar on Land annexed to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs ofWar on Land signed at the Hague, 18 October 1907, prohibited the
employment of arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering [article 23 (e)] and the destruction or seizure of property unless such
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destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war [article
23(e)]45. The Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, included a similar provision in
article 53 which stipulates:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to
the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative
organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations.46
Although all of the above-mentioned provisions, as stated in the 1907
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the 1945
Nuremberg Charter, and the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar do give a very high degree of protection to a wide
range of environmental objects, we find that the 1977 Protocol (I) Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection ofVictims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 4" has spelled out, clarified and codified
customary and conventional international law relative to the protection of the
environment and environmental objects during armed conflicts or situated or located
in territories under occupation. Thus, article 54 prohibits attacks against, destruction
or the rendering useless of any objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population.48 In addition, article 56 of the same protocol provides protection for and
prohibits any attack against or destruction of works or installations containing
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations.49
Moreover, article 55 of the protocol prohibits any widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment, and it, further prohibits any attack against the
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natural environment by way of reprisals.50 The 1977 Protocol (II) Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) includes provisions concerning the
protection of the environment and environmental objects which are similar to those
included in Protocol I 51. Protocol II, furthermore, prohibits the commission of "any
acts of hostility directed against historic monuments, works of arts or places of
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples."52
The 1977 Enmod Convention53 prohibits any acts, activities or operations
which have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effect as the means of destruction,
damage, or injury" to any state party to the Convention or to the environment; this
prohibition applies to all situations in times of peace as well as in times of armed
conflicts.54 Cultural property as an important aspect of the environment are protected
under customary and conventional international law, all states are under an
international obligation to refrain from any act of hostility directed against such
property.55 International law, in addition to all of the aforementioned, proscribes the
use of certain weapons and means of warfare which cause significant harm to the
environment and its different aspects and elements and/or cause unnecessary damage
or suffering.56
All such acts as are prohibited by the laws and customs of war whether
prohibited by treaty or customary international law do constitute war crimes as
generally defined as "violations of the laws and customs of war". Individuals who
commit such violations must be held accountable and criminally responsible under
international law. Iraqi officials and individuals who ordered the commission of any
such acts and those who committed or participated in the commission of any such acts
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are accountable and must criminally be held responsible under international law.
Seizure and destruction of property, sickening destruction of Kuwait City and other
places in Kuwait, burning of over 600 oil wells, causing large oil spills, causing
widespread and severe damage to the Kuwait environment and the environment of
other Gulf States, the looting and destruction of cultural centers, Kuwait University
and other educational, scientific and health institutions, and a whole host of other
crimes against the Kuwaiti environment as previously stated in chapters two and three
supra, all are just instances of crimes committed or ordered to be committed by the
Iraqi President and other Iraqi officials and individuals who must be held criminally
responsible under international law.57
This opinion is even supported by the fact that International Tribunal for
former Yugoslavia has jurisdiction to try individuals accused of committing acts of
similar nature; thus article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia provides in part:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts
against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly;...58
Article 3 of the same Statute provides:
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The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other
weapons calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilfull damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and sciences, historic
monuments and works of art and science'
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In addition, article 8 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court is even more elaborate in this respect; it reads in part:
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in
particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons
or property protected under the provisions of the relevant
Geneva Convention:
(b) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or health;
(iii)Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
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(iv)Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(v)Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects,
which are not military objectives;
(vi)lntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated;
(vii)Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military
objectives;
(viii)Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided
they are not military objectives;
(ix)Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities ofwar;
(x)Employing poison or poisonous weapons;
(xi)Employing asphyxiating, poisonous other gases, and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices;
(xii)Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare
which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering
or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law
of armed conflict,
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(xiii)Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts;
(xiv)Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided
they are not military objectives;
(xv)Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the
conflict;....60
The above quoted provisions of article 8 of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court are those provisions which are most relevant to war
crimes which affect the environment or any of its elements, forms, or aspects. The
said article 8 confers upon the International Criminal Court a very broad jurisdiction
with regard to war crimes and war crimes relating to property and the environment or
any of its elements, forms, or aspects, broadly defined. It is hard to foresee an armed
conflict situation involving any serious damage to the environment or any
environmental object, including property, which escapes the jurisdiction of the
Court.61
It should, however, be stressed that all the relevant provisions enumerating
environmental crimes as war crimes as stated in the provisions quoted above from
the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court do snot create new war
crimes, for this enumeration is an attempt to list the already existing war crimes as
stipulated in the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Protocols
additional to the Geneva Conventions. A careful reading of the relevant provisions of
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the Rome Statute (article 8) does indeed show that acts listed as war crimes, insofar as
the environment is concerned, are stated as violations in the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, the 1977 Protocols and the 1945 London Charter. Thus, any violation
of any of the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, or the 1977 Protocols
relating to the environment in times of armed conflict as previously studied in
Chapter Two of this research is considered a war crime as stated in article 8 of the
Rome Statute and as recognized under prior treaties and protocols. This is what fits
the definition of war crimes as violations of the laws and customs of war or armed
conflict.
As studied and concluded in chapter two, the rules and provisions of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Protocols of 1977 (or at least Protocol I)
have indeed become part of customary international law of general acceptance
binding upon all states. As a result, the war crimes relating to the environment
specified in article 8 of the Rome Statute are considered as such under customary
international law. It follows from that the conclusion that whether or not Iraq has
ratified the Rome Statute and whether or not the Rome Statute will come into force,
any act committed by Iraqis in violation of the provisions of article 8 of the Rome
Statute must be considered as a war crime under the already existing rules of treaty
and customary international law protecting the environment in times of armed
conflict or relating thereto. The value of the Rome Statute is however manifested in
the fact that it establishes a permanent court empowered with the jurisdiction to try
future war criminals. Jurisdictional issues with regard to Iraqis who may be accused
of committing war crimes in the second Gulf armed conflict will be studied later in





Paragraph © of article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter enumerated crimes against
humanity for which the international responsibility of the individual is established as
follows:
Crimes against humanity. namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecution on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
A first reading of this provision might indicate that it has nothing to do with
the environment and environmental matters during or as a result of armed conflicts;
but if we reread the phrase "and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population", we may find environmental relevance. Indeed, inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population may contain, inter alia, the infliction of
severe damage to the environment which might cause unnecessary human suffering
to a large or a considerable segment of the civilian population. The infliction of
severe damage or destruction to an environmental object or an object of an
environmental character such as dams, dykes, and nuclear electric generating stations,
is certain to cause unnecessary human suffering. Thus, such acts are and must be
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considered as inhumane acts committed against civilian population, i.e. such acts are
crimes against humanity.
It should be noted that considerations of humanity had been referred to long
before the conclusions of the London Agreement embodying the Nuremberg Charter,
the Hague Conventions No. II of 1899 and No.IV of 1907 respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land referred to "the interests of humanity and the ever
increasing requirements of civilization"62 The 1899 Convention No.II referred to
"populations and belligerents remains under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public
conscience."63 The 1907 Convention No. IV stated that "the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and rule of the principles of the law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."64 Accordingly, interests
and laws of humanity have been widely accepted to be part of the law of nations or
international law. Some considered them to be important source of international law
and laws and customs ofwar.65
In fact, what the London Agreement and the Nuremberg Charter had done was
to clarify the fact that any violation of the interests and laws of humanity was indeed
an international crime, a crime against humanity for which the international criminal
responsibility of the individual was established. Considerations and interests of
humanity were indeed the bases and cornerstones upon which all Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the two Protocols of 1977 were built.66 New and other
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developments have led to the enlargement and spreading of notions respecting the
considerations and interests of humanity with regard to armed conflicts as well as
peace-time law such as the many various conventions and other instruments of human
rights.67 These and other developments have led to the express recognition that
crimes against the environment are crimes against humanity, crimes against the peace
and security of mankind, international crime and universal crimes.68
The importance of including crimes against the environment or environmental
crimes within the category of crimes against humanity is represented in the fact that
such crimes can be considered to have been committed not only in war or armed-
conflict situations but in peace-time situations. Thus, the inclusion of environmental
crimes into the category of crimes against humanity would give an added protection
to the environment. Consequently, environmental crimes would be considered as war
crimes if committed in armed-conflict situations and crimes against humanity if
committed in peace-time situations. This opinion has not however been widely
recognized as an expression of the existing international law and still needs some
clarifications and qualifications.
Although the final efforts to codify and spell out crimes included within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court have resulted in listing environmental
and environment-related crimes under the category of war crimes as illustrated in the
previous part of this chapter, article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court dealing with "Crimes against humanity" included a provision which-
in our view- has a significant environmental relevance. Article 7 states in part:
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1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crimes against humanity"
means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack:
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of
acts referred to in paragraph I against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack.
Consequently, if acts against the environment of a state or any component
thereof were designed to cause great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health, such acts would be considered crimes against humanity "provided
that such acts (a) were committed as part ofwidespread or systematic attack, (b) that
they were committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy
which proves the element of intent, and (c) that they were directed against any
civilian population. The existence of an armed conflict or war nexus is not required.69
It took the international community several decades to drop out the requirement of
armed conflict or war insofar as crimes against humanity are concerned, 0 and this
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made it possible to claim that the inclusion of environmental or environment-related
crimes committed in peace-time situations, non-armed conflict situations and
ambiguous situations which have not reached the level of being considered as armed-
conflict situations into the category of crimes against humanity is certain to extend
the scope of the protection of the environment; thus in armed conflict situations the
environment would be protected by the rules and provisions relative to war crimes,
whereas in non-armed conflicts or peace-time situations the environment would be
protected by the rules and provisions prohibiting crimes against humanity.
The large-scale environmental destruction and damage caused by the Iraqis
and the intentional use of the environment as a weapon during the conflict as shown
in chapters 2,3 and 4, supra, are certain to fit the definitions of crimes and humanity,
crimes against the peace and security of mankind, universal crimes and international
crimes for which the international responsibility of the individual is established.
Article 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia dealt with
crimes against humanity and considered that any inhumane act committed or directed
against any civilian population constituted a crime against humanity.71 The same rule
exists with regard to the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda [article
3(1)]= In addition, article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
included a similar rule [article 7(k)].73 We assert that such a rule applies to acts
involving large-scale environmental damage or destruction and to acts involving the
use of the environment or environmental objects as weapons of war or armed
conflicts since such acts are sure to be directed against any civilian population and are
sure to cause unnecessary suffering to such population.
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Our view which includes environmental and environment-related crimes
within the category of crimes against humanity is, however, not commonly shared by
many writers, nor does it reflect existing rules of international law as perceived by
most writers and as not supported by the practice of states. Professors Birnie and
Boyle studied the developments of the matter in the ILC reports and the 1998 Statute
of the International Criminal Court and concluded that drastic changes took place
with regard to the position of the ILC concerning the categorization of environmental
crimes and the ensuing effects.74
Before 1996 the ILC had categorized such crimes as crimes against humanity
but in 1996 it moved them into the category of war crimes which, when committed
"in a systematic manner or on a large scale" amount to crimes against the peace and
security ofmankind.75 Professors Birnie and Boyle wrote:
The effect of this re-classification and re-drafting is that
the offence can be committed only during armed conflict, only
when the methods and means of warfare are "not justified by
military necessity", and only when the intended environmental
damage "gravely prejudices the health or survival of the
population". As defined by the Commission, the offence is far
removed from its original form and has lost its autonomous
character. Moreover, although it reflects some of the
contemporary concern arising out of Iraq's environmental
warfare against Kuwait in 1991, the final ILC text "has
emasculated to such an extent that its conditions of
applicability will almost never be met".76
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court retained the ILC's basic
approach but in a less castrated form. This Statute and the relevant provisions were
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The question now are as follows: Which court or tribunal has or may have
jurisdiction to try Saddam Hussein, his aides, his subordinates, and the members of
his armed forces for the crimes they committed against the environment whether
included under the definitions of "crimes against peace", "war crimes", "crimes
against humanity" or independent "international crimes"? Does the to be established
International Criminal Court pursuant to the newly signed Rome Statute have
jurisdiction over the above stated crimes committed against Kuwait and its
environment? Do we need to establish another international tribunal to try Saddam
and his subordinates? Should such a tribunal be established by a Security Council
resolution? Or, should it be established by a treaty or an agreement to be concluded
by the concerned states? Do Kuwait courts have jurisdiction over the stated crimes?
Can they legally try Saddam Hussein and his subordinates for such crimes? Or, do we
need to establish a new Kuwaiti Court to be given the power to try such cases
pursuant to a new Kuwaiti law to be enacted on the subject?
First: The International Criminal Court: Although the newly signed Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court conferred upon the Court subject-matter
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide,108 crimes against humanity,109 war crimes,110
and the crime of aggression,111 all of which are connected with and cover in some
respect or another crimes against the environment as illustrated throughout this
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chapter, article 11 of the Rome Statute bars the jurisdiction of the said Court over the
crimes committed by Saddam Hussein and his aides and subordinates because of the
rules concerning "jurisdiction ratione temporisThis article reads:
1. The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes
committed after the entry into force of this Statute.
2. If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into
force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this
Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration
under article 12, paragraph 3.
Article 12 is relevant in this regard, it stipulates:
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the
crimes referred to in article 5 [These crimes are, the crime of
genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes, and the crime
of aggression],
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may
exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States
are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in
question occurred or, if the crime was committed on
board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that
vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national.
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3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this
Statute is required under paragraph 2, that Statute may, by
declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question.
The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any
delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.
Thus, according to these quoted provisions of articles 11 and 12 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Court will not have jurisdiction over
crimes committed before the entry into force of the Statute for each of the States
concerned. But there is a possibility, however remote, that a State which becomes a
Party to the Statute may declare that it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court over
crimes that had been committed on its territory prior to the entry into force of the
Rome Statute if such crimes are among the four categories of crimes over which the
Court has jurisdiction, i.e., the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and the crime of aggression. In addition, there is another remote possibility
that the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations may decide to refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more of such
crimes appear to have been committed [article 13 paragraph (b) of the Rome Statute],
It therefore appears that Kuwait can either refer the crimes committed by Saddam
Hussein and his subordinates to the Prosecutor after establishing the Court on the
ground that such crimes had been committed on Kuwaiti territory or may request the
Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter and refer such crimes to
the Prosecutor under the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, such
possibilities appear remote as the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute are not clear
and are susceptible of conflicting views and contradictory interpretations. In addition,
the Rome Statute has not come into force yet and may take years to enter into force.112
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Second: An Ad Hoc International Tribunal. Probably, the establishment
of an ad hoc international tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and his subordinates for the
crimes they committed against Kuwait, its territory, its population, and its
environment is the most logical solution on the international level. Such a tribunal
could be established either by a treaty concluded by the concerned States or by a
Security Council resolution to be issued under Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter. The
states which participated in the Liberation of Kuwait together with the Gulf states
including Kuwait could participate in the formation and conclusion of a treaty or an
agreement establishing an ad hoc tribunal similar to the Nuremberg Tribunal, such an
ad hoc tribunal would be entrusted with the jurisdiction to try Saddam Hussein and
his subordinates for all the crimes they committed against the State of Kuwait, its
population, its territory and its environment and all other crimes against peace, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and other international crimes committed by Saddam
and his subordinates. But after the passage of a little more than a decade now, it may
seem doubtful whether the concerned sates would see it politically suitable to
establish such a tribunal; besides, it may seem now difficult to achieve a unanimous
agreement regarding a treaty on the establishment and jurisdiction of the tribunal. It
may take years and years to get the proposed treaty concluded and the proposed
tribunal operating.
Now we can say convincingly that creating such a Court is necessary in the
interests ofmaintaining international peace and security.
Probably, it is better and easier to have such a tribunal established by the
U.N.Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter. The establishment
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of the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for
Rwanda constitutes very useful precedents in this regard.113
In this connection we may refer to the concurrent Resolution of the Congress
of the United States concerning the urgent need for an international criminal tribunal
to try members of the Iraqi regime for crimes against humanity in which it is resolved
by the House of Representatives, with Senate concurring, that :
(2) the President and the Secretary of State should
(B) Work actively and urgently within the international community
for the adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution
establishing an International Criminal Court for Iraq.114
Other efforts have been undertaken within the United States, Kuwait and
other states to encourage the United Nations Security Council to establish such a
tribunal, but so far it appears that the Security Council is reluctant to establish any
such tribunal because of the changing international political environment in favour of
alleviating the sufferings of the Iraqi people. This has led to the softening of the
international community's resolve to hold an international criminal trial for Saddam
Hussein and his henchmen. The Kuwaiti jurisdiction and other concerned states'
jurisdictions might be the next most logical alternative as illustrated below:
Third: The Kuwaiti Jurisdiction. The crimes committed by Saddam
Hussein and his subordinates against Kuwait, its territory, its population and its
environment do constitute international crimes, crimes against humanity and universal
298
crimes. Jurisdiction to try individuals who committed such crimes is conferred upon
the courts of all states; its is a universal jurisdiction. There are, at least, two
international law principles each of which alone gives the Kuwaiti courts the right to
entertain jurisdiction over the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein and his
subordinates; these principles are : (1) the territorial principle,115 and (2) the
universality principle.116 Indeed each of these two principles independently confers
upon the Kuwaiti Legislature the power and authority to prescribe rules of law
defining international crimes and determining their punishments."7 Saddam
Hussein's crimes and those of his subordinates were committed on the territory of
Kuwait against the Kuwaiti nationals and the environment; they are also considered
crimes against Kuwait's legitimate national and international interests and they are
against the interests of the international community and humanity or mankind as a
whole. Thus, the two principles are applicable and the Kuwaiti courts have original
jurisdiction over such cases even though the Kuwaiti legislature may have not acted to
define such crimes and determine their punishments. To be more precise, we invite
the Kuwaiti legislature to enact a law defining in detail the crimes committed by
Saddam Hussein and his subordinates against Kuwait, its population, its territory and
its environment and to determine the corresponding punishment or punishments with
regard to each crime . But we must stress once again that Kuwaiti courts do have
original jurisdiction over such cases even though the Kuwaiti legislature did not act as
yet. The Kuwaiti courts get their power and authority directly from the rules and
principles of international law which have passed into and constitute an integral part
of Kuwaiti law as will be seen in chapter 6 infra U8 But in response to a question
which might be raised as to whether Kuwaiti courts may entertain jurisdiction based
on the principle of territoriality to try and punish persons who never entered Kuwait
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not caught on Kuwaiti soil, we may easily assert that under the general criminal
jurisdiction principles adopted by the Kuwaiti legal system and most of the Arab and
Middle Eastern States legal system, the courts of a state do have territorial jurisdiction
to try and punish all perpetrators and accomplices of any crime committed in whole or
in part or planned to be committed in whole or in part within the territory of that state
or any crime having any effect within that territory. Persons accused of committing
such crimes and their accomplices can be tried in absentia if not caught by the
authorities of the state concerned .119
However, the principle of universality may indeed be the most logical and
most convincing principle upon which Kuwaiti courts entertain jurisdiction to try and
punish Saddam Hussein and his subordinates. Saddam Hussein cannot and may not
claim any immunity as the Kuwaiti court trying him would be sitting as an
international court applying international law and trying him for serious violations of
the rules of international law and international humanitarian law which do not give
any person any shield of immunity for violating such rules as has been clearly shown
in this chapter.
Recent trials and trial attempts concerning heads of states or governments
might be important to refer to in this connection. The last of these cases, so far, is the
case against the leader of Libya , Colonel Moammar Kadhafi which was brought
before the French courts to allow the criminal proceedings and prosecution ofColonel
Kadhafi to continue12". Colonel Kadhafi was accused of planning and perpetrating
terrorist crimes, namely causing the explosion of a French DC 10 Airliner over the
Tenere Desert and the killing of all 170 people on board which took place on
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September 19, 1989. A very remarkable step was taken by the Paris Court of Appeal
on October 20,2000, when it allowed criminal proceedings against Colonel Kadhafi to
continue and decided that "the judge can proceed because immunity does not apply to
acts such as terrorism."121 Unfortunately, this decision was overruled by the French
Court of Cassation, the highest French Court, on March 13, 2001, on the ground that
heads of states do enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution in foreign countries.122
But, unlike the position adopted by the French Court of Cassation, American
and British Courts adopted a different position. Thus, the United States Court of
Appeals refused to recognize the immunity of Noriega as the head or acting head of
state in Panama and affirmed a lower court's judgments of convictions against him.
The events of this case began when President George Bush directed, in December
1989, U.S. armed forces combat in Panama to safeguard American lives, restore
democracy, preserve the Panama Canal treaties, and seize Noriega to face federal drug
charges in the United States. As a result of this armed intervention Noriega lost his
effective control over Panama and he surrendered to U.S. military officials on January
3, 1990. He was taken to Miami to face the then pending federal charges against him.
A lengthy trial took place and the jury found Noriega guilty and district court entered
judgments of conviction against him and sentenced him to a number of consecutive
long imprisonment terms. Noriega appealed his convictions, and, later, filed in
district court a motion for a new trial which was defined by the district court. Noriega
filed a second appeal. The U.S.Court of Appeals had to deal with the two appeals.
One of the most important grounds upon which Noriega based his appeals was that of
the defense of head-of-state immunity according to which the district court should
have dismissed the indictment against him. Noriega insisted that he was entitled to
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such immunity because he served as the de facto, if not the de jure, leader of
Panama.123
The Court of Appeals examined, in detail, the rules of head-of-state immunity
as developed and applied in the U.S. legal and judicial system and concluded that
Noriega's immunity was not recognized by the Executive Branch, and that "by
pursuing Noriega's capture and his prosecution, the Executive Branch has manifested
its clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied head-of-state immunity.'"24 The
Court stressed further that Noriega had never been the constitutional leader of
Panama; that Panama had not sought immunity for Noriega; and that under applicable
rules of American law, former heads of states did not enjoy any immunity insofar as
their private or criminal acts were concerned.125
In another important case dealing generally with the immunity of foreign
government officials accused of committing crimes against the law of nations or
crimes against humanity, the Filartiga case, the U.S.Courts, including the U.S.Court
of Appeals, declared that torture was an international crime, a crime against the law
of nations and a crime against humanity, that the courts of the United States and the
courts of all other nations do enjoy universal jurisdiction to hear cases against persons
accused of committing torture and persons accused of being implicated in one way or
another in the commission of the crime of torture and that all such persons are the
enemies of mankind. The court of Appeals declared further that persons accused of
committing or implicated in the commission of torture could not invoke the defense of
immunity nor could they claim that they were acting under the colour of their
authority.126
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The House of Lords in Great Britain has reached similar conclusions in the
Pinochet case in its final phase127 decided on 24th of March 1999. The case involved
an extradition request made by Spain to the authorities in Great Britain to extradite
Pinochet, the former head of State of Chile, who was on a visit to London, to be tried
in Spain for various crimes against humanity allegedly committed whilst he was head
of state during the period between 1973 and 1990. The Hosue of Lords allowed the
appeal but a rehearing of the appeal before a different constituted committee in the
Hosue of Lords took place and on that rehearing the House of Lords finally decided
that:
[Tjorture was an international crime against humanity and
jus cogens and after the coming into effect of the International
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 there had been a
universal jurisdiction in all the Convention State parties to either
extradite or punish a public official who committed torture; that in
the light of that universal jurisdiction the state parties could not
have intended that an immunity for ex-heads of state for official
acts of torture ....would survive their ratification of the
Convention; that ....since Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom
had all ratified the Convention by 8 December 1988 the applicant
could have no immunity for crimes of torture or conspiracy to
torture after that date;... ,128
Although extradition of Pinochet could not be effected because of a medical
expert opinion that Pinochet would not be able to stand trial proceedings because of
lack of medical fitness, the Hosue of Lords' decision is a clear affirmation of the
principle of universality. The underpinnings of this decision support the conclusion
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that heads of states who are still in power do not enjoy immunity for crimes of torture
and related crimes as the 1984 Convention against Torture, upon which the House of
Lords bases its decision, excludes any such immunity.129
Finally, it might be worthwhile to refer to the efforts of the international
community to bring Slobodan Milosevic to justice before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milosevic was until very recently the
Head of State of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when an indictment was issued
against him and four others of his very close aides, including Milan Milutinovic, the
President of Serbia, by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.
The charges against Milosevic and his aides included crimes against humanity and war
crimes.130 Efforts to have Milosevic surrendered to the custody of the Court to proceed
with his trial have finally achieved success. Milosevic was surrendered to the Custody
of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia where he made his first
appearance in the arraignment proceedings on the third of July 2001. Criminal
proceedings are expected to take several months or even years before they are finally
concluded but justice seems to be gaining the day.
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CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that the international criminal responsibility of the individual
has been firmly established in international law since the conclusion of the 1945
London Agreement embodying the Charter of Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal. The scope of this responsibility is ever increasing so as to include more
crimes and more types of responsibility as time goes by. Many crimes have been
added to the various categories of international crimes. Crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, the traditional international crimes include
certain environmental elements and factors. War crimes in particular cover a large
variety of environmental crimes. But environmental crimes are committed during or
as a result of armed conflicts as well as during peace-time situations, this latter
category may be included under crimes against humanity or general international
crimes. International environmental crimes are even becoming increasingly growing
as an independent category of international crimes covering all environmental crimes
whether committed in or because of armed conflicts or in peace-time situations.
The international criminal responsibility for environmental crimes is firmly
established and recognized under international law. All individuals are responsible
under international law for the international crimes they commit, plan or participate in
committing, or instigate their commission irrespective of the official positions of such
individuals. The official position of any individual, be it a head of a state, a head of
government, a minister, a commander-in-chief of the armed forces , or a holder of any
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other military or civilian position, does not give that individual any shield or
immunity from prosecution nor can such position be a reason for mitigating applicable
criminal punishment or punishments.
Under existing rules of international law, superiors are responsible for the
international crimes committed by any of their subordinates if such superiors planned,
ordered, instigated or participated in the commission of any such crimes. Superiors
are equally responsible under existing international law for the international crimes
committed by their subordinates if the superior "knew", "must have known", "should
have known" or "had reason to know" that any of such crimes "was planned", "was
being planned" or "was being committed" and did not take adequate and effective
measures to prevent the commission or the completion of the crime. All such rules are
applicable to all international crimes including crimes against the environment.
As we have seen, Saddam Hussein is responsible for all international crimes
he committed against Kuwait including all the crimes committed against the Kuwaiti
environment whether they were listed under "crimes against peace", "war crimes",
"crimes against humanity" or "independent international crimes". He, his aides and
subordinates are responsible for all the crimes committed against Kuwait, its
population, its territory and its environment. An international tribunal could be
established by the concerned State or by the Security Council to try Saddam Hussein,
his aides and his subordinates. But it must be noted that under the principle of
universality the courts of all nations have jurisdiction to try Saddam Hussein, his aides
and subordinates. Kuwaiti courts have jurisdiction over such crimes according to the
territoriality principle and the universality principle. Each of these principles is
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capable by itself of establishing the jurisdiction of the Kuwaiti courts over such
crimes.
It is also important to stress the importance of the most recent indictment
issued by the International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia on 27 May 1999
against the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the President of Serbia
and three other accusing them of committing and ordering the commission of crimes
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes in Kosova. It has been further declared
that an investigation of the responsibility of the president of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia for other prior serious violations of the international humanitarian law in
former territories of Yugoslavia is underway by the Prosecutor of the Court. This, as
has been declared is the first time that a head of State in power is being indicted by an
international tribunal. This could be a useful precedent to be followed with Saddam
Hussein if an international tribunal is established to try him and set in motion the
operative processes of international law.
It should also be stressed that until such a time that Saddam Hussein is caught,
arrested, and brought to trial, a trial in absentia can be held to establish his guilt and
order all measure related thereto.
It must at last be emphasized that the successful completion of fair criminal
proceedings and criminal trials of both Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, two
of the most notorious planners, instigators, and perpetrators of heinous war crimes and
crimes against humanity in modern history, and their henchmen will, if realized,
restrain all persons who hold either a de jure or a de facto authority in their countries
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and will make all such persons refrain from ever planning, instigating, committing
and/or ordering the commission of such crimes.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
1. General books on international law have not, so far, included any sizable part or
section on the international criminal responsibility of states or state crimes; they
include relatively few and short notes on the international criminal
responsibility of the individual. Specific research topics and articles on the
criminal responsibility of states or state crimes and on the individual's criminal
responsibility under international law appear to have been increasing during the
past decade or so as it will be shown in most of the coming notes.
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LAW, 4th ed. 561 et. seq. (1990); L.SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
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PUBLISHED in the Series "International Studies in Human Rights, vol. 21, p
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Criminals, 39 AJIL 257, 262 et.seq. (1945).
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1946; Full text of the Judgment presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs to Parliament by Command of His Majesty Cmd. 6964, London, 1946;
Full text of the Judgment also in 22 Proceedings in the Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 411-589; 41 AJIL 172
(1947); 20 Temp. L.Q. 167(1947).
4. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991 was established
by the U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 of 1993 which was adopted by
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5. The International Tribunal for Rwanda was established by U.N. Security
Council Resolution No. 955 which was adopted on 8 November 1994. The
Statute of International Tribunal for Rwanda was annexed to this resolution.
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urgent need for an international criminal tribunal to try membrs of the Iraqi
regime for crimes against humanity.
115. The territoriality principle is a universally well-settled and deeply rooted
principle of international law and national laws of every state in the world.
According to this principle, every state has the right and authority to prescribe
rules of law applicable to all activities within its territory and its
appurtenances, i.e., its airspace and territorial sea. Each and every state has
the right and authority to prescribe and apply within its territory rules of law
defining crimes and determining the corresponding punishment or
punishments for each crime. The territorial principle, furthermore, confers
upon the courts of every state the jurisdiction to try criminals accused of
committing any criminal act upon or within the territory of that state. Each
and every general book on environmental law includes a sizable part on
territory, territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. See, e.g. I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 2, at 300 et.seq. The Iraqi crimes including crimes against peace,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and all other international crimes as
detailed in this chapter are crimes committed upon and within the territory of
the State of Kuwait and its appurtenances. Hence, the Kuwaiti courts have
original jurisdiction to try all Iraqi criminals accused of committing all such
crimes including the Iraqi president, his aides and all his subsordinates, all
who do not enjoy any immunity under the rooted rules of international law as
detailled in this chapter.
116. The universality principle is now well-recognized as a deeply rooted principle
of international law under which the courts of each and every state in the
world have jurisdiction to try any individuals, irrespective of their
nationalities, who are accused of committing crimes against international
public order and crimes under international law. The scope of this principle is
increasingly growing day by day. Crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, other violations of the international humanitarian law,
serious violations of international human rights law, crimes against the
environment, and other international crimes are included under the principle of
universality. See generally; I BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 304-305 and
references provided therein; Henkin & Others, supra note 118, at 1049, 1082-
318
6; RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNTIED STATES (THIRD) 1986, § 404 provides:
"Universal Jurisdiction to Define and Punish Certain Offenses:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern,
such as priacy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war
crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases of
jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present."
117. See, notes 115-116, supra.
118. See chapter 6, infra.
119. Trial in absentia is accepted in almost all Arab countries and the countries
adoptingin one form or another the French Criminal law principles. The
Kuwaiti Criminal Law has indeed recognized the Validity of holding trials in
absentia. Article 11 of law No. 16 of 1960 establish the jurisdiction of the
Kuwaiti Courts in criminal matters on the basis of territoriality.
120 The most authoritative effort to confront the issue of legality of nuclear
weaponry was made by the International Court of Justice in its advisory
opinion of 1996. The majority decision expressed the strong view that a
threat or use of nuclear weapons might possibly be legal in the setting of a
state confronting an extreme threat to its own survival, but that all states have
a legal duty to pursue disarmament in good faith. S ee legality of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons (July 8, 1996), I.C.J. reports (1996), p.226; see also
Richard Falk, "Nuclear weapons, International Law and the World Court: A
Historic Encounter, " A M J. Int'l. 91(1996), 235-48. Jonathan Schell, The
Gift of Time: The case for abolishing nuclear weapons now (New York: H.
Holt & Co., 1998); Arundhati Roy, "The End of Imagination" The Nation
(Sept.28, 1998) 11-19.
121. Cour D'Appel de Paris, Chambre d'Accusation 2™e section, Arret, prononce
en Chambre du Conseil le 20 Octobre 2000.
122. This decision was taken by the French Court of Cassation on 13 March 2001,
A1 Ahram International p.l, 14 March 2001.
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123.United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Manuel Antonio Noriega,
Defendant - Appellant, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Nos.
92-4687, 96-4471, Judgment, July 7, 1997.
[http://laws. Findlaw. Com/1 lth/924687 man.html]p.4.
[hereinafter cited as Noriega Appeals' Case\
124 Id. at 5-6.
125 Jd. at 6.
126.Fi/artiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F. 2d 876 (1980) passim, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
577 F. Suppl 860 (1984), Passim.
127.Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), House of Lords, March 24, 1999, The Weekly Law
Reports 9 April, 1999, pp.(827-927).
128 Id. at 828.
129.Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment 91984), U.N. Doc.A/Res/39/46, see in particular articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7
8, & 14.
130.The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor
of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic,
Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Vlajko Stojiljkovic; Indictment, May 22, 1999 confirmed
by judge David Hunt on May 24, 1999. Press release May 27, 1999.
320
GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our study in this dissertation focused on the "International Responsibility for
Environment Damage As A result of Armed Conflicts: with Special Reference to
Kuwait". The first chapter had to deal with the general and basic rules concerning the
protection of the environment in international law. International law does include
rules establishing a firm general obligation binding upon all states to protect and harm
or damage the environment. But international law does not recognize every
environmental harm or damage as compensable environmental damage. Only
significant environmental damage is compensable. Fault-based or fault-caused
liability arising out of the violation of due diligence obligations is the generally
accepted type of state liability in international environmental matters under
international law, but strict liability is emerging to be applicable in cases of
particularly serious, dangerous, hazardous and ultra-hazardous activities. Significant
transboundary environmental damage or pollution is prohibited under international
law and any act causing significant transboundary environmental harm or pollution is
prohibited and must not be allowed to continue irrespective of the fact that such act or
activity was not originally prohibited under international law. The injured state is
entitled to full reparation which may take any one form or a number of forms but it
"must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and re-establish
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed."
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The law of international environmental responsibility relative to armed
conflict was dealt with in chapter two. We have seen that the threat to use force
and/or the actual use of force by a state or a group of states against another state or
group of states is prohibited under the U.N.Charter except in case and within the strict
requirements and confines of self-defence. International law and the law of the
Charter of the United Nations establish the international responsibility of states for
damage or injury done to any other state including environmental damage, injury or
destruction caused by unlawful use of force or coercion. There has developed a basic
norm of general international law binding upon states and requiring them not to
damage or cause damage or destruction to the environment of other states during
peace-time as well as wartime situations and situations of armed conflicts.
But it should be emphasized that although international law bars the use of
biological and chemical weapons, it does not at present proscribe the use of nuclear
weapons in extreme cases of self-defence. Uranium-plated weapons and depleted
uranium were reportedly used in recent conflicts but the effects on the environment
are not yet clear and assessments of environmental damage have not so far been
disclosed. The rules of law in this critical area is unclear and has not developed to
give adequate protection to the environment. Nuclear-weapon states which are the
most powerful in the world manipulate the process of law-making in this area and it is
not expected, therefore, that rules of law protecting the environment against the actual
use of nuclear weapons will be firmly established or developed within the near future
law in this area yields to power-politics.
The Security Council and the international responsibility of states for
environmental damage as a result of armed conflicts were dealt with in chapters three
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and four. These two chapters have to focus on the Iraqi aggression and illegal
invasion and occupation of Kuwait and all ensuing environmental impacts. The
Security Council had to deal with the situation under chapter 7 of the Charter of the
United Nation and had to condemn the Iraqi aggression, invasion and illegal
occupation of Kuwait. Adequate actions had to be taken by the Security Council
under chapter 7 of the Charter. With regard to environmental damage resulting from
the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and all military operations
relation thereto, the Security Council recognized the international responsibility of
Iraq for any such damage, loss or injury and decided to establish the U.N.
Compensation Fund and the U.N. Compensation Commission to process and verify
claims of compensation fded against Iraq for any loss, damage or injury, including
environmental damage, resulting from the Iraqi aggression, invasion and occupation
of Kuwait. A portion of the proceeds of the sale of Iraqi oil and oil products had to be
assigned for payments covering awards of compensation approved by the
U.N.Compensation Commission.
The U.N.C.C. has had to deal with millions of claims. Although it is a
political body and a subsidiary organ of the U.N.Security Council, the U.N.C.C. has
functioned as a quasi-judicial body. The U.N.C.C. and various panels of
commissioners applied Security Council resolution 687, other relevant resolutions,
U.N.C.C. Governing Council decisions, and other relevant rules of international law.
The requirements of due process and other cardinal principles of justice were
observed and upheld by various panels of commissioners. The panels have adopted
and followed investigative approaches which went beyond many adversarial systems
before the courts of law. Evaluation and admissibility of evidence have been subject
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to the discretionary powers of the panels but the panels require strict requirements in
connection therewith.
The U.N.C.C. has so far processed and verified three types of environmental
and environment related claims; the well Blowout Control Claim, The Fluid Lost
Claim and the Monitoring and Assessment Claims. The latest group of claims, the
monitoring and assessment claims were among the category "F4" claims,
environmental claims filed by states and approved by the U.N.C.C. on 21 June 2001.
It is expected that all claims including environmental claims will be finally settled and
approved by the U.N.C.C. by the end of 2003.
The authority of the Security Council to take all the actions and measures it
has taken and to establish the U.N.C.C. and all other bodies it has established was
contested by some authors and writers but now it seems that the Security Council's
authority has been firmly established within the U.N. system and in state practice.
The Security Council has to act and must act in all situations it sees necessary to act in
order to deal effectively with any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or acts of
aggression.
International crimes and the environment and the protection of the
environment through the determination of the international criminal responsibility of
individuals have been dealt with in Chapter Five. International law has been
developing to include environmental crimes among war crimes. Environmental
crimes as war crimes require the existence of a war nexus, a requirement which limits
the scope and effectiveness of recognizing certain environmental crimes as war
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crimes. It is therefore, essential that environmental crimes be included within the
category of crimes against humanity and crimes against peace and security of
mankind. Of course certain strict requirements must be required to exist. So far not a
single international court or tribunal has the power to try Saddam Hussein, his
henchmen, and his subordinates for the crimes they committed against Kuwait, the
Kuwaiti people and the environment in the area; but calls have been advancing for the
holding of an international trial for Saddam Hussein and his henchmen and
subordinates. The proceedings against Slobodan Milosevic which are now taking
place before the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia are a positive
sign that the international community has reached a mature stage of development and
that presidents and heads of states have in fact lost immunity against criminal
proceedings in respect of serious international crimes. A day will come when Saddam
Hussein faces criminal proceedings and international justice achieves victory.
But even if the international community fails to establish a competent
international tribunal having proper jurisdiction to try Saddam Hussein, national
courts of appropriate jurisdiction may witness the commencement of criminal
proceedings against him. Kuwaiti courts may entertain jurisdiction based on the
principles of territoriality and universality. But an important development which is
unfolding these days ins the reported news that a criminal action has been lodged with
the appropriate Belgian Authorities. Whether this action will ultimately lead to a
successful completion of a criminal trial and judgment against Saddam Hussein is not
at all sure, but a criminal action has been launched and proceedings are about to start.
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In addition, all treaties to which Kuwait is a party and customary international
law rules on the subject of environmental responsibility and the protection of the
environment have been incorporated into the Kuwaiti law, and have become legally
binding upon all authorities and persons in Kuwait.
The Kuwaiti courts applied relevant Islamic rules and principles, international
law, and the Kuwaiti laws to cases of environmental responsibility, but the said courts
refrained from exercising jurisdiction over actions filed to obtain compensation for
loss, damage, or injury resulting from the Iraqi invasion and illegal occupation of
Kuwait and considered that such actions would better be dealt with by the U.N.
Compensation Commission in accordance with pertinent Security Council resolutions
and other relevant rules of international law.
Our main conclusion is that the rules of international law relative to the
international responsibility for environmental damage or injury resulting from armed
conflicts are still uncertain and the threshold they establish for their application is too
high and too restrictive to the extent that most environmental losses, damage or
injuries resulting from armed conflicts are not covered by such rules. The terms
"widespread", "severe" and "long-term" as used in Protocol I to describe the
environmental damage or injury are too narrow and too restrictive to the extent that
the conditions of the applicability of Protocol I environmental provisions will almost
never be met. In addition relative international instruments, including Protocol I, do
not contain adequate procedural and structural rules relative to the effective operation
and application of environmental provisions of such instruments. The Enmod
Convention is probably the only exception as it gives every State Party to the
Convention which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach
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of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention the right to lodge a
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations; all State Parties to the
Convention are under an obligation to cooperate in carrying out any investigation
which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the U.N.
Charter. Each State Party to the Enmod Convention is under another obligation to
provide assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the U.N.Charter, to any State
Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been
harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention (Article V
of the Convention).
Our recommendation in this connection is to loosen up the requirements of the
applicability of the environmental provisions of the conventions and instruments of
the laws of armed conflicts: Thus the terms "widespread", "severe", and "long-term"
might be qualified as follows: the term "severe" might be dropped altogether or
replaced by the term "serious" ; the term "long-term" might be restricted to a number
of months or one year at the most. This of course will need the holding of a new
diplomatic conference to review Protocol I or even to prepare a whole new Protocol
on the protection of the environment in armed conflict situations.
Another important recommendation we advance is that procedural and
structural provisions and devices be included in relative instruments on the laws of
armed conflicts. A permanent institution concerned with the protection of the
environment in time of armed conflicts and handling claims of international
responsibility for damage to the environment has to be established either through the
amendment of a relevant international instrument or by the Security Council under
chapter 7 of the U.N.Charter.
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Claims of environmental damage and claims of loss, damage, or injury
resulting from the Iraqi invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait could not have been
adequately dealt with had the Security Council not acted and established the U.N.
Compensation Commission and the U.N. Compensation Fund. The Security Council
is not guaranteed to act similarly in other situations. Therefor, the establishment of
an international agency or institution as that proposed above by the present writer
with automatic authority to intervene and act might help avoid any failure to act on
the part of the Security Council in any specific situation.
The establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court upon the
completion of the required ratifications with the authority it has regarding the holding
of trials for individuals accused of committing war crimes including environmental
crimes might be one of the most important developments leading to the protection of
the environment in time of armed contlicts and established the criminal responsibility
of individuals committing crimes against the environment in time of war or armed
conflicts and other pertinent situations. This will remain to be judged after the
establishment and operation of the said Court. But we strongly support the
establishment of International Criminal Court.
Finally, we invite the Kuwaiti National Assembly and all parliaments and
legislative bodies in all countries to adopt very clear legislations empowering national
courts to try all persons accused of committing, participating in the commission or
instigating the commission of war crimes including environmental crimes, crimes
against peace and security of mankind and crimes against humanity. Jurisdiction will
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